Chronicle Of Coups In Nigeria – A Fundamental History Lesson - Part 3

Read Part 2 HERE.... Leaked [Police] Special Branch Report: "Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966" Part III By Nowamag...

Read Part 2 HERE....

Leaked [Police] Special Branch Report:

"Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966"

Part III

By Nowamagbe Omoigui, MD, MPH, FACC

This is the Police Report on the official investigation into the coup of 15 January 1966. It was prepared by Police Special Branch Interrogators based on interviews with soldiers, other ranks and some officers who had been arrested after the mutiny.

None of the soldiers and officers involved had come to formal trial in a court-martial as of the time of the July 29 1966 "counter-coup". Indeed the fact they were not court-martialed was one of the grievances listed by those officers who carried out the unfortunate operations of July 28-August 1, 1966.

The coup report was released to very few individuals in Nigeria and certain foreign governments in early August 1966 - and then leaked. The remainder of the report which allegedly implicated certain other persons has apparently never been released widely to this day. It exists, we are on its trail - and shall publish it on sight.

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KADUNA, NORTHERN REGION

121. Major C.K. Nzeogwu of the Nigerian Military Training College (NMTC) at Kaduna was appointed by the "inner circle" as the commander of the rebellion in the North. The manner in which this was to be organised appears to have been left entirely to him.

122. The record does not show that any officers, other than Major Nzeogwu, in the North were taken into the confidence of the inner circle. It is, however, probable that some time before the rebellion Major Nzeogwu obtained the co-operation of Major T. Onwatuegwu and Captain G. Ude, both of the NMTC.

123. Whereas in the West and in the Lagos area military movements by night were not unusual as a result of the disturbed conditions then prevailing, this was not the case at Kaduna. It was, therefore, necessary that a cover be provided for the proposed rebellious activities, at the same time creating a reason for bringing troops out of barracks by night without alerting the senior officers of 1 Brigade to Nzeogwu's intentions.

124. It has been established that Military night exercises in the Kaduna area, organized by the NMTC, then under the command of Major Nzeogwu commenced in early December 65, leading up to Exercise Damissa on 13 and 14 Jan. 66. By then the population of Kaduna and the Police were accustomed to troop movements after dark.

125. The master plan of the inner circle made provision for the arrest of a number of leading political personalities who were not to be killed unless they offered resistance. This may well have been true as far as the West, Mid-West and the East were concerned. In view of Major Nzeogwu's activities at the Premier's Lodge in Kaduna, however, it is thought that this officer had no intention of abiding by these decisions but was determined, from the start, to kill the Premier of the North at any cost.

PART 111- EXECUTION:

126. The details of exercise DAMISSA are not relevant to this report. Suffice it to say that the night exercise of 13 Jan 66 took place in the area of the Ministers' quarters in Kaduna, whereas that of 14 Jan 66 was held in the bush some 5 or 6 miles outside Kaduna along the Zaria road.

Units involved

l27. On 14 Jan 66 troops from the following units took part in Exercise DAMISSA:

(1) 3rd Battalion NA -"C" Company

(2) N.M.T.C.

(3) No. 1 Field Squadron NAE

(4) No.2 Field Squadron NAE

(5) 1 Brigade Transport Company NASC

(6) lst Field Battery NAA

Arms and Ammunition

128. Troops proceeding on military training exercises by night or by day were normally issued with their arms, either without ammunition or with blanks.

129. As far as can be established, this practice was first deviated from on Jan 13 66 when, at approximately 0900 hours Major Nzeogwu handed the Acting RQMS of the NMTC, Ssgt. J. Daramola, a list of live ammunition required for Exercise DAMISSA. This NCO handed the list to Cpl. E. Aiyikere, the arms storeman, with instructions to draw this ammunition from the NMTC Magazine at Kawo. This was done and the ammunition was issued in bulk at approximately 1730 hours on 14 Jan 66 by Ssgt. Daramola and CMS Oko (also of NMTC).

130. This list of ammunition issued is not available but it has, however, been established that at least 6 x 84 mm projectiles for the Carl Gustav Anti-Tank gun were issued to Sgt. Yakubu Adebiyi, an instructor in the Tactical Wing of the NMTC. These were loaded into a landrover whilst the bulk of the small Arms Ammunition drawn was loaded into a 3-Tonner driven by NA/ 18266054 Pte. Clement Agbe of 1 Bde. Transport Coy. This driver subsequently transported the ammunition to the DAMISSA exercise area.

Briefing

131. Exercise DAMISSA terminated at approximately 0130 hours on 15 Jan 66. Around that time all officers engaged in the exercise with the exception of the officers of 1st Field Battery NAA, were called by Major Nzeogwu to attend an "O" Group in the bush at which, they believed, the success or otherwise of the exercise was to be discussed. Identified as present at this discussion are the following:

(1) Major C.K. Nzeogwu )NMTC

(2) Major T. Onwatuegwu )NMTC

(3) Captain G. Ude ) NMTC

(4) 2/Lt. S. R. Omeruah )3rd Bn NA - "C" Coy

(5) 2/Lt. D.K. Waribor )

(6) Capt. B. Gbulie )at the time in command of lst and 2nd Field Squadron NAE

(7) 2/Lt. Ileabachi )

(8) 2/Lt. Kpera ) lst Field Sqn NAE

(9) 2/Lt. P. Ogoegbunam Ibik )

(10) Lieut. E. Okafor )

(11) 2/Lt. Ezedima ) 2nd Field Sqn NAE

(12) 2/Lt. H.O.D. EGHAGHA )

132. The officers of 1st Field Battery NAA were not called to the "O" Group for reasons which are not altogether clear. No direct use in connection with the rebellion was made of this Battery that night.

133. When all the officers were assembled, Major Nzeogwu addressed then on the subject of the rapidly deteriorating political and security situation in the Federation. He claimed that a stage had been reached at which the politicians should be told to quit. To accomplish this, he announced, the army had decided to take over power by force of arms.

He compared the incomes of the politicians with those of Nigerian workers and urged the officers to support the rebellion. He further announced that the revolt was taking place simultaneously in all regional capitals and at Lagos and that, therefore, they need fear no repercussions as a result of the activities in which they were about to participate that night. It would appear that none of these present raised a dissenting voice. In fact, their subsequent actions showed, in most cases, enthusiastic support for the plan.

134. Major Nzeogwu then proceeded to issue set tasks to each officer present. Events have shown that, subsequently, last minute changes in these plans were made. The tasks allotted have been established as follows:

Occupation of Vulnerable Points

135. The officer in over-all charge of this part of the operation was Capt. B. Gbulie. He claimed to have distributed tasks as shown below on the spur of the moment:

(1) Ammunition Service Depot (ASD) -2/Lt. Ileabachi

(2) P & T Telephone Exchange -2/Lt. P. Ogoegbunam Ibik

(3) N.B.C. House -2/Lt. Kpera

(4) BCNN Radio & TV Station -2/Lt. Ezedima

(5) State House -2/Lt. Okafor

(6) Road Blocks on Kachia Road near PMF Barracks -2/Lt. Eghagha

136. In addition, Capt. Gbulie was instructed to rouse the following officers to inform them of what was taking place and to ask for support:

(1) Capt. P. Anakwe - 1 Bde Staff Capt. "A"

(2) Major A.A. Keshi - Brigade Major

(3) Capt. L. Dillibe - 1 Bde Staff Capt. "Q"

(4) Lieut. J.C. Ojukwu - 1 Recce Squadron NA

(5) Lieut. Ikeachor

(6} Lieut. Mohammed Eandiya

Capt. Gbulie has stated under interrogation that he complied with this order and caused these officers to foregather at HQ 1 Bde where he informed them of the situation.

137. As far as has been established, the following officers were then detailed for tasks as shown:

(1) Assassination of Alh Sir Ahmadu Bello

Major C.K. Nzeogwu

2/Lt. K.D. Waribor

2/Lt. S.E. Omeruah

Capt. G. Ude

(2) Assassination of Brigadier S. Ademulegun

Major T. Onwatuegwu

(3) Assassination of Colonel R.A. Shodeinde

2/Lt. K.D. Waribor

(4) Abduction of Sir Kashim Ibrahim

Major T. Onwatuegwu

(5) Abduction of Makaman Bida - Regional Finance Minister

Major C.K. Nzeogwu

138. After the officers had been briefed they were sent to join their men and to proceed immediately with the execution of the tasks allotted to them. It is not clear whether or not Major Nzeogwu instructed the officers to inform their men of what was afoot. It is certain that the men of 3rd Battalion who were to be used for the attack of the Premier's Lodge were not briefed. It is equally certain that Capt. Gbulie addressed all the men of the Engineers under his command and spoke to them along the lines in which Major Nzeogwu had briefed the officers.

139. Immediately after the "O" Group, senior NCOs of all units represented were sent to the 3~Tonner containing the ammunition and order to draw ammunition for their men. In the case of the "C" company this raised a problem. The men believed the exercise to be finished and a number of them queried the reason why they should be issued with live ammunition. This was explained to them by 2/Lt. Waribor who told them that they were proceeding on Internal Security Operations.

140. After the issue of ammunition had been completed, the entire force left the exercise area and proceeded to its allotted targets.

141. The following officers and ORs have been identified as having been involved in the attack on the Premier's Lodge:

Officers

(1) Major C .K. Nzeogwu - NMTC

(2) 2/Lt. K.D. Waribor - "C" Coy, 3rd BN NA

(3) 2/Lt. S.E. Omeruah - "

(4) Capt. G. Ude

Other ranks

(1) NA 18147406 Sgt. Husa Kanga - NMTC

(2) NA l8149900 Sgt Yakubu Adebiyi - NMTC

(3) Sgt Duromola Oyegoke . NMTC

(4) NA 5888 Pte. Ogbole Agwu - 3rd Bn NA

(5) NA 2405 Pte Bello Mbulla - 3rd Bn NA

(6) NA 18151763 L/Cpl . Samuel Amajo - 3rd Bn NA

(7) NA 18151319 L/Cpl Danyo Mbulla - 3rd Bn NA

(8) NA 5684 Pte. Abu Odiedier - 3rd Bn NA

(9) NA 18148998 Pte Lekoja Gidan-Jibrin - 3rd Bn NA

(10) NA 163287 Cp1. Bako Lamundo - 3rd Bn NA

(11) NA 5860 Pte. Joseph Wadu Goji -3rd Bn NA

(12) NA 1982 Pte. Alexander Agbe - 3rd Bn NA

(13) NA 18151864 Pte Lagwin Goshit - 3rd Bn NA

(14) NA 18266006 Pte Augustine Oguche Agbo - 3rd Bn NA

(15) NA 634212 Pte Effiong Atkinson - 3rd Bn NA

(16) NA 18147284 Cpl. Tunana Bangir - 3rd Bn NA

(17) NA 18l49368 Cpl. Abibo Elf - 3rd Bn NA

(18) NA 18151873 Pte. Uguman Monogi - 3rd Bn NA

(19) NA 1562 Pte Felako Kwa - 3rd Bn NA

(20) NA 18149363 Cpl. Reuben Nwagwugwu - 3rd Bn NA

(20) NA 502542 Cpl. Yakubu Kaje - 3rd Bn NA

(21) NA 505092 L/Cpl. Mamis Hundu - 3rd Bn NA

(22) NA 18151861 L/Cpl Thaddens Thamyil Tsenyi1 - 3rd Bn NA

(23) NA l8148269 L/Cpl Issna1m Tayapa - 3rd Bn NA

(24) NA 18148272 L/Cpl Ali Shendam - 3rd Bn NA

(25) NA 18151771 Pte. Usuman Gabure - 3rd Bn NA

(26) NA 18149613 Pte Emmanue1 Ekwueme - 3rd Bn NA

(27) NA 4887 Pte Erastus Nakito - 3rd Bn NA

(29) NA 3659 Pte Jonathan Anahiri - 3rd Bn NA

142. When this force left the DAMISSA exercise area, it was led by Major Nzeogwu who was travelling in a landrover accompanied by a driver and two OR's. He was followed by another landrover containing Sgts. Adebiyi, Manga and Oyegoke who were armed with two 84mm Carl Gustav Anti-Tank Guns and 6 projectiles.

143. Following this were a number of other vehicles, landrovers and 3-Tonner containing 2/Lts. Waribor and Omeruah and troops from "C" Coy 3rd BN NA.

144. On arrival at the main gate to the compound, Major Nzeogwu found 4 PCs on guard in front of the gate. They were the following:

(1) No.8301 L/Cpl. Musa Nimzo

(2) No. 10674 PC. Akpan Anduka

(3) No. 18913 PC Hagai Lai

(4) No. 18920 PC Peter Attah

145. Major Nzeogwu, who was armed with a sterling SMG, ordered the constables to face the wall. Attah complied with this order but the three others refused. Without further ado, Major Nzeogwu immediately opened fire on them with his SMG killing all three on the spot.

146. Immediately after the killing of the policemen, Major Nzeogwu ordered the two men with the guns and the 3 NMTC Sergeants to follow him into the compound, bringing with them the Carl Gustav guns and the projectiles for these weapons.

147. Immediately inside the compound, Major Nzeogwu stationed the Carl Gustavs some 10 yards apart facing the lodge. The gunners were Sgts. Oyegeke and Manga, whilst Sgt. Adebiyi acted as ammunition number. As soon as both guns had been loaded, Major Nzeogwu ordered the NCOs to open fire at the Lodge. Both fired their projectiles bursting inside the ground floor rooms of the building. Sgt. Adebiyi stated that he then ran towards Sgt. Manga to help this NCO reload.

Whilst he was with Manga he heard Major Nzeogwu shouting repeatedly "Fire you bastard, fire". Immediately after this both Manga and Adebiyi heard a burst of SMG fire. They turned round and observed Sgt. Oyegoke slumped on the ground bleeding from multiple wounds. It was clear to both that their colleague had been killed by Major Nzeogwu either for refusing to obey or because he attempted to run away.

143. After the killing of Oyegeke, Major Nzeogwu ordered Sgt. Adebiyi to take over Oyegeke's gun and to continue firing at the house. Both Adebiyi and Manga, frightened by Oyegoke's killing, continued to fire as ordered. They used a total of 5 projectiles. As a result the building caught fire.

149. Whilst all this was happening, 2/Lst. Waribor and Omeruah had arrived with the men from 3rd BN who were rapidly deployed around the outer perimeter wall of the lodge. Although these men heard the bursting of the Carl Gustav projectiles, the SMG and SLR fire and the screaming of women and children inside the compound, they were in no position to observe what was happening.

150. 2/Lt. Waribor, whilst deploying his men, instructed them to shoot anyone they observed attempting to leave the compound. A number of civilians, including women, however, were seen running and crying and Major Nzeogwu firing at them with his SMG.

151. NA 502342 Cpl. Yakubu Kaje of 3rd BN NA reports that, at a given moment, he observed a civilian coming out of the Lodge armed with a sword. The corporal and the men with him stopped the civilian and ordered him to drop the sword. At this moment, according to the corporal, Major Nzeogwu arrived on the scene and asked the civilian, in Hausa, for the whereabouts of the "master of the house". The man replied that he did not know, whereupon Major Nzeogwu threatened to kill him unless he led him to his master. The man then agreed and led Major Nzeogwu to the back of the building. A shortwhile afterwards, the corporal states, he heard a number of shots fired. Assuming that Kaje is telling the truth, it is probable that the Sardauna of Sokoto died at that moment.

152. Cpl. Kaje has further reported that when the firing ceased, Major Nzeogwu came from the compound and was met at the gate by 2/Lt. Waribor, who asked the Major: "Did you get the man?", to which Nzeogwu answered, "Yes". When Major Nzeogwu left the compound he stated for all to hear, exultantly, "I have been successful, he is dead".

153. It has not been possible to establish the circumstances in which the senior wife of the deceased Premier was killed. The same applies to the death of one Zaruni, the Premier's personal body-guard. It is presumed that they died at the same time as the Premier.

154. With regards to the killing of Ahmed Ben Musa, Senior Assistant Secretary (Security) in front of the Lodge, none of the men interrogated has admitted to having witnessed this. Ahmed Ben Musa was shot dead in his car by a number of unidentified soldiers, having arrived at the Premier's Lodge after being alerted by the police. Presumably the soldiers had ordered Musa to drive away but he could not do so for some unexplained reason. They then killed him.

ASSASSINATION OF BRIGADIER S. ADEMULEGUN

155. The following have been identified as having been involved in the killing of this senior officer and his wife at No.1, Kashim Ibrahim Road, Kaduna at approximately 0200 hours on 15 January 1966:-

(1) Major Timothy Onwatuegwu (NMTC)

(2) NA 18265005 Spr. Yakubu Dungo 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(3) NA 18266079 L/Cpl . Lawrence Akuma 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(4) Spr. Raphael O1atunde 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(5) James Aluta 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(6) Emmanuel Udo 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(7) Simon Agi 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(8) Felix 0. {Snu) 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE {now NMTC)

(9) L/Cpl . Mu1i {Snu) 2 Fd. Sgn. NAE {now NMTC)

(10) NMT Cp1. Yakubu Bako 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(11) Spr. Mathew Asanya 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(12) Joseph Odion 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(13) Spr. Henry Va1ia 1 Fd. Sgn. NAE

(14) NA 18149929 Pte. Geofrey Eborendu 1 Bde. Tpt Coy NASC

156. After the briefing at the DAMISSA "O" Group by Major Nzeogwu at 0130 hours l5 Jan 66, Major Onwatuegwu entered a landrover driven by No. NA 18149929 Pte. G. Eberandu of Bde. Tpt. Coy. With the exception of L/Cpl. Lawrence Akuma all the men mentioned were made to enter this vehicle and another landrover.

157. Before leaving the exercise area these men drew ammunition from the 3-Tonner already referred to in this report. They had already been briefed as what was expected from them that night by Capt. Gbulie, the OC. The two vehicles then moved off to the junction of the Lagos Zaria roads where they stopped. Here the men from one of the landrovers were transferred to a 3-Tonner whilst the empty landrover containing only the driver and L/Cpl. Muli was despatched to the Air Force Base by Major Onwatuegwu.

158. When L/Cpl. Muli returned, the convoy, now consisting of 2 landrovers and one 3-Tonner, proceeded to the residence of Brigadier Ademulegun. At some distance from the house, variously estimated at between 100 and 400 yards, all three vehicles stopped. Major Onwatuegwu ordered a section of men under L/Cpl. Muli to accompany him towards the house.

159. The Brigadier's house was guarded by L/Cpl. Lawrence Akuma and three sappers of 2 Field Squadron NAE. When the Major and his party arrived, L/Cpl. Akuma and the two sappers were on the verandah of the house whilst one sapper was patrolling the grounds. The latter challenged Major Onwatuegwu when he approached. He was disarmed and escorted to the house where he was made to join the guard commander and the other two members of the guard. They were all placed in the custody of a number of soldiers.

160. Major Onwatuegwu, accompanied by a number of soldiers entered the house. A short while after this, the guard heard several shots fired upstairs after which the Major and his men returned. The guard were placed into the 3-Tonner truck and driven to HQ 1 Brigade where they remained until released in the morning.

ASSASSINATION OF COLONEL R.A. SHODEINDE

161. The only persons positively identified as having been involved in the murder of this senior officer are the following:-

(l) Major C.K. Nzeogwu - NMTC

(2) Major T. Onwatuegwu - NMTC

(3) Lieut. G.E. Nwokedi - NMTC

162. It will be recalled that at the briefing by Major Nzeogwu, it was 2/Lt. Waribor who was allotted the task of killing the Colonel, after the attack on the Premier's Lodge 2/Lt. Waribor has stated that after the completion of his task at the Premier's Lodge, he was ordered by Major Nzeogwu to effect the arrest of Makaman Bida before proceeding to Col. Shodeinde's residence. He was unable to do so, because he did not know the address of the Colonel, and therefore, returned to Brigade Headquarters.

163. Mrs. Shodeinde has stated that at approximately 0300 hours on Jan 15. 66 she heard the sound of three vehicles stopping in front of her house. Immediately afterwards she heard a voice which she identified as that of Major Nzeogwu, calling her husband's name. The Colonel was fast asleep. She left her bed and switched on the lights. As she did so, the men outside started to shoot at the doors and windows of the house and she was immediately wounded in the left hand. The door then flew open and about ten soldiers rushed into the room. Amongst these she identified Major Nzeogwu, Major Onwatuegwu and Lieut. Nwokedi.

164. By this time the Colonel was awake and sitting up in bed. Mrs. Shodeinde started to cry and beg for her life. Nzeogwu assured her that they had not come to kill her but her husband the Colonel. When she continued shouting, the other soldiers shot at her legs, wounding her several times.

165. Major Nzeogwu and the others then commenced firing at the Colonel whilst still in bed, who fell down dead or dying by the side of the bed. Mrs. Shodeinde then fled from the room and ran for shelter to the servant's quarters where she remained until the attackers left.

ABDUCTION OF SIR KASHIM IBRAHIM -

GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN NIGERIA

166. This abduction was accomplished by the persons involved in the assassination of Brigadier S. Ademulegun. Their names are, therefore, not repeated here.

167. After killing the Brigadier, Major Onwatuegwu ordered his men to re-enter their vehicles and drove straight to the Governor's residence. On arrival a number of men were deployed around the house whilst the Major entered accompanied by a number of unidentified soldiers.

168. The house was then being guarded by the following police constables:-

(1) No.11258 PC Benson Sihindatiya

(2) No.185 " Yohana Garkawa

(3) No.1391 " Johnson Lamurde

(4) No.18909 " Warzar

169. At approximately 0245 hours Major Onwatuegwu and his party reached the residence, according to PC Lamurde. The Major was then in the landrover. The first landrover containing some 7 men stopped. The man jumped out and overpowered the PC on duty. The Major then entered the building.

170. Whilst the Major and his party were inside, the military personnel who remained outside the building heard a burst of SMG fire. It is certain that this burst of SMG fire killed PC Yohana Garkawa. PC Sihindatiya was disarmed by 4 soldiers and dragged to the police guard room where he saw the dead body of PC Garkawa. The soldiers pointed at the body and said "Do you see your brother?". They then instructed him to lead them to the bedroom of the Governor. When he stated that he did not know where the Governor was sleeping they threatened to kill him. By that time, however, the Governor had been found by other soldiers reaching the residence. He was brought out and made to enter the 3-Tonner and was driven to HQ 1 Brigade.

171. Simultaneously with the Governor, his two ADC's Messrs. Noman Dikwa and Garba Lango, were abducted and driven to 1 Bde HQ in the landrover containing Major Onwatuegwu.

ABDUCTION OF MAKAMAN BIDA -

NORTH REGIONAL FINANCE MINISTER

172. This attempted abduction (or assassination) failed because the Minister was not in his house that night, having traveled to Bida, his home town, the previous day. The incident is, however, worth reporting, because during the search of the Minister's residence one man, Ahmadu Pategi, a Government driver, was killed by Lieut. Waribor who mistook him for the Minister.

173. Among those taking an active part in this incident the following have been identified:-

(1) 2/Lt. Waribor - NMTC (other names are illegible)

174. After the completion of the operation at the Premier's Lodge, 2/Lt. Waribor met Major Nzeogwu near the main entrance to the Lodqe. The Major had been wounded during the attack and had bloodstains on the right side of his face and his shirt. The Major ordered Waribor to take his platoon to the house of Makaman Bida, to arrest the Minister and to take him to Brigade Headquarters.

175. Waribor complied with the order, and drove straight to the Minister's house. On arrival he deployed his men around the house and called in a loud voice upon the Minister to surrender. This brought no reaction so he forced open the door with the intention of searching the house. At this moment Major Nzeogwu arrived. The Major ordered Waribor to search the ground floor whilst he, accompanied by a number of men from 3rd Brigade NA went upstairs.

176. Waribor's search downstairs proved fruitless. He collected about 3 house servants and questioned them as to the whereabouts of their master. They claimed that the Minister had traveled to Bida and was returning in the morning. Whilst he was questioning the servants outside the house, Waribor observed a man running from the house with his face covered.

Believing this to be the Minister, Waribor fired at the man and killed him. He then went to the body, and after removing the cloth from the man's face, found that he was mistaken. It was later established that the body was that of Ahmadu Pategi, a Government driver attached to the Minister.

177. Major Nzeogwu, having failed to find the Minister upstairs then came down and enquired from Waribor why he had fired his SMG. Waribor explained after which Nzeogwu ordered him to accompany him to the house of Colonel Shodeinde, who according to the plan was to be killed that night. The Major then drove off before Waribor had a chance to assemble his men and to mount into the vehicles. Since Waribor did not know Col. Shodeinde's address and the Major had departed without him, he had no choice but to return to Brigade Headquarters.

OCCUPATION OF OTHER VULNERABLE POINTS

178. This was carried out by the officers named in paragraph 135 of this report without producing any incident of interest to this enquiry. 2/Lt. H.O.D. Eghagha whose task it was to set up a road block on the Kachia Road near the Police Mobile Force Barracks was instructed to prevent the PMF from travelling into Kaduna. This, it is thought, implied that he and his men were to attack the PMF should they move out in strength. It has been established, however, that 2/Lt.

Eghagha instructed his men not to molest the PMF as these were too few in number to affect materially the rebellious operations of that night. It is a fact that the majority of the Northern PMF were, at that time, serving in Western Nigeria.

THE NIGERIAN AIR FORCE

179. Although not directly involved in any of the incidents reported on in this document, there is no doubt that the Nigerian Air Force played a comparatively important role in the rebellion under the command of 2/Lt. Godfrey Ikechukwu Amuchienwa of the Military Training and Security Squadron NAF at Kaduna.

NOTE: At this point the (incomplete) report ends.

__________________

SPELLINGS: Please excuse some of the spelling errors. The original documents from which these were culled had a few areas that were not very legible

OPERATION ‘AURE’:

Northern Nigerian Military Counter-Rebellion

July, 1966

By Nowa Omoigui, MD

Nowa_o@yahoo.com

________________________________________

Source:

Subject: Re: A page Listing Dr. Nowa Omoigui's Accounts of Various Military Coups in Nigeria

Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2002 17:57:20 -0700 (PDT)

From: Nowa Omoigui
To: Urhobo Historical Society
________________________________________
BACKGROUND
In the early hours of January 15, 1966, citing a laundry list of complaints against the political class, there was a military rebellion in Nigeria against the first republic [http://www.dawodu.com/nzeogwu2.htm].Led by a group of Majors who were predominantly of eastern origin, the Prime Minister, a federal minister, two regional premiers, along with top Army officers were brutally assassinated.A number of civilians were also killed.[http://www.gamji.com/NEWS1103.htm]

The coup succeeded in Kaduna, the northern region capital, failed in Lagos, the federal capital, and in Ibadan, the western regional capital, but barely took place in Benin the midwestern capital, and Enugu the eastern capital. 

The majority of those murdered were northerners, accompanied by some westerners and two Midwesterners.No easterner lost his or her life.On January 16, rather than approve the appointment of Zanna Bukar Dipcharima, a politician of northern origin, as acting Prime Minister, the acting President, Nwafor Orizu, himself of eastern origin, handed over power to Major-General JTU Aguiyi-Ironsi, the GOC of the Nigerian Army, also of eastern origin. This was allegedly at the behest of the rump cabinet, allegedly to enable Ironsi put down the revolt which, as of then, had already failed in southern Nigeria.Until it became apparent recently in separate testimony by Alhaji Shehu Shagari and Chief Richard Akinjide, it had always been publicly assumed in the lay Press that the hand-over was voluntary although unconstitutional - since no such provision existed in the Nigerian constitution.However, it does seem that as far back as 1969, Martin Dent pointed out the involuntary nature of the so-called hand-over in an academic paper, based on an interview with Alhaji Shettima Ali Monguno.
In July 2000, at a public book launching ceremony in Nigeria, Chief Richard Akinjide stated:

“Talking on the first coup, when Balewa got missing,
we knew Okotie-Eboh had been held, we knew Akintola
had been killed. We, the members of the Balewa cabinet
started meeting. But how can you have a cabinet
meeting without the Prime Minister acting or Prime
Minister presiding. So, unanimously, we nominated
acting Prime Minister amongst us. Then we continued
holding our meetings. Then we got a message that we
should all assemble at the Cabinet office. All the
Ministers were requested by the G.O.C. of the Nigerian
Army, General Ironsi to assemble. What was amazing at
that time was that Ironsi was going all over Lagos
unarmed. We assembled there. Having nominated ZANA
Diphcharima as our acting Prime Minister in the
absence of the Prime Minister, whose whereabout we
didn't know, we approached the acting President,
Nwafor Orizu to swear him in because he cannot
legitimately act as the Prime Minister except he is
sworn- in. Nwafor Orizu refused. He said he needed to
contact Zik who was then in West Indies.

Under the law, that is, the Interpretation Act, as
acting President, Nwazor Orizu had all the powers of
the President. The GOC said he wanted to see all the
cabinet ministers. And so we assembled at the cabinet
office. Well, I have read in many books saying that we
handed over to the military. We did not hand-over.
Ironsi told us that "you either hand over as gentlemen
or you hand-over by force". Those were his words. Is
that voluntary hand-over? So we did not hand-over. We
wanted an Acting Prime Minister to be in place but
Ironsi forced us, and I use the word force advisedly,
to handover to him. He was controlling the soldiers.
The acting President, Nwafor Orizu, who did not
cooperate with us, cooperated with the GOC. Dr. Orizu
and the GOC prepared speeches which Nwafor Orizu
broadcast handing over the government of the country
to the army. I here state again categorically as a
member of that cabinet that we did not hand-over
voluntarily. It was a coup. “
Corroborating Akinjide’s account, according to Shehu Shagari, in his Book “Beckoned to Serve”,
“…....….At about 7.00 am, I returned to Dipcharima’s residence to meet with some NPC ministers who had gathered there. Dipcharima was then the most senior NPC minister available. We received the latest reports on the situation, first from Alhaji Maitama Sule, Minister of Mines and Power, who had visited the PM’s residence by bicycle! We then heard from Alhaji Ibrahim Tako Galadima, the acting Minister of Defence, who had brought along with him Chief Fani-Kayode. 

Chief Fani-Kayode said he had been fetched from Ibadan early that morning by rebels and locked up at the Federal Guard Officers Mess in Dodan Barracks, where the mutineers initially made their headquarters. Disguised in army uniform, loyal troops handed him over to Alhaji Galadima, who had called in at the barracks, which was a stone’s throw of his residence…………….The acting Minister of Defence assured us that Major-General Ironsi was doing his best to arrest the situation.
Maitama Sule and I were separately detailed to ex

However, we decided to recognize Dipcharima, a Kanuri from Bornu, as our interim leader; and to ask the acting President, Dr. Orizu (President Azikiwe was away on leave), to appoint Dipcharima acting Prime Minister. We also summoned Major General Ironsi and gave him full authority to use every force at his disposal to suppress the rebellion. He moved his headquarters temporarily to the police headquarters at moloney street to facilitate easy communication with army units in the regions.
While at Dipcharima’s residence, we contacted the British High Commission and requested for military assistance in the event that our loyal troops should require any. The response was positive, but the British insisted that the request must be written by the PM; or, in his absence, by a properly appointed deputy. We, therefore, drove to the residence of Dr. Orizu, and requested him to appoint Dipcharima acting prime minister. Dr. Orizu requested to see our NCNC colleagues to confirm whether they supported our proposition, and they joined us soon afterwards. They had apparently been caucusing at Dr. Mbadiwe’s residence. He (Mbadiwe) was their choice of acting Prime Minister. This was naturally unacceptable to us since the NPC was the major governing party. 

While we were at Orizu’s residence, Major-General Ironsi, who had seemingly secured Lagos, came in with some armed escorts. He requested for a tete-a-tete with Orizu. The two had a 40 minutes discussion in another room, while we waited anxiously in the sitting room, with the armed soldiers standing and staring at us. When Major-General Ironsi finally emerged, he talked to Dipcharima sotto voce; and then drove off with his troops. Dr. Orizu then joined us, regretted his inability in the circumstances to oblige our request. He suggested we all return to our homes and wait until we were required. All efforts to get any clarification failed, and we left in utter desperation.
I was about to break the Ramadan fast on Sunday 16th January, when all ministers were asked to report to the Cabinet Office at 6.30 pm. The whole premises was surrounded by soldiers in battle order that some of us initially hesitated to enter. In the Cabinet chamber were Major General Ironsi, Bukar Dipcharima and Ibrahim Tako Galadima. There were no officials present. 

Major General Ironsi admitted to us that he had been unable to suppress the rebellion, which he said was getting out of hand. He stated that the mutineers were in control of Kaduna, Kano and Ibadan, and had killed two regional premiers, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Chief Akintola. They had also murdered a number of his best officers, including Brigadiers Maimalari and Samuel Adesujo Ademulegun, the Commander 1st Brigade Headquarters in Kaduna. Ironsi was full of emotion and even shed some tears. When we asked him about the whereabouts of Sir ABubakar and Chief Okotie-Eboh, he said he still did not know but averred efforts were being made to locate them. At this stage Mbadiwe broke down and kept crying: “Please where is the Prime Minister?” 

When we reminded Major-General Ironsi if he needed to avail himself of the British pledge of assistance, he replied it was too late as the army was pressing him to assume power. Indeed, he confessed his personal reluctance to take over because of his ignorance of government; but insisted the boys were adamant and anxiously waiting outside. He advised it would be in our interest, and that of the country, to temporarily cede power to him to avert disaster. Accordingly, we acceded to his request since we had no better alternative. Ironsi then insisted that the understanding be written.
Surprisingly, there was no stationery to write the agreement; and all the offices were locked while no official was around. Alhaji AGF Abdulrazaq the Minister of State for the Railways (former NPC legal adviser), managed to secure a scrap paper on which he drafted a statement, which we endorsed. That was the so called voluntary hand-over of power by the Balewa Government to Major General Ironsi! It was agreed that the statement would be typed and Dipcharima would sign it on our behalf. We were then advised to return home and await further instructions. I only got to break my Ramadan fast around 9:30 pm. 

Later at 11.50 pm, Dr. Orizu made a terse nationwide broadcast, announcing the cabinet’s voluntary decision to transfer power to the armed forces. Major General Ironsi then made his own broadcast, accepting the “invitation”. He suspended certain parts of the constitution; set up a national military government, with the office of military governors in each region; and briefly outlined the policy intentions of his regime. Nigeria’s first democratic experiment was effectively over. And although the mutiny had by then practically collapsed, military rule had arrived. It was a fact. 

The following morning, 17 January, Alhaji Kam Salem, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police (then also doubling for the Inspector-General, Mr. Louis Orok Edet, while on vacation), called at my residence to confide that both the PM and Chief Okotie-Eboh had been confirmed killed. He then hinted that Major General Ironsi was still negotiating with the rebels in Kaduna, led by Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu”
Then Lt. Col. (later General) Gowon, who was not physically present when the rump cabinet was handing over, says he was later told by Ironsi and other officers (who were outside the cabinet office chambers, and thus did not themselves witness the event)that it was voluntary.He recalls asking three separate times to be certain, but now says that had he known it was not, he would have acted differently on that day as the Commander of the 2nd Battalion at Ikeja which supported Ironsi in putting down the Ifeajuna-Nzeogwu revolt. 

The substantive President, Nnamdi Azikiwe, also of eastern origin, had left the country in late 1965 first for Europe, then on a health cruise to the caribbean, after allegedly being tipped off by his cousin, Major Ifeajuna, one of the masterminds of the coup and, some say, overall leader.Interestingly, (assuming reports that he had foreknowledge are true) Azikiwe did not notify his alliance partner, the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, with whom he had clashed over control of the armed forces during the Constitutional crisis of January 1965, following the controversial December 1964 federal elections.[http://www.gamji.com/nowa11.htm] 

In fact President Azikiwe’s personal physician, Dr. Humphrey Idemudia Idehen, abandoned him abroad when he got tired of the “health trip”, having run out of his personal estacode allowance, unaware that there may have been a good reason why Azikiwe did not want to return to Nigeria, after their original planned return date in December 1965 passed.Not even the Commonwealth Leaders’ Conference hosted for the first time by the country in early January was incentive enough for the President to return, for obvious reasons of protocol.However, after the coup, in a statement to the Press in England on January 16, among other things, Azikiwe did not condemn the coup per se, but said: 

“Violence has never been an instrument used by us, as founding fathers of the Nigerian Republic, to solve political problems. ….I consider it most unfortunate that our 'Young Turks' decided to introduce the element of violent revolution into Nigerian politics. No matter how they and our general public might have been provoked by obstinate and perhaps grasping politicians, it is an unwise policy……..As far as I am concerned, I regard the killings of our political and military leaders as a national calamity….”
Major Ifeajuna was later to be accused by Major Patrick Nzeogwu, leader of northern operations, of bungling or ignoring an apparent understanding to assassinate General Ironsi in Lagos - an oversight, or “misguided consideration” (to use Nzeogwu’s words)that caused the failure of the coup.Indeed, Nzeogwu bluntly declared publicly that the execution of the coup in the South was tribalistic.Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi (rtd), leader of operations in the Western region, has since corroborated the view that operations in Lagos were compromised by nepotism.For this and other reasons, over the years, some analysts have come to view Nzeogwu, who was recruited two full months after the plot was already in progress, as a tool in a plot he never fully understood.Indeed, in offering condolences for the death of the Sardauna of Sokoto, ex-Senate President Nwafor Orizu told Alhaji Shehu Shagari that Major Nzeogwu was “an unknown entity among the Ibos (sic) in the Eastern region.”
Those who have defended the January mutiny as being motivated by nationalistic, rather than tribal instincts, say Ironsi escaped because he had gone for a party on a Boat along the Marina that night and was not at home when mutineers allegedly came calling. Tenuous explanations exist for why the Igbo speaking Premiers of the Midwest and Eastern regions were spared and no Igbo commanding or staff officer was specifically targetted. January apologists also say that there were a few non-Igbo officers involved (although none were entrusted with key targets and most were brought in at the last minute). It is argued that the mainly Igbo speaking plotters intended to release Chief Obafemi Awolowo (a westerner) from jail in Calabar to make him leader. Others interpret the same information, combined with the highly specific pattern of killings, to mean that the coup was carried out by officers sympathetic to the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), although hijacked by the GOC of the Nigerian Army, possibly encouraged by Senate President Nwafor Orizu, and urged on by officers like Lt. Col. Victor Banjo, Lt-Col. Francis Fajuyi, Lt. Col. H. Njoku, Lt. Col. C. O. Ojukwu and Major Patrick Anwunah.
On January 17,Major General Ironsi established the Supreme Military Council in Lagos and announced Decree No. 1, effectively suspending the constitution, although it was not formally promulgated until March.Later that day MajorPCK Nzeogwu, the leader of the revolt in the northern region negotiated a conditional surrender in which Ironsi agreed not to bring the mutineers to military trial.The next day, military governors were appointed for each of the four regions (Major Hassan Katsina – North, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Ojukwu – East, Lt. Col. Adekunle Fajuyi – West, and Lt. Col. David Ejoor, Midwest).
Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo was briefly summoned back from the Imperial Defence College where he was undergoing a course.Brigadier Babatunde Ogundipe, erstwhile Chief of Staff, Nigerian Defence Forces, was made Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters.Lt. Col. Yakubu Chinwa Gowon, the most senior surviving northern officer, who was in the process of assuming command of the 2nd Battalion at Ikeja on January 14/15, a unit which proved critical to restoration of order in Lagos, was made Chief of Staff (Army).
Other early military appointments include:
Chief of Staff (NAF),Lt. Col.George Kurubo (East, non-Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 2 Bde, Lt. Col. H. Njoku (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 2 Bn, Major H. Igboba (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Abeokuta Garrison, Major G. Okonweze (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 4 Bn, Major Nzefili (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Federal Guards, Major Ochei (Midwest, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 1 Bn, Major D. Ogunewe (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 1 Bde, Lt. ColW. Bassey (East, non-Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 3 Bn, Major Okoro (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, Depot, Major F. Akagha (East, Igbo)
Commanding Officer, 5 Bn,Major M. Shuwa (North) 

It is said that there was initial euphoria by the public, even in the far north, against old ministers.However, there were some early problems too, which, to discerning eyes, were pregnant with foreboding.In his book “Years of Challenge”, Brigadier Samuel Ogbemudia (rtd) recalls:
“Before January 15, 1966, I had thought that the Nigerian soldier was not blood thirsty, thus ruling out the possibility of a bloody coup. Events proved me wrong and forced me to change my opinion about the Nigerian soldier.Although the ordinary man on the street welcomed the change of government, rejoiced and danced away in ecstatic jubilation, the atmosphere was muggy.” 

For example, in the West, AG/UPGA supporters settled scores against supporters of former Premier Akintola’s NNDP, creating a major crisis which evolved into an international refugee problem.It is said that 2000 refugees fled across the border to neighbouring Dahomey before the border was closed from January 16-26.No less than a thousand people were killed in the melee before Lt. Col.FA Fajuyi, the new military governor, detained surviving NNDP supporters allegedly for their own protection.In the North, there were some subdued early signs of a recoil among civilian elite, while unrest simmered in the Army.The net result was that Ironsi quickly felt threatened by Nzeogwu's supporters on one hand, and upset northern troops on the other. 

REFLECTIONS OF AN IGBO DIPLOMAT
In his book, “No Place to Hide - Crises and Conflicts inside Biafra”, Bernard Odogwu, then a Nigerian diplomat, but destined to become Chief of Biafran Intelligence,reveals that shortly after the coup of January 15, 1966 he and a fellow diplomat called Adamu Mohammed at the Nigerian mission to the United Nations in New York had a frank discussion about it.Odogwu wrote that “we were both in agreement that the so called ‘revolutionaries’ had performed very badly, in view of the one sidedness of the operation and the selectiveness of the killings.”Following this discussion Odogwu made an entry on January 23, 1966 into his personal notebook:
“With all the returns in, we now seem to have a complete picture of the coup, the plotters, and the casualties.Reading through the newspapers, one gets the impression that this national catastrophe which is termed a “revolution” is being blown greatly out of proportion.It does appear to me though, that we have all gone wild with jubilation in welcoming the so-called ‘dawn of a new era’ without pausing to consider the possible chain reactions that may soon follow……….I shudder at the possible aftermath of thisthis folly committed by our boys in khaki.; and what has kept coming to my mind since the afternoon is the passage in Shakespeare’s MACBETH - ‘And they say blood will have blood’.
First I ask myself this question; ‘What will be the position as soon as the present mass euphoria in welcoming the ‘revolution’ in the country fades away?’ There is already some rumour here within diplomatic circles that January 15 was a grand Igbo design to liquidate all opposition in order to make way for Igbo domination of the whole country.What then is the Igbo man’s defence to this allegation in light of the sectional and selective method adopted by the coup plotters?
Although, sitting here alone as I write this, I am tempted to say that there was no such Igbo grand design, yet the inescapable fact is that the Igbos are already as a group being condemned by the rest for the activities of a handful of ambitious Igbo army officers; for here I am, with the rest of my Igbo colleagues, some thousands of miles away from home, yet being put on the defensive for such actions that we were neither consulted about, nor approved of.Our Northern colleagues and friends now look on us Igbos here as strangers and potential enemies. They are now more isolated than ever before. Their pride is hurt; and who would blame them?
Secondly, I ask myself the questions posed to me this afternoon by my colleague; What would I do if I were placed in the position of the Northerner?What do I do?How do I react to the situation?Do I just deplore and condemn those atrocities or do I plan a revenge?I do not blame the Northern chaps for feeling so sore since the events of the last few days. They definitely have my sympathy, for it must have been shocking to say the least, for one to wake up one fine morning to find nearly all one’s revered leaders gone overnight.But they were not only Northern leaders as such, and I am as much aggrieved at their loss as any other Nigerian, Northern or otherwise.I am particularly shocked at the news that Major Ifeajuna personally shot and killed his mentor, Brigadier Maimalari.My God!That must have been Caesar and Brutus come alive, with the Brigadier definitely saying ‘Et tu Emma’ before collapsing………”
“…….As for the new man at the helm of affairs, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, he too like the majority of the Majors is an Igbo, and that has not helped matters either. …..”
“…….Granted that he is such a good soldier as he is reputed to be, the question is: ‘Are all good soldiers necessarily good statesmen? Again how well prepared is he for the task he has just inherited?’ I do hope that he is also as wise as he is reputed to be bold, because if you ask me, I think the General is sitting on a time bomb, with the fuse almost burnt out.We shall wait and see what happens next, but from my observations, I know the present state of affairs will not last long. A northern counter-action is definitely around the corner, and God save us all when it explodes.”
MISUNDERSTANDING AND SUSPICION
Indeed, misunderstandings and suspicions in Ibadan and Kaduna led to the deaths ofMajor S. A. Adegoke (who was accused of running a checkpoint but was actually killed on suspicion of cooperating with the mutineers) and 2/Lt. James Odu respectively, several days after the Nzeogwu-Ifeajuna January mutiny had already been put down.In the 4th Battalion at Ibadan, northern troops drove Igbo officers out of the barracks and refused to cooperate with Major Nzefili, a midwesterner from Ukwuani and the 2ic to late Lt. Col Largema, for no other reason than he was ‘Igbo speaking’.Nzefili had absolutely nothing to do with the January coup and, paradoxically, first heard of it via early morning phone calls to the barracks from the American and British embassies in Lagos looking for information.Nevertheless, four weeks later, he had to be replaced by Lt. Col Joe Akahan, a Tiv officer from the North, just to placate the soldiers.In exchange, Nzefili was madethe General Manager of the Nigerian Railway Corporation, where had previously worked in the days prior to joining the Army.
In Kaduna, when Odu was killed by soldiers, several northern officers actually ran away from the barracks, fearful for their lives.In the Federal Guards Company in Lagos, northern rank and file fuming over the role of their commander, Major Donatus Okafor, in the coup, refused to accept Major Ochei as their new commanding officer unless Captain Joseph Nanven Garba was redeployed from Brigade HQ and appointed his second in command.While all this was going on, about 32 officers and 100 other ranks were initially detained at KiriKiri prison on suspicion of complicity in the coup. Captain Baba Usman, General Staff Officer (II) Intelligence, was appointed military liaison to the Police and was responsible for transporting them daily to Force Headquarters Moloney where most were interrogatedby a Police team on their part in the coup.This team included Isa Adejo, MD Yusuf, and Mr. Trout, an expatriate who was then Head of Special Branch. When the interrogations were completed in March the detainees were distributed away from each other to other prisons, all of which were in the South, but predominantly in the East - which proved to be another source of suspicion. The report was then submitted to the government and a panel nominated to court-martial the detainees, chaired by Lt. Col Conrad Nwawo, the midwestern Igbo speaking officer and personal friend of Nzeogwu who had negotiated Nzeogwu’s surrender in January.However, even this panel found that every time it wanted to sit, the date was postponed by directives from Supreme HeadQuarters, a process that repeated itself again and again until overtaken by events in July.
On Friday January 21, acting on a tip off, the decomposing corpse of the slain Prime Minster, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and others were discovered by Police at Mile 27 on the Lagos-Abeokuta road.The only hint that gave away the identity of the late Prime Minister’s body was the ‘frog and bridle pattern’ of the white gown he had worn when arrested by Major Ifeajuna.The next day, coinciding with the moslem festival of Id-el-fitr, the Prime Minister’s death was officially announced and he was buried in Bauchi.However, the Ironsi government decided not to publicly announce the deaths of others who had been killed in the coup, including all the top military officers, leaving room for rumors and innuendos.Indeed their deaths were not officially publicly announced until Ironsi was overthrown.
The shape of Ironsi’s advisory team became clear as time went on.Chief among them was Francis Nwokedi, former permanent secretary in the ministry of external affairs, who had become close to him during his days in the Congo.Others were Pius Okigbo (economic adviser) and Lt. Col Patrick Anwunah who was later Chairman of the National Orientation Committee.However, most of General Ironsi’s advisers were faceless civilians.The most common complaint was that, although highly qualified and distinguished, they were either all Igbos or Igbo speaking.I have no way of verifying or refuting this allegation.Knowing how other governments in Nigeria have behaved (and continue to behave), it is hard to know what to make of these observations, but they were recorded by observers across ethnic and regional boundaries.
On February 12, Ironsi took his most sensitive decision to date when he made Nwokedi the sole commissioner forthe establishment of an administrative machinery for a unified Nigeria - even though he already appointed a separate Constitutional Review Panel under Rotimi Williams which had not submitted a report.Four days later he promulgated the Suppression of Disorder Decree making allowance for military tribunals and martial law.About this time too, he abolished thecompulsory Hausa language test for entry into the northern civil service - a decision which appealed not just to non-Hausa speaking northerners but also to southerners eyeing northern public service careers as well.Ironsi also authorized a counter-insurgency campaign against Isaac Boro's "Peoples Republic of the Niger Delta".The internal security operation in the Kaiama area of present day Bayelsa state that captured Boro was led by Major John Obienu of the Recce regiment supported by infantry elements of the 1st battalion in Enugu, prominent among whom was then Lt. YY Kure.Boro, (along with Samuel Owonaru, Nottingham Dick and Benneth Mendi) was eventually convicted of treason and sentenced to death only to be released by the subsequent Gowon regime and die fighting during the civil war.
The fissures in the polity were becoming increasingly glaring.For example, on the one hand, Peter Enahoro (Peter Pan) criticized Ironsi's indecisiveness with national issues. On the other, the murder of northerners in January and lack of prosecution of those responsible was the focus of increasingly strident write-ups in Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, a Hausa newspaper.In the background, increasing food prices as a result of the delayed effect of 1965 crises in the west on planting was beginning to affect the prices of food stuffs everywhere. 

Anyway, on February 21st, General Ironsi announced a bold reform policy.A few days later on the 25th the former President, Nnamdi Azikiwe, quietly returned to the country, only to become the focus of controversy when subsequently dismissed by Lt. Col Ojukwu as Chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
On March 7, sensing some heat, former leading politicians in the Western and Eastern regions were detained, but those of the northern region were left alone because of political sensitivities resulting from the coup.Indeed, Ironsi made an effort - ultimately insufficient - to walk on eggs with the North.The way his advisers saw it, he had appointed and promoted the son of the Emir of Katsina as the new military Governor, released NPC ministers who were detained by Nzeogwu in Kaduna,reappointed Sule Katagum to the Public Service Commission and placed Malam Howeidy in charge of the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria.In May, among other promotions, he promoted three substantive northern Captains (Ibrahim Haruna of Ordnance, Murtala Muhammed of Signals and Mohammed Shuwa of Infantry) who were then acting Majors to the ranks of temporary Lt. Cols.But he fell short on more culturally sensitive matters.For example,the military governor of the northern region, then MajorHassan Katsina, was discouraged by the Ironsi government from attending the funeral of the late Prime Minister Balewa in Bauchi.Proper funerals were not allowed for the other victims of the January coup.
On March 31st, military governors were asked to join the federal executive council, thus enlarging its membership.On April 14, native authority councils andlocal government entities in the North were dissolved.By then the concept of unification was garnering controversial attention.Mustafa Danbatta and Suleiman Takuma wrote strong public letters against unification in April 7 and 19 respectively.Takuma was arrested, in part because he raised the sensitive issue of trying the January plotters.
On 12May, proposed Decrees 33 and 34 were discussed by the SMC.Decree No. 33 was a list of 81 political societies and 26 tribal and cultural associations that were to be dissolved.Decree No. 34 divided Nigeria into 35 provinces and made all civil servants part of a unified civil service.It is said that there was opposition and that the final version was watered down.Even then, althoughIronsi did not legally require approval of the SMC for decisions, there continues to be doubt about whether Ironsi fully appreciated the depths of opposition which Decree 34 would create in the North.How vigorously did Katsina, Kam Salem, and Gowon, for example, forewarn him of consequences?Had he by then become hostage to a kitchen cabinet outside government?
The answer may have been provided by two sources.According to Brigadier Ogbemudia (rtd) who was then Brigade Major at the 1st Brigade, during a visit to Kaduna, 1st Brigade Commander Lt. Col Bassey tried to advise General Ironsi to back off from the controversial decree, but a civilian adviser who came along with the General retorted saying:“Colonel, the General understands Nigerians more than you here. You will find that the people will soon see him as the much sought redeemer of our dreams.Do not worry. Everything is under control.”It was claimed that national surveys had been done to show that the decree was welcome all over the country.More recently General Gowon has said the matter was still being discussed in the SMC when the government suddenly promulgated the decree.That said, Eastern region Governor Lt. Col.Ojukwu did not help matters for the General when, the next day after promulgation on May 24, he publicly announced in Enugu that on the basis of seniority, Igbo civil servants would be transferred to other regions and Lagos.Needless to say, he unintentionally sent shivers through the northern civil service because that region was not only educationally disadvantaged but traditionally paid the lowest salaries in the federation, automatically relegating northerners to the bottom of any unified civil service.
Caught between radical (pro January 15) and conservative (anti January 15) polarities, Ironsi could be said to have promulgated the 24th May decrees to satisfy the radical intelligentsia in the southernpress while projecting vision, authority and control.But funny enough the leading spokesman for the January coup, Major Nzeogwu, was later quoted during his last interview in April 1967 (with Ejindu) as saying the Unification decree was “unnecessary, even silly”.It is also on record that a group of lecturers at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka opposed unification.So it would seem Ironsi was responding to other impulses.
According to Norman Miners, the unitary concept advanced by Ironsi’s advisers was more likely motivated by ideological, personal and economic agendas.In the book “The Nigerian Army 1956-66”, he expresses the opinion that the theoretical foundations date back to the 1951 party congress of the NCNC. Indeed, the concept of federalism which we now all sing about, was regarded by columnists in the West African Pilot in the fifties as a colonial "divide and rule" contraption cooked up by Britain as a concession to the North after the April 1953 riots in Kano.The second plank upon which unification was built was the cost argument.Unification was economically cheaper than multiple layers of administration in the country - a position that was argued by Dr. Sam Aluko, a notable economist.The third plank was the personal motive factor.Unification offered southerners (including Igbos) vast new employment opportunities in the “northern frontier”. The flip side of this was the provocation of morbid fear of domination in the North, fear which united hitherto antagonistic northern political constituencies.
PROVOCATIONS
While all of this was going on, complaints about “Igbo provocations”, were increasing.Northerners filed reports about parties being called by their Igbo colleagues to celebrate what they called the “January Victory”.Offensive photographs showing Major Nzeogwu standing on the late Sardauna of Sokoto were said to be distributed in the open including market places.Some Igbos were even alleged to have worn stickers to that effect and were eager, in conversations with northerners, to point to Nzeogwu saying ‘Shi ne maganin ku”, meaning “he is the one who can knock sense into you”.Grammophone records with machine gun sounds were released, to remind Northerners, it is said, of the bullets that felled their leaders in January.Celestine Ukwu, a popular Igbo musician allegedly released a piece titled “Ewu Ne Ba Akwa”meaning “Goats are crying” in Igbo (although there is an account that claims that this song originated from a non-Igbo artiste from Rivers).Derogatory remarks about Northerners were reportedly commonplace, even in Army Barracks.To compound matters, resentment began building against Igbo traders who had allegedly raised the prices of their foodstuffsto match the increases in the West.All of these factors were shrewdly exploited by an unlikely coalition of disenfranchised politicians, petty contractors, marketing board and northern development corp debtors,civil servants and university students of northern origin fearful of future career prospects in the public service.As former President Shehu Shagari put it in his biography “Beckoned to Serve”, …’>From the northern viewpoint, the implications of all this in terms of distribution of power, the allocation of public resources and amenities, the prospect of Igbo and southern domination, and the threat to mainstream northern ways of life were unmistakable.’Opposition to unification in particular was spearheaded by northern students and civil servants.

To be continued in part four