Read Part 1 HERE..... Leaked [Police] Special Branch Report: "Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966" Part I By Nowama...
Leaked [Police] Special Branch Report:
"Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966"
Part I
By Nowamagbe Omoigui, MD, MPH, FACC
This is the Police Report on the official investigation into the coup of
15 January 1966. It was prepared by Police Special Branch Interrogators based
on interviews with soldiers, other ranks and some officers who had been
arrested after the mutiny.
None of the soldiers and officers involved had come to formal trial in a
court-martial as of the time of the July 29 1966 "counter-coup".
Indeed the fact they were not court-martialed was one of the grievances listed
by those officers who carried out the unfortunate operations of July 28-August
1, 1966.
The coup report was released to very few individuals in Nigeria and
certain foreign governments in early August 1966 - and then leaked. The
remainder of the report which allegedly implicated certain other persons has
apparently never been released widely to this day. It exists, we are on its
trail - and shall publish it on sight.
1. Due to unforeseen circumstance it has not been possible, so far, to
inform the nation fully of events which took place in the Federation on 15th
January 66 at Lagos, Ibadan, and Kaduna, events which were directly responsible
for further military action on the 29th July 66.
2. It will be appreciated that events of this nature require prolonged,
painstaking investigation. It is realized that the absence of legitimate
information on this subject has produced a flood of undesirable rumours and
speculation. It is, however, pointed out that without thorough investigation,
the wisdom of any premature releases, unsupported by fact, was questionable.
3. Investigations have not yet been completed but it is now possible to
put the nation, and the world, in possession of the facts so far collected. The
civilian involvement and influence in the whole affair is not as far as
possible, included in this report.
4. It has been established that sometime during August 1965, a small
group of army officers, dissatisfied with political developments within the
federation, began to plot in collaboration with some civilians, the overthrow
of what was then the Government of the Federation of Nigeria. The plan which
eventually emerged from their deliberations was that on a date not yet decided
at the time, the following action would be taken by troops from selected units,
led by the ringleaders of the plot:
a). The arrest of leading politicians at Lagos, Ibadan, Kaduna, Enugu
and Benin. The plan stipulated that wherever resistance was encountered, the
individuals concerned were to be killed.
b). The occupation of key points such as radio and TV stations,
telephone exchange and other public utilities, police headquarters and signal
installations, by carefully selected troops who were not, however, to be
informed in advance of the true nature of their operations.
c). The movement of troops and armoured fighting vehicles to Jebba and
Makurdi to hold the Benue and Niger Bridges with a view to preventing the
movement of any troops, opposed to the plotters' aims, to and from the North.
d). The assassination of all senior army officers known to be in a
position to foil, successfully, the conspirators' efforts to topple the
governments of the federation.
e). The eventual take-over of the machinery of government by the rebels.
5. Although the original plan stipulated that the action intended by the
plotters should take place, simultaneously, in all the Regional capitals, no
arrangements were made to implement these intentions in Benin and Enugu.
6. The date on which the plot was to be put into execution was decided
by several factors. These include the return of the Premier of Northern Nigeria
from Mecca and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference held at Lagos
between the 11th and 13th January 66. An additional factor was the possibility
that details of the plotters intentions might have leaked out, necessitating
early implementation of the plot. In this manner, the night of 14th to 15th
January was finally selected.
7. The action which was well planned and conducted like a military
operation was, in its first stages efficiently carried out.
8. Immediately before "H" hour, which has been set for 2am on
the 15th January, a number of junior officers were taken into the confidence of
the ringleaders of the plot. It is known that a number of these were reluctant
to comply with the wishes of the plotters. Confirmed information indicates that
it was made clear to these junior officers that those who were not with the
conspirators would be regarded as being opposed to them and might suffer death
as a consequence.
9. Non commissioned ranks involved in the night's activities at Lagos,
Kaduna and Ibadan, were given no previous information of the true nature of the
action in which they were about to be engaged.
10. The activities of the rebels, commencing at 2am on 15th January 66,
resulted in the deaths of the following personalities:
AT LAGOS
a. Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of the Federation
of Nigeria.
b. Chief F. S. Okotie-Eboh, Finance Minister of the Federation.
c. Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari, Commander of the 2nd Brigade NA
d. Colonel K. Mohammed, Chief of Staff Nigerian Army
e. Lieut-Colonel A. C. Unegbe, Quartermaster General.
f. Lieut-Colonel J.T. Pam, Adjutant General, Nigerian Army
g. Lieut-Colonel A. Largema, Commanding Officer 4th Battalion Ibadan
AT IBADAN
h. S. L. Akintola, Premier of Western Nigeria
AT KADUNA
i. Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto and Premier of
Northern Nigeria
j. Brigadier S. Ademulegun, Commander of the 1st Brigade NA
k. Colonel R. A. Shodeinde, Deputy Commandant, Nigerian Defence Academy
l. Ahmed Dan Musa, Senior Assistant Secretary (Security) to the North
Regional Government
m. Sergeant Duromola Oyegoke of the Nigerian Army
n. The senior wife of Sir Ahmadu Bello
o. The wife of Brigadier Ademulegun
11. In addition to the foregoing, four members of the Nigeria Police,
one junior NCO of the Nigerian Army, and an estimated number of six civilians
lost their lives during the night's events. One major of the Nigerian Army was
accidentally shot and killed at Ibadan on the 17th January 66, bringing the
total loss of life to twenty-seven.
12. Apart from the aforementioned killings, a number of political
leaders and civil servants were arrested by the plotters and detained in
military establishments at Lagos and Kaduna. These included:
a. Sir Kashim Ibrahim - at the time Governor of Northern Nigeria
b. Alhaji Hassan Lemu - Principal Private Secretary to the Premier of
Northern Nigeria.
c. Aba Kadangare Gobara - Assistant Principal Private Secretary to the
Premier of Northern Nigeria.
d. B. A. Fani-Kayode - at the time Deputy Premier of Western Nigeria.
_________________________________
DETAILS OF THE EVENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
13. In August 1965, three officers, Major Okafor, Major Ifeajuna and
Captain Oji who were already dissatisfied with political developments in the
Federation and the impact of these developments on the Army, held series of
discussions between them about the matter and set about the task of searching
for other officers who held views similar to their own and who could,
eventually, be trusted to join them in the enterprise of staging a military
coup d'Etat.
14. In September 1965, Major I. H. Chukwuka of Nigerian Army
Headquarters Lagos was persuaded to join the group of conspirators, followed in
October 1965 by Major C. I. Anuforo, also of the Army headquarters. Major C. K.
Nzeogwu was brought in around that time through the efforts of Major Anuforo,
an old friend of both Majors Nzeogwu and Okafor. Major Nzeogwu in turn secured
the support for the plan of Major A. Ademoyega who had worked with him in the
Nigerian Army Training College Kaduna.
15. By early November the recruiting activities of the group were
completed and an inner circle of conspirators emerged, consisting of the
following officers:
Major CK Nzeogwu
Major A. Ademoyega
Major EA Ifeajuna
Major CI Anuforo
Major IH Chukwuka
Major D. Okafor
Captain O. Oji
Planning for the execution of the plot started in earnest in early
November 1965 at a meeting of the inner circle which took place in Major
Ifeajuna's house in Lagos.
16. The plan which eventually emerged from their deliberations was
broadly as follows:
a. The arrest of VIPs at Kaduna, Ibadan, Lagos, Enugu and Benin. The
plan stipulated wherever resistance to arrest was encountered, the individuals
concerned were to be killed
b. The occupation of vulnerable points such as Radio and TV stations,
telephone exchange, police signals installations, airfields and civilian
administrative establishments, by carefully selected troops who were not,
however, to be informed in advance of the purpose of their operations.
c. The movement of troops to Jebba and Makurdi to hold the Niger and
Benue bridges against any movement of troops opposed to the plotters' aims, to
and from the North.
d. The killing of all senior army officers who were in a position to foil
successfully the conspirators efforts to topple the Governments of the Federation
and who resided in the areas of operations.
e. The eventual take-over of the machinery of Government by the Army.
17. Amongst the civilian VIPs scheduled for arrest, the following have
been named:
a. The Prime Minister of the Federation
b. The Federal Finance Minister
c. The Premiers of Northern, Western, Midwestern and Eastern Nigeria.
18. Additional personalities scheduled to be arrested in Lagos were the
following:
a. K. O. Mbadiwe
b. Jaja Wachuku
c. Inua Wada
d. Shehu Shagari
e. T. O. Elias
f. Ayo Rosiji
g. M. A. Majekodunmi
h. Mathew Mbu
i. Richard Akinjide
j. Waziri Ibrahim
19. Other ranking politicians were to be placed in house arrest pending
a decision as to their disposal and eventual fate.
20. Events have shown that other political figures including the Deputy
Premier of Western Nigeria, the Finance Minister and the Governor of Northern
Nigeria were scheduled to be arrested.
21. The conspirators further decided that the following senior army
officers represented a threat to their plans and must be killed during the
first hours of the rebellion:
Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari - Lagos
Brigadier S. Ademulegun - Kaduna
Colonel K. Mohammed - Lagos
Colonel R. A. Shodeinde - Kaduna
Lt. Col. A. Largema - Ibadan
Lt. Col. A. C. Unegbe - Lagos
Lt. Col. J.T. Pam - Lagos
NOTE: Lt. Col. Largema was the CO of 4th Battalion NA stationed at
Ibadan. On 15th January 66, however, this officer was on temporary duty at
Lagos, staying at the Ikoyi Hotel
22. For the actual execution of the plan, three commanders were
nominated, namely:
a. Northern Nigeria Major C.K. Nzeogwu
b. Lagos Area Major E. A. Ifeajuna
c. Western Nigeria Captain E. N. Nwobosi
23. The latter officer was not a member of the inner circle and was not
approached until either the 13th or 14th January 66. He was, however, well
known to the conspirators who were certain that when the time came he could be
relied on to cooperate.
24. The execution of the plan was to take place in three areas only,
i.e. Kaduna, Ibadan and the Lagos area, although many of the participants
believed the insurrection to be nation wide. It is a matter of established fact
that no violent action took place in either Benin City or Enugu. It has been
suggested that these areas were spared because the plotters found it impossible
to recruit reliable co-conspirators in these regions. None of the officers has
indicated under interrogation that any efforts to recruit collaborators in
either Benin or Enugu were made. Indeed subsequent action of some of the
leading officers indicated collaboration with the then Premier of Eastern
region.
25. For the purposes of this report, the execution of the plan is dealt
with in three main sections, namely Lagos Area, Ibadan and Kaduna. Each section
is divided into incidents, showing the identities of officers and men involved.
LAGOS AREA:
26. The execution of the plan commenced by the calling of a meeting late
on 14 January 66 of the Lagos members of the inner circle and, for the first
time, of junior officers previously selected to take an active part. A number
of those present had attended a cocktail party that very evening in the house
of Brigadier Mai-Malari in Ikoyi. The following attended this meeting which was
held in the Apapa House of Major Ifeajuna:
a. Major EA Ifeajuna
b. Major CI Anuforo
c. Major D Okafor
d. Major A. Ademoyega
e. Major IH Chukwuka
f. Captain O Oji
g. Captain GS Adeleke
h. Lt. G. Ezedigbo
i. Lt. BO Oyewole
j. 2/Lt. ES Nweke
k. 2/Lt. BO Ikejiofor
l. 2/Lt. NS Wokocha
m. 2/Lt. Igweze
27. Major Ifeajuna addressed the meeting on the subject of the
deteriorating situation in Western Nigeria to which, he contended, the
politicians had failed to find a solution. He added that as a result the entire
country was heading toward chaos and disaster. He next acquainted the junior
officers with the inner circle's plans and asked them if they were prepared to
assist to put an end to this state of affairs. Major Ifeajuna claims that all
present pledged their support for his plans with the exception of Captain
Adeleke who was, however, later persuaded to join. It was made clear to these
junior officers that those who were not with the conspirators would be regarded
as being opposed to them and might suffer death as a consequence.
28. When, at the end of the meeting, it was clear that all present were
in support of the rebellion, tasks and targets were issued as follows:
a. Abduction of the Prime Minister and the Federal Finance Minister:
Major Ifeajuna, 2/Lt. B. Oyewole, 2/Lt. Ezedigbo
b. Killing of Colonel Mohammed and Lt. Col. Unegbe: Major CI Anuforo,
2/Lt C. Ngwuluka
c. Killing of Brigadier Mai-Malari: Major D. Okafor, Capt. O. Oji, 2/Lt.
C. Igweze
d. Killing of Lt. Col. Pam: Major IH Chukuka, 2/Lt. G. Onyefuru
e. Occupation of the Control Room at FT Police HQ Lion Building: 2/Lt NS
Wokocha
f. Occupation of P & T Telephone Exchange: , Lt. PM Okocha, 2/Lt. CC
Anyafulu
g. Occupation of N.E.T. Building: 2/Lt DS Nweke
But there were apparent last minute change of the plans as will be shown
later in this paper.
29. Troops selected for these various tasks were to be drawn from the
following units (all stationed or accommodated at Apapa and Dodan barracks,
Ikoyi):
a. No. 1 Signal Squadron
b. Camp - HQ 2 Brigade NA
c. Lagos Garrison Organization
d. The Federal Guard Unit
30. The Federal Guard Officers Mess at Ikoyi was named as the rallying
point for all teams on completion of their tasks.
31. All other officers and other ranks to be involved, either
consciously or unconsciously in the operations were called out for alleged
Internal Security operations between midnight and 0100 hours to allow time for
the issue of arms and ammunition and the provision of the necessary transport.
With the exception of other ranks of the Federal Guard, they were all ordered
to report to Headquarters of No. 2 Brigade NA in battle order, with their arms.
Ammunition was issued to them by Lt. Okaka, assisted by Major Ifeajuna, RSM
Ogbu of Camp 2 Bde and others.
32. Officers and men moved off to their various assignments at around
0200 hours as planned.
ABDUCTION AND ASSASSINATION OF SIR ABUBAKAR TAFAWA BALEWA
33. The party charged with the abduction of the Prime Minister (PM) left
HQ 2 Bde at approximately 0200 hours. The following have been identified as
members of that group:
OFFICERS
a. Major EA Ifeajuna (in command)
b. 2/Lt. G. Ezedigbo (Federal Guard Unit)
c. 2/Lt. Oyewole (2 Brigade Transport Company)
NO. 1 SIGNAL SQUADRON
NA 84254 Cpl C. Madumelu
NA 18149591 L/Cpl . O. Achi
NA 18159447 S/Sgt. A. Ogbogara
NA 18150401 Sgt. L. Onyia
NA 500147 Sgt. BS Odunze
NA 18150392 Sgt. F Impete
NA 18150400 Sgt. I Ndukaife
NA 1856 Sgmn. S. Onwuli
NA 18149817 Cpl. P. Okoh
NA 18149084 Cpl. U Eduok
NA 18150345 Cpl. Z. Chukwu
NA 18150206 L/Cpl FI Okonkwo
NA 3775 Sgmn FN Chukwu
NA 18150443 L/Cpl RC Amadi
NA 18159121 WO II J Onyeacha
CAMP - HQ 2 BRIGADE NA
NA 3339 Pte NA Evulobi
NA 18150137 L/Cpl S. Kanu
NA 502724 WO II L. Okoye
NA 124643 WO I (RSM) J. Ogbu
ARMY HEADQUARTERS (LGO)
NA 504299 Sgt. J. Nwakpura
NA503865 Sgt. B. Iberesi
NA 149820 Sgt. E. Okonkwo
NOTE: The above named were not all, of necessity, directly involved in
the abduction of the PM. A number of them operated on the premises of the
Federal Finance Minister, adjacent to the residence of the Prime Minister
34. The small convoy reached the Onikan roundabout at approximately 0230
hours and halted near the PM's residence. Major Ifeajuna ordered all troops to
leave their vehicles and divided them into three groups with targets as shown:
PRIME MINISTER
Major EA Ifeajuna - in command
Sgt. B. Iberesi
Sgt. J. Nwakpura
Sgt. BS Odunze
Cpl. P. Okoh
Cpl C. Madumelu
Sgmn FN Chukwu
Sgmn. S. Onwuli
2/Lt. Oyewole
FEDERAL FINANCE MINISTER
2/Lt. G. Ezedigbo - in command
WO I (RSM) J. Ogbu
L/Cpl FI Okonkwo
Cpl. Z. Chukwu
Cpl. U Eduok
Sgt. F Impete
S/Sgt. A. Ogbogara
Sgt. I Ndukaife
WO II L. Okoye
ON GUARD OVER VEHICLES AND APPROACH ROADS
WO II J Onyeacha - in command
L/Cpl RC Amadi
Pte NA Evulobi
L/Cpl S. Kanu
Sgt. E. Okonkwo
35. The latter group was given the task of stopping and turning back all
vehicles approaching Onikan road. There is no record concerning their
instructions as to what action they were to take in the event of any of the
drivers refusing to obey the order to turn back.
36. The Major knocked on the gate and was answered by a policeman who
was on guard inside. The Major identified himself as an Army Officer whereupon
the PC (Police Constable) granted them access. The Major asked the PC how many
men were on guard with him and was told that there were six. The Major then
ordered the PC to show where they could be found.
The PC agreed whereupon the Major seized his rifle and passed it to one
of his men. The PC then led the group to round up the remaining members of the
Police guard. At the back of the house, ie. at the creek side, they found a PC
armed with a rifle and accompanied by a Police dog. The Major ordered the PC to
surrender his rifle, which he refused to do. He was then hit in the face by
Sgt. Odunze whereupon he capitulated and surrendered his firearm.
Major Ifeajuna ordered Sgt Odunze and Cpl. Okoh to stand guard over the
PC and his dog with orders to shoot both if they made an attempt to abscond or
raise the alarm. All the other members were disarmed and taken to the main gate
where they remained guarded by Sgt Iberesi and 2 others. They were all informed
that they would be shot if they attempted to escape or raise the alarm.
37. Major Ifeajuna and few of his men then approached the back entrance
to the Prime Minister's residence having secured the police orderly, and the
stewards under arrest, and broke into the lounge and thence to the Prime
Minister's bedroom. A voice from the inside asked who was there. The Major
replied by kicking the door open, entering the room and pointing his gun at the
Prime Minister and thereafter led out the PM wearing a white robe with white
trousers and slippers. The PM was then led away by Major Ifeajuna along Awolowo
Road where Ifeajuna had parked his car adjacent to the Onikan swimming pool.
ABDUCTION AND ASSASSINATION OF FS OKOTIE EBOH
38. On arrival at the Onikan roundabout, at approximately 0230 hrs on 15
Jan 66, Major Ifeajuna divided his force into three groups as shown in para 34
of this report. Major Ifeajuna and his group proceeded towards the PM's
residence and 2/Lt Ezedigbo took his men to the compound of the Finance
Minister. When they arrived at the front gate, they found this locked and were
compelled to gain access by jumping over the wall. Inside they found a number
of civilian guards, about 5, who were armed with bows and arrows. These offered
no resistance and were disarmed and placed under guard. At least one policeman
was encountered in the compound. He too was disarmed and escorted to the 3-Ton
truck by RSM J. Ogbu.
39. 2/Lt Ezedigbo then attempted to open the front door but found this
also to be locked. He broke one of the panes of glass in the door with his SMG
but even failed to open the door which he finally broke down by kicking it with
his boot. He then entered accompanied by the following other ranks:
WO II L Okoye
Sgt. I Ndukaife
Sgt. E. Okonkwo
Cpl. U. Eduok
Sgt. F. Impete
Before entering 2/Lt Ezedigbo ordered his men to walk quietly and to
make no noise, a rather superfluous caution considering the noise which must
have been made when the door was broken open. They mounted the stairs to the
first floor. Having arrived there, the 2/Lt posted one man on the balcony and 3
on the landing.
40. The officer then shouted twice "Okotie-Eboh", come
out". When this met with no response he entered a bedroom where he found
the Minister dressed only in a loin cloth. He ordered the Minister to precede
him down the stairs, and the Minister was escorted to the 3-Ton lorry. Rumors
that the Minister was beaten and otherwise ill-treated on the way to the
vehicle have been stoutly denied by all who took part in the operation.
41. Whilst the Finance Minister was being loaded into the 3-Tonner, the
PM was escorted from his house and placed into Major Ifeajuna's car. 2/Lt
Ezedigbo joined Ifeajuna whilst the ORs (other ranks) re-entered their
respective vehicles. The convoy then moved off to the Federal Guard Officers'
Mess, stopping en route at a point in Ikoyi where Major Ifeajuna and 2/Lt.
Ezedigbo killed Brig. Mai-Malari. (editors comment: Maimalari had escaped from
the team that had been sent to kill him at home)
ARREST AND ASSASSINATION OF COLONEL K. MOHAMMED AND LT. COL. A. UNEGBE
42. Meanwhile Major CI Anuforo, assisted by 2/Lt. C. Ngwuluka and the
following other ranks:
NA 173629 WO II B. Okugbe - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18149383 Sgt. J Oparah - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 1641 Cpl. C. Egwim - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18149792 Cpl. E. Nwoke - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18150530 L/Cpl. J Nwankpa - No. 1 Signal Sqn
NA 18151259 Pte C. Unegbu - Military Hospital, Yaba
proceeded in the two private cars of Anuforo and Ngwuluka to No. 1, Park
Lane Apapa, the residence of Colonel K. Mohammed. This was then being guarded
by unarmed nursing orderlies of a Field Ambulance stationed in Apapa.
43. On arrival Major Anuforo ordered all his party to leave the cars, which
had stopped some distance from the house. They then advanced towards the house
led by Major Anuforo. They were challenged by Pte L. Onyegbule, then on
sentry-go. Major Anuforo told the sentry to "shut up" and to put up
his hands. The Major then gave orders that the sentry and the other 3 members
of the guard be banded together in one place in the custody of Pte. C. Unegbu,
who although a member of a medical unit, was then bearing arms.
44. Major Anuforo then went to the front door of the house and knocked.
It would appear that he received an answer, because he was heard shouting
"You first come out and see who is knocking". With the Major at this
stage was WO II B. Okugbe. When he received no further answer to his knocking,
Anuforo ordered his men to cock their weapons. He then kicked open the door and
entered accompanied by Cpl. E. Nwoke, WO II Okugbe and Cpl Egwim.
45. The house was searched until the Colonel was found, in night attire,
in his bedroom. The Colonel was forced out of the house by Major Anuforo and
the other ranks who had accompanied him, and put into Anuforo's car. It is
believed that before being put into the car, the Colonel's wrists were tied
with a rifle sling which was still in place when later, his dead body was
discovered along the Abeokuta road.
46. Before leaving, Major Anuforo instructed the Colonel's guard to
return to their unit and not to discuss what they had seen with anyone. Sgt. J
Oparah and Cpl. E. Nwoke could not get into the car of Major Anuforo because of
the presence of the Colonel and were odered to follow on foot to the house of
Lt. Col. Unegbe, situated on Point road, Apapa, not very far away.
47. On arrival at Lt. Col. Unegbe's house, Major Anuforo entered the
house alone. They heard SMG fire inside the compound and were later ordered to
bring out the dead body of the Lt. Col.
48. Whilst the men were inside collecting Lt. Col. Unegbe's body, Col.
Mohammed was compelled to leave the car by Major Anuforo. The latter told the
Colonel to say his prayers as he was going to be shot. The Colonel did not
plead for mercy or remonstrate in any other manner, but quietly prayed until he
was shot in the back by Major Anuforo, using his SMG.
49. Colonel Mohammed's corpse was stowed into the boot of Major
Anuforo's car while the body of Lt. Col. Unegbe was placed on the floor in the
back of the car. Anuforo and his men then entered the vehicle which was driven
straight to the Federal Guard Officers' Mess. At the Mess the two bodies were
unloaded on the ground.
Continued in Part Two
Leaked [Police] Special Branch Report:
"Military Rebellion of 15th January 1966"
Part II
By Nowamagbe Omoigui, MD, MPH, FACC
________________________________________
This is the Police Report on the official investigation into the coup of
15 January 1966. It was prepared by Police Special Branch Interrogators based
on interviews with soldiers, other ranks and some officers who had been
arrested after the mutiny.
None of the soldiers and officers involved had come to formal trial in a
court-martial as of the time of the July 29 1966 "counter-coup".
Indeed the fact they were not court-martialed was one of the grievances listed
by those officers who carried out the unfortunate operations of July 28-August
1, 1966.
The coup report was released to very few individuals in Nigeria and
certain foreign governments in early August 1966 - and then leaked. The
remainder of the report which allegedly implicated certain other persons has
apparently never been released widely to this day. It exists, we are on its trail
- and shall publish it on sight.
________________________________________
ASSASSINATION OF LT. COL PAM
50. Major Chukuka assisted by 2/Lt G Onyefuru and the other ranks
NA 160152 Sgt. NN Ugongene - No. 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18150196 Sgt. H. Okibe - No. 1 Signal Squadron
NA 154544 Sgt. B. Anyanwu - Camp - HQ 2 Bde NA
NA 403298 Sgt. L. Egbukichi - Army HQ (LGO)
NA 18150416 Sgt. P. Iwueke - HQ 2 Bde NA
had by then accomplished the arrest of Lt. Col. JY Pam and was being
guarded inside a landrover in the Mess premises. Majors Chukuka and Anuforo
held a brief discussion after which both Majors entered the Landrover. The
driver was ordered to proceed to Ikoyi.
51. At a point inside Ikoyi the landrover was stopped and both Majors
descended. Major Anuforo ordered Lt. Col. Pam to leave the vehicle, which he
did. Major Anuforo then spoke to him and told him that he was going to be
killed and would do well to say his prayers first. Lt. Col. Pam pleaded but
Major Anuforo remained adamant, stating that he was carrying out orders. Then
without warning Major Anuforo fired a burst from his SMG into Lt. Col. Pam's
body killing him on the spot.
52. Major Anuforo then ordered the NCOs in the landrover to come down
and load the dead body into the vehicle. The men, who were shocked and
frightened by the killing were reluctant to comply with this order and refused
to leave the vehicle until Major Anuforo pointed his SMG at them and threatened
to kill them unless they did as they were told. They then obeyed and loaded the
corpse. The party then drove back to the Federal Guard Officers Mess where the
body was off-loaded and placed alongside the bodies of Col. Mohammed and Lt.
Col. Unegbe.
ASSASSINATION OF BRIG. MAIMALARI
53. The assassination of Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari as originally conceived
in the conspirators Master plan failed.
54. Major DO Okafor and Captain Oji were present at HQ 2 Bde when troops
were being mustered and issued with arms and ammunition. When these
arrangements had been completed these two officers entered Major Okafor's
personal car accompanied by the following ORs from No. 1.
Signal Squadron:
NA 500611 L/Cpl B Okotto
NA 18150074 L/Cpl P Esekwe
55. They drove direct to the Federal Guard Unit in Dodan Barracks,
Ikoyi, where, in the meantime, Lt. Ezedigbo and 2/Lt. Igweze had roused
additional troops and arranged for the issue of arms and ammunition. By the
time the troops were ready for the alleged IS operations, Major Okafor and Captain
Oji had arrived at the barracks and were at the Unit guardroom. Major Okafor ordered
that troops mount into 2 Federal Guard Landrovers detailed for the operation by
Ezedigbo
56. Federal Guard personnel detailed for this operation were the
following:
NA 3785 Sgt. SA Umch
NA 18150997 Sgt. N. Ibundu
NA 18149870 L/Cpl N. Noji
NA 3995 L/Cpl HH Okeke
NA 18149870 L/Cpl P. Nnah
NA 1706 Pte. J. Ogu
NA 18149723 Pte. S. Eke
NA 18141571 Pte. I. Onoja
NA 18148787 Pte. JF Enunehe
NA 18149970 Pte. J Abaye
NA 3695 Pte. CS Dede
NA 18151261 Pte. S. Adekunle
57. The following vehicles were used:
Landrover NA 773 - driven by Pte. I Onoja
Landrover NA 957 - driven by L/Cpl N. Noji
58. The party drove direct to the house of Brigadier Z. Mai-Malari at 11
Thompson Avenue, Ikoyi. This is a corner house and situated at the point where
Brown road runs into Thompson Avenue. On arrival at their destination, the
troops were dismounted and divided into three sections commanded as shown:
No. 1 Section - Captain Oji
No. 2 Section - 2/Lt C Igweze
No. 3 Section - Sgt. SA Umch (in reserve)
59. The reserve section under Sgt. Umch was ordered to take post in a
dark place opposite the house. The three officers, followed by their men then
entered the compound which was guarded by NCOs and men of the 2 Battalion NA.
Major Okafor ordered the Sentry to call the Guard Commander whom he informed
that the situation was bad and that he, Okafor, had come to take over the
guard. He instructed the Guard Commander to assemble his men and to take them
back to his unit. The Guard Commander, according to some of the ORs
interrogated, replied that he could not obey this order as he had received no
instructions to that effect. Major Okafor and Captain Oji overruled the Guard
Commander's objections and entered the compound
60. Whilst Major Okafor was pre-occupied with the guard the telephone in
the downstairs lounge of the Brigadier's house started to ring. Some of the men
present, including 2/Lt. Igweze, have stated that the Brigadier came downstairs
to answer the telephone. No sooner had he picked up the receiver than a burst
of SMG fire was heard in the compound. This was Captain Oji firing at a member
of the Brigadier's Guard, a L/Cpl of 2 battalion. The L/Cpl was killed and his
body later placed into Major Okafor's Landrover. At the same time, L/Cpl Paul
Nwekwe of 2 Brigade Signal Troop who was on gaurd in the front of the main gate
to the compound, was hit in the neck by a bullet, thought to be a richochet.
61. Brigadier Mai-Malari, alerted to the presence of Major Okafor's
force in his compound by Captain Oji's burst of fire dropped the telephone and,
followed by his wife, was observed running into the boy's quarters. From there
he escaped into the road, and it is thought, tried to make his way to the
Federal Guard Barracks.
62. According to the ORs interrogated, Major Okafor flew into a rage
when he discovered that the Brigadier had escaped and bitterly blamed the men
of the Federal Guard for not shooting the Brigadier when they saw him running
towards the boy's quarters. He then ordered all present that the Brigadier must
be shot on sight.
63. Major Okafor then jumped into the landrover driven by L/Cpl Noji. He
informed 2/Lt Igweze that he was going to get "that man" and to
arrange for more troops to come to the Brigadier's House. He drove around the
area for some time but failed to find the Brigadier. By the time he returned to
11 Thompson Avenue, Major Ademoyega and Captain Adeleke had arrived there in a
landrover driven by L/Cpl D. Omeru.
Major Ademoyega had already informed Captain Oji that the Brigadier had
been killed and that he had seen his body at the Federal Guard. Captain Oji was
overheard telling Okafor that "the Jack had been killed". It is
presumed that by "the Jack" Oji meant the Brigadier. Major Okafor
then informed the troops with him that Brigadier Mai-Malari had been killed by
men from another unit.
64. The time, by then, was nearly 0400 hrs. captain Oji was ordered by
Major Okafor to proceed to 2nd Battalion in Ikeja to check the situation there.
The Captain left in landrover NA 773 accompanied by Sgt. H. Irundu, L/Cpl H
Okeke, Pte. S. Adekunle and Pte. I Onoja.
65. As stated elsewhere in this report, Major Ifeajuna and his convoy,
after the abduction of the PM and the Finance Minister, drove towards the
Federal Guards Officers mess where he made a brief stop and then proceeded
toward Ikoyi Hotel, still with the PM in the car. At a point in the Golf
course, adjacent to a petrol station Brigadier Mai-Malari was walking towards
Dodan Barracks when he saw Major Ifeajuna's car. The Brigadier recognized his
Brigade Major Ifeajuna and shouted and beckoned him to stop. Then Ifeajuna
stopped the car and accompanied by 2/Lt Ezedigbo went towards Brig. Mai-Malari
and killed him.
66. After the Brigadier had been killed, his body was loaded into the
3-Tonner and driven to the Federal Guard Officers' Mess.
ASSASSINATION OF LT. COL. LARGEMA
67. Although not initially alloted to Major Ifeajuna as a target for
assassination, Major Ifeajuna proceeded to Ikoyi Hotel to kill Lt. Col.
Largema. On arrival at the hotel Major Ifeajuna told the receptionist on duty
that he had an urgent message for Lt. Col. Largema of Room 115.
The time was between 0330 and 0400. He then asked the hotel receptionist
to supply him with the master key which can open all doors in the hotel but was
told that this was not available. He then ordered the receptionist to lead him
to the room in which Lt. Col. Largema was staying, warning the receptionist on
the way that he would be shot if he refused to comply with whatever he might be
ordered to do.
68. On their arrival on the first floor Major Ifeajuna, accompanied by
2/Lt Ezedigbo instructed the hotel receptionist to knock on the door of Lt.
Col. Largema and to inform him that he was wanted on the telephone. It should
be pointed out here that rooms in this hotel have no telephones. There are
situated in small alcoves in the corridors. In the case of Room 115, the
telephone alcove is only a few paces away.
69. Lt. Col Largema responded and came out dressed in pyjamas and
slightly dazed by sleep. In the meantime the two armed soldiers had stepped
back into the corner near the lifts from where they could not be observed by
Lt. Col. Largema when he came out of his door. The Lt. Col. then picked up the
receiver, which was off the hook. At this moment both the soldiers near the
lift opened fire with their SMG. Lt. Col. Largema fell down and died.
70. The killers went downstairs and called the third man to come up.
Between the three of them they then carried the dead body down the stairs and
deposited it on the floor. They then called yet another soldier from the
Mercedes car who helped the other three to carry the body to the car. The whole
party then drove off.
71. When Major Ifeajuna and party returned to the Federal Guards
Officers' Mess he learnt that the GOC was in town and was organizing 2nd
Battalion NA at Ikeja to attack the rebels. He was then joined by Major Okafor
and they drove off together in Major Ifeajuna's car.
At the Yaba Military Hospital they dropped 2/Lt Ezedigbo who had been
wounded in the encounter with Brigadier Mai-Malari. The time was about 0400
hrs. Major Ifeajuna drove away on to the Abeokuta road. On the way they stopped
and Ifeajuna asked the PM out of the car whence he shot and killed him. When he
and Okafor became certain that the PM was dead they left the body in the bush
at a point beyond Otta on the Lagos to Abeokuta road. They then opened the boot
of the car and dropped the body of Lt. Col. Largema near that of the PM.
They then drove on to Abeokuta. On the way after Abeokuta two other
soldiers in the car were dropped and told to find their way back to Lagos
whilst Ifeajuna and Okafor proceeded to Enugu. They arrived Enugu at about 1415
hours and proceeded to the Premier's Lodge where they held discussion with Dr.
MI Okpara, then Premier of Eastern region, after which they separated and went
into hiding. Ifeajuna eventually escaped to Ghana where he was received by the
former President Kwame Nkrumah who sent him to Winneba to stay with SG Ikoku.
72. At the Federal Guard Officers' Mess the corpses of Brigadier
Mai-Malari, Col. Mohammed, Lt. Col. Pam and Lt. Col. Unegbe were loaded into a
3-tonner lorry in which was sitting Chief Okotie-Eboh still alive. The time was
then about 0330 hours.
73. By this time Major A. Ademoyega and Major CI Anuforo were present on
the Mess premises. Major Ifeajuna having departed, these two officers took
command of his men and vehicles. They mounted into Major Anuforo's Peugeot car
accompanied by 2/Lt Igweze. Major Ademoyega entered the landrover.
74. On the instructions of Major Anuforo, the little convoy moved off
with Anuforo leading. They traversed Lagos and went along Abeokuta road. At a
given point, unidentifiable by the men interrogated, Major Anuforo stopped the
convoy and he, 2/Lt Igweze and Major Ademoyega left their vehicles. They came
to the tailboard of the 3-Ton truck and detailed a number of men to take
position in front and to the rear of the convoy with instructions to stop and
turn back all approaching traffic.
75. Major Anuforo then ordered the four corpses to be unloaded onto the
road. The bodies were then carried into the bush on the left hand side of the
road. Major Anuforo then observed FS Okotie-Eboh still seated in the truck and
asked the question: "Who is that man"?, which leads to the belief
that, until then, Anuforo was unaware of the presence of Okotie-Eboh in the
truck. The Finance Minister replied "I am Okotie-Eboh".
Major Anuforo then ordered the Minister to step down. The latter complied,
whereupon Major Anuforo informed him that he was going to be shot. The Minister
commenced to plead for his life. This met with little or no response from
Anuforo who is reported as having confined himself to stating that he was
acting under orders. The Minister was then forced to go into the bush, pushed
along by Major Anuforo and Major Ademoyega and followed by 2/Lt Igweze and Sgt.
Ndukaife to the spot where the bodies of the 4 senior officers had been
deposited. Arriving there, without hesitation, Major Anuforo killed Okotie-Eboh
with a short burst from his SMG.
77. Major Anuforo then returned to the road followed by the others but
leaving 2/Lt
Igweze, Cpl. Egwim, L/Cpl Nwankpa and Cpl. Nweke on guard over the
five bodies.
78. The convoy drove off and returned later, accompanied by 3 Ferret
scout cars which had been obtained from 2 reconnaisance Squadron at Abeokuta.
Four spades were brought out from the landrover and used to dig graves for the
burial of the corpses. The graves were dug by Cpl. C. Egwim, Cpl Z Chukwu,
L/Cpl J Nwankpa and private N.A. Evulobi. When this task had been completed,
they all boarded their respective vehicles and drove off to Lagos.
OCCUPATION OF P & T TELEPHONE EXCHANGE,
N.E.T., AND LION BUILDING
79. These three cases have been treated jointly as they are of lesser
importance and because the officers and men involved left Apapa together in the
same vehicle
80. Although it is probable that the officers concerned in the
occupation of these vulnerable points were fully aware of the purpose of their
activities of that night, they have all denied this. It is certain that none of
the ORs involved received any advance information on this subject.
P & T AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE EXCHANGE
81. After the distribution of arms and ammunition at HQ 2 Brigade, 2/Lt
PN Okocha and 2/Lt OC Anyafulu were allotted a Landrover and 3 Ors and
instructed to proceed to the P & T Exchange by Major A. Ademoyega and to
wait there until he, Ademoyega, joined them
82. They drove there and, after waiting for a very short time, Major
Ademoyega arrived in another Landrover accompanied by other officers and men.
The Major went straight to the main door and knocked. The door was opened by
one of the employees and Major Ademoyega, 2/Lt Okocha and 2/Lt Anyafulu
entered, accompanied by the Ors. The Major sent the 2/Lieutenants upstairs with
orders to bring down all the workers from the Exchange, whilst the 3 soldiers
were ordered to guard the three entrance doors of the building.
83. When all the workers were assembled, Major Ademoyega addressed them
and ordered them not to pass any calls. He reassured them that there was no
danger and advised them not to panic. He told them that he was leaving the two
2/Lts and the soldiers at the Exchange to ensure that his orders were obeyed.
After speaking to the officer in charge of the exchange, Major Ademoyega
instructed the 2/Lts not to molest any of the workers leaving instructions that
they must not leave there until he, Ademoyega, returned to collect them.
84. Neither of these officers have admitted that they took any steps to
ensure that the automatic exchange would cease to function. An automatic
exchange does not depend upon any human agency to continue functioning and it
must, therefore, be accepted that one of these officers interfered with the
installation.
85. At 0500 hours 2/Lt Okocha complained that he was unwell and left in
the landrover that had brought them there. 2/Lt Anyafulu and the 3 ORs remained
in the exchange until about 0645 hours. Seeing no sign of Major Ademoyega,
Anyafulu became worried. The workers of the day shift began to arrive but were
prevented from entering by the soldiers. He then decided to return to his unit.
He gave the soldiers some money to enable them to travel back to Apapa by bus.
He too returned to Apapa in a commercial bus and remained in his office until
arrested.
NIGERIAN EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS (N.E.T)
86. After the distribution of arms and ammunition at HQ 2 Brigade, Major
A. Ademoyega ordered the following officers and ORs to enter with him into a
landrover driven by L/Cpl Umoru:
Captain GS Adeleke
2/Lt NS Wokocha
2/Lt ES Nweke
NA 18149089 Sgt. E. Ogbu - Army HQ (LGO)
NA 18150419 Cpl. H Nwegu - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 504344 Cpl. B Nwuogu - Army HQ (LGO)
NA 18150320 L/Cpl R Ejimkonye - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 504221 Sgt. F Agonsi - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18151015 Sgt. F. Eke - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18150647 Cpl. JC Iroegbulam - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 1810641 Cpl. Esonu - 1 Signal Squadron
NA 18150599 Cpl. D. Oharuzike- 1 Signal Squadron
87. From Apapa the party drove straight to Lion Building where 2/Lt ES
Nweke, Sgt. E Ogbu, Cpl. H Nwegu, Cpl B Nwuogu and L/Cpl B Ejimkonye left the
vehicle and entered the building. Major Ademoyega spoke to the officer in
charge and ordered him to cease receiving or transmitting all messages. He
introduced 2/Lt Nweke as the officer who would see to it that his orders were
obeyed. Major Ademoyega and Capt. Adeleke then drove away.
88. 2/Lt. Nweke posted his men in strategic positions to prevent anyone
entering or leaving the building and remained inside the building with L/Cpl
Ejimkonye to ensure that no messages were received or transmitted. The party
remained there until 0820 hours when, in the absence of any further instructions,
2/Lt Nweke and his men traveled to the Federal Guard Barracks in Ikoyi by taxi.
On arrival there they were arrested.
89. There is no doubt that 2/Lt Nweke was fully aware of the fact that
his occupation of the NET was connected with the rebellion of which he was
informed at the meeting of officers late on 14 Jan 66 in Major Ifeajuna's house
in Apapa.
FEDERAL TERRITORY POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
LION BUILDING, LAGOS
90. As shown in paragraph 85 of this report, Major Ademoyega,
accompanied by 2/Lts Wokocha and Nweke left HQ 2 Brigade at Approximately 0200
Hours in a landrover driven by LCpl Umoru, which also contained 9 ORs
91. They arrived at Lion Building around 0220 hours where Major
Ademoyega, 2/Lt Wokocha, Sgt. F Agonsi, Sgt. F. Eke, Cpl Iroegbulam, Cpl S.
Esonu and Cpl. D. Ohazurike left the vehicles and entered the building. Cpls
Ohazurike and Esonu were posted downstairs at the security desk. Major
Ademoyega spoke to the policemen on duty there and told them that they were
engaged on military operations. He ordered them not to answer the telephone nor
transmit any telephone messages. The two corporals were instructed to ensure
that the police obeyed the Major's orders.
92. Major Ademoyega, 2/Lt Wokocha and the others then proceeded upstairs
to the Police Control Room. Here they found 4 PCs and one WPC on duty. A SPO,
rank not identified was also on duty there. Major Ademoyega spoke to the police
and ordered them not to receive or transmit any telephone or radio messages. He
informed the SPO that they were engaged in military operations and that the
soldiers were there to protect the Police.
93. At approximately 0320 hours. The GOC, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi
arrived at Lion Building in a Jaguar car. He entered the lobby holding a pistol
in his hand and asked the two soldiers on duty what they were doing there. They
replied that they did not know why they were there and that they had been
brought by Major Ademoyega. They also told the GOC that 2/Lt. Wokocha and some
others were upstairs. The GOC then ordered Cpl. Esonu to go up and to bring
down the 2/Lt. Esonu complied but could not find the control room. He came down
again and informed the GOC of his failure.
94. The GOC, after having asked the men to which unit they belonged,
then ordered them to return to their barracks immediately. He added that he did
not know what was happening but that he was turning out 2 Battalion to attack
the men then engaged on unlawful operations in Lagos. After this, the GOC left.
95. Cpl. Ohazurike then ordered Esonu to go upstairs again, accompanied
by a PC, to find 2/Lt Wokocha and to tell him of the visit of the GOC. Esonu
complied and passed the message to 2/Lt Wokocha. The latter then decided that
it would be wisest to comply with the GOC's orders. He collected all his men
and went to the Ministry of Defence where he succeeded in obtaining transport
to take the entire back to Apapa where they arrived around 0430 hours.
IBADAN - WESTERN NIGERIA
ABDUCTION OF R.A. FANI-KAYODE AND
ASSASSINATION OF S.L. AKINTOLA
96. As has already been demonstrated, Captain E. Nwobosi, OC 2 Field
Battery NNA, was taken into the confidence of the conspirators either on 13 or
14 Jan 66, whilst he was attending a Brigade Training Conference at Apapa.
During the afternoon of 14 Jan 66, he was given a set of written instructions
by Major Ifeajuna.
It is probable that these instructions included the arrest of the
Premier and Deputy Premier of the West and an order to bring these VIPs to the
Federal Guard Officer's Mess. The instruction also probably included an order
to make arrangements for a 105 mm Howitzer to be brought to Lagos after the
operation. This written instruction has not been recovered and was probably
destroyed by Capt. Nwobosi after his arrest.
97. Capt. Nwobosi was further instructed by Major Ifeajuna to stand by
his telephone in Abeokuta to await a message giving the all clear and
"H" hour.
98. Capt. Nwobosi returned to Abeokuta, where he arrived around 1800
hrs. Since the battery which he commanded was in the process of being formed
and had not, as yet, been supplied with vehicles, Capt. Nwobosi went to 2 Recce
Squadron, also stationed at Abeokuta, where he spoke to Capt. Remawa and 2/Lt.
Orok.
He gave them a message purporting to have come from Major OBIENU, CO 2
Recce Sqn, instructing these two officers to supply him, Nwobosi, with one
3-Ton truck and a landrover. Capt. Remawa agreed and arrangements were made for
the vehicles to report to Nwobosi at midnight, with drivers. Later that
evening, Capt. Nwobosi received a telephone call from Major Ifeajuna giving him
the all clear and giving "H" hour as 0200 hours.
100. Around midnight, Capt. Nwobosi, woke up 2/Lt. A. A. O. Egbikor of
his unit and Sgt. T. Ibolegbu, the acting Battery Sergeant Major (BSM). He
ordered the latter to turn out 25 men for IS operations and to tell the Battery
Quartermaster Sergeant (BQMS), Ambrose Chukwu, to prepare all the Unit's stock
of small arms and ammunition for immediate issue to the men. Although Capt.
Nwobosi claims that he gave no intimation to anyone about the night's
operations, the interrogation of the ORs involved has made it clear that around
1930 hours he instructed certain key NCOs to stand-by for IS operations.
101. After the men had been roused, they were issued with arms and
ammunition by the BQMS. A total of 15 SLRs and 12 Sterling SMGs were issued.
The two officers drew SLRs. When issued, each SLR magazine contained 20 rounds
of ammunition, whilst each SMG magazine contained 28 rounds.
102. After the issue of arms, the men now marched to the parade ground
where they were addressed by Capt. Nwobosi who informed them that they were
proceeding to Ibadan for I.S operations. The men were then ordered to enbus.
When this was completed the vehicles contained the following personnel:
(1) Landrover
Capt: E.Nwobosi
NA 504197 BQMS A. Chukwu
NA 2630 Gnr. D. Odiachi
NA 3330 Gnr. I. Ajao
NA Gnr. S. Adefi
NA 5117 Lbdr E. Uloh
NA 5479 Gnr. R. Nwabuisi
NA 5145 Gnr. B. Akau
Driver: NA 2215 Tpr. A. Itodo (2 Recce Sqn)
(2) 3-Ton Truck
2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor
NA 502193 Sgt. T. Ebelegbu {acting BSM)
NA 18147640 Sgt. M.E. Ogaga
NA 4175 Gnr. G. Njeku
NA 4266 Gnr. B. Ifezue
NA 18144875 Lbdr. A. Aghar
NA 5792 Gnr. (lllegible)
NA 3208 Gnr. J. Echenim
NA 4195 Gnr. O.Onyekwe
NA 4337 Gnr. S. Ukelenye
NA 18151782 Gnr. B. Mba
NA 5498 Gnr. R. Gbongbo
NA 3094 Gnr. D. Ugbemoiko
NA 5789 Gnr. 0. Dasheet
NA 5675 Gnr. J. Gwaske
NA 4338 Gnr. s. Anukam
103. When all were seated, the convoy moved off to Ibadan. Whilst still
in Abeokuta, Capt. Nwobosi stopped to pick up a pregnant woman in labour and
take her to the nearest hospital. After this incident, the convoy continued on
its way uninterrupted, reaching Ibadan around 0200 hours as planned.
104. They drove straight to the P & T automatic telephone exchange
in Agodi, where Capt. Nwobosi and 2/Lt. Egbikor ordered all the employees to
leave the building, believing that this would stop all telephone communication
in and out of Ibadan. In the event, this was not the case, as the automatic
exchange continued to function and telephone communication continued unimpaired
throughout the night.
105. From the P&T the force drove to the Eleyele ECN Power Station.
Here the employees were ordered to stop the generators and to leave the
building. A number of the employees prevailed on Capt. Nwobosi to give them a
lift into the town. He obliged and dropped them near Dugbe Market, on his way
to the house of R.A. Fani-Kayode.
106. Arrived at the Deputy Premier's residence, the 3- Tonner remained
outside and the landrover drove into the compound. Of two policemen on guard at
the gate, one escaped and the other was overpowered and put into the landrover.
A number of persons believed to have been thugs were seen in the compound, but
these absconded when they caught sight of the armed soldiers.
107. All the men were ordered to take up defensive positions around the
house. Capt. Nwobosi then shouted "Fani-Kayode: Come down you are for
lawful arrest by the army". A voice from upstairs replied affirmatively to
the Captain's summons, but nothing stirred. Nwobosi repeated his call once or
twice and eventually fired a round from his SLR into the ground. When this
failed to produce any reaction from Fani-Kayode, the Captain ordered the
following to accompany him into the house:
(1) 2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor
(2) BQMS A. Chukwu
(3) Gnr. I. Ajao
(4) Gnr. S. Adefi
(5) Sgt. T. Ibelegbu
108. To gain entrance, Capt. Nwobosi was compelled to break a glass
panel in the door with his SLR. He reached in, turned the key and opened the
door. The small party then entered and mounted the stairs where they found
Fani-Kayode in a bedroom. He raised his hands above his head and said "I
surrender". Capt. Nwobosi replied "you have wasted a lot of time - we
could have shot you. This is a lawful arrest by the army". Fani-Kayode was
then escorted downstairs and put into the landrover after his hands had been
tied together, with a rifle sling. From upstairs a-woman's voice was heard
shouting "Don't kill him".
109. All the men were then assembled and mounted into their respective
vehicles. They drove straight to Premier's Lodge, directed by Fani-Kayode. When
they arrived, they had to overpower the police guard consisting of 1 Corporal
and 5 PCs. These were put into the 3- Tonner under guard. The landrover then
drove in and was parked facing the main entrance porch. At this time the
security lights were burning and the lodge emergency generator was running.
110. The men were disposed around the building in strategic positions
whilst Capt. Nwobosi went to the generator room to switch off the lights.
Whilst he was there according to the landrover driver, Tpr. A. Itodo, a shot
was fired. It was believed that this was the shot fired by Capt. Nwobosi, which
killed the generator attendant. His body was later found with a bullet wound in
the back of the head.
111. It is known that by the time S.L. Akintola had been informed by the
wife of R.A. Fani-Kayode of what had happened by telephone. Akintola had
returned from Kaduna only a short time before the arrival of Nwobosi and his
men. He had been to the North to greet the Sardauna when the latter arrived
from Mecca. Akintola must have been further alerted by the commotion caused by
the overpowering of the police guard and the killing of the generator
attendant.
112. All dispositions having been taken, Capt. Nwobosi stood in the
middle of the courtyard and shouted "Akintola come down - you are for
lawful arrest by the army on orders from HQ 2 Brigade. A voice from upstairs,
presumably that of Akintola, replied "Yes, I am coming" Nothing
further happened. Capt. Nwobosi repeated his summons a number of times without
reaction from Akintola. He then fired from his SLR one round at the building.
When this produced no result, the Captain ordered the following to accompany
him into the lodge:
(1) 2/Lt. A.A.O. Egbikor
(2) BQMS A. Chukwu
(3} Gnr. S. Adefi
(4} Gnr. I. Ajao
{5) Gnr. B. Akau
(6) Gnr. J. Gwaske
(7) LIBdr E. Uloh
113. To gain entrance, Captain Nwobosi was compelled to force the main
door to the lodge. They all entered and mounted the stairs. On the first floor
they searched a number of rooms without encountering anyone, until they came to
S.L. Akintola's bedroom which was locked. When Nwobosi was about to force this
door, Akintola opened fire from inside the room with an SMG, shooting through
the closed door. This first burst of fire immediately wounded Gnr. S. Adefi in
the hand, 2/Lt. Egbikor in the head and Capt. Nwobosi on the left cheek. None
of the injuries were sufficiently serious to impede them. Nwobosi and his men
immediately returned the fire whilst retreating down the stairs. They then left
the house in a hurry and sought cover amongst the flowerbeds facing the back
building.
114. Two of the men, L/Bdr. Uloh and, Gnr. Ajao remained upstairs and
sought refuge in one of the other rooms. Akintola came to the room covering the
entrance porch and continued to fire at his assailants with his SMG without,
however, hitting anyone. Capt. Nwobosi ordered his men to return the fire which
they did, massively. Akintola continued firing until he ran out of ammunition.
115. Around this time R.A. Fani-Kayode was heard shouting from the
landrover to Akintola urging him to surrender. Akintola, now defenceless,
decided to surrender and was next seen coming out of the front room, by Gnr.
Ajao. When Akintola saw Ajao and Uloh he raised his hand in surrender and went
downstairs. Capt. Nwobosi in the meantime, was heard shouting repeatedly
"bring him out, bring him out".
116. Capt. Nwobosi then ordered 2/Lt. Egbikor and BQMS A. Chukwu to
shoot the Premier. These two opened fire on Akintola with their SLRs, joined,
shortly afterwards, by Nwobosi himself. S.L. Akintola fell down dead or dying
with several bullets in his body.
117. After the killing of Akintola, Capt. Nwobosi assembled his men,
released the captured policemen and drove off. This time he was joined in the
landrover by 2/Lt. Egbikor. They stopped at a roundabout near the Central
Police Station, where Capt. Nwobosi ordered Sgt. T. Ibelegbu to proceed
independently to Abeokuta with orders to collect a 105 mm Howitzer from the
battery gun park together with a team of 12 gunners, and to drive to 2
Battalion, Ikeja. There, Ibelegbu and his party were to await the arrival of
Capt. Nwobosi.
118. On the way out of Ibadan, R.A. Fani-Kayode begged Capt. Nwobosi to
be released. The Captain refused this request and informed Fani-Kayode that he
had orders to bring him to the Federal Guard Officers' Mess in Lagos.
119. The party drove direct to Dodan Barracks where they arrived around
0700 hours, having left Ibadan at approximately 0400 hours. On their arrival
they were all arrested.
120. The party travelling in the 3-Tonner with the 105 mm Howitzer was arrested
on arrival in 2 Battalion lines, Ikeja.
Continued in Part Three
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