Read Part 7 HERE The Orkar Failed Coup of April 22, 1990 Part 2 By Nowa Omoigui, MD, MPH, FACC GENERAL ABACHA's BROADCAS...
The Orkar Failed Coup of April 22, 1990
Part 2
By Nowa Omoigui, MD, MPH, FACC
GENERAL ABACHA's BROADCAST
After the radio station in Lagos was regained by loyal troops, there was a brief announcement by Lt. Col. GT Zidon followed by the following broadcast by Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha:
"I, Lieutenant-General Sani Abacha, Chief of Army Staff, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, have found it necessary to address you once again in the course of our nation's history. In view of the unfortunate, development early this morning, I'm in touch with the CGS, Service Chiefs, GOCs, FOCs, AOCs, of the armed forces and they have all pledged their unflinching support and loyalty to the federal military government of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida who is perfectly safe and with whom I am in contact.
"Early this morning there was sporadic firing by a few disloyal and misguided soldiers in some isolated parts of Lagos, followed by an embarrassing radio broadcast.
"Fellow Nigerians, you will all agree with me that the reasons given for this grave misconduct are significantly motivated by greed and self-interest. The soldiers involved decided to constitute themselves into national security nuisance for no other cause than base avarice.'
'Most of these disloyal elements have been arrested and are already undergoing interrogation. The remaining dissidents are advised in their own interest to report to the nearest military location and hand over the arms and ammunition in their possession. All formation and unit commanders are hereby directed to exercise effective command and control. "At this stage, let me reiterate our commitment to pursue vigorously the transition programme. No amount of threat or blackmail will detract the federal military government's attention in this regard. We are set to hand over power to a democratically elected government in 1992. I wish to assure all law-abiding citizens that the situation is now under control and people should go about pursuing their lawful interest.
"Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
"Thank you."
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GENERAL BABANGIDA'S BROADCAST
A broadcast was also made by President Babangida:
"Fellow Nigerians, I salute you all, first and foremost, let me assure you further that the unfortunate situation of this morning in some parts of Lagos has been brought under control by loyal troops as earlier stated by the chief of army staff and chairman, joint chiefs of staff, Lieutenant-General Sani Abacha with whom I have been in contact and he is with me this evening.
"I also want to seize this opportunity to commend all members of the Nigerian armed forces the Nigeria police and security agents for the gallant and professional manner the situation was contained.
"Let me also congratulate the civil populace for their continued support for this administration. I wish to state that all law-abiding citizens should go about their normal duties and their safety guaranteed. Let me also assure the diplomatic community and all foreigners in the country that the security of their lives and property is hereby guaranteed.
Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Thank you for your co-operation."
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ESCAPE FROM RADIO NIGERIA
Isolated and surrounded, with the coup clearly headed for failure, the most senior officers involved, Lt. Col Nyiam and Major Saliba Mukoro initially contemplated a suicide pact, but then escaped from the radio station and eventually left the country for exile in Britain and the US respectively.
Isolated and surrounded, with the coup clearly headed for failure, the most senior officers involved, Lt. Col Nyiam and Major Saliba Mukoro initially contemplated a suicide pact, but then escaped from the radio station and eventually left the country for exile in Britain and the US respectively.
Great Ogboru, the civilian alleged to be a key co-factor, also slipped out of the country to Europe. Mukoro later became an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at a University in the U.S. Security agents detained and hounded those elements of their respective families left behind. But unconfirmed reports later suggested that on Major Mukoro's wife simply walked away from supposed house arrest at Ikeja cantonment in Lagos and found her way abroad. Great Ogboru's brother was jailed and it is said that even after fully serving his jail term, General Abacha refused to release him.
How did Mukoro and Nyiam escape from Radio Nigeria?
According to Col. Nyiam, in a 2000 interview with the Guardian: "At the point of battle when we had, as it were, allowed all soldiers loyal to us to engage, we decided that we would walk like officers out of that zone with the resolve that it will be better to be shot standing than crawling. And we walked, there was no disguise. How we walked out of the encirclement is what I called the mystery and I give that glory to where it belongs....I will say that when we left the zone of the conflict itself between 1.00 and 2.00 a.m., here again we give credit to the poor Nigerians around the shore of the new third mainland bridge.
There were a lot of poor people who lived there, who lived in the shanties. Those people immediately created a force to ferry anybody involved in the action across the water to the other side and I must say that when we got there they were so generous that even in the heat of it all when they were giving us water to drink, they felt that their water was too dirty for me to drink and they went and bought mineral - that shows you the generousity of the poor.
They felt we were too good to drink their water so they gave us soft drink. It was these same poor people who became our scout and helped us to walk through Isale Eko and thereafter when we got to a point on the old Carter Bridge, we asked them to go back and we walked on foot. Again, there were soldiers, how they did not see us - that credit goes to God. In cases where soldiers, the police and other forces saw us, they ignored us and even helped us to go through. In effect, people should not be over critical of the police or disown soldiers because many of them have been suffering from the same problems average people go through. In summary, the mystery and experience of this body and mind talking to you and Mukoro is only but a demonstration of God's power."
COURTS-MARTIAL
Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar was arrested along with about 300 other military personnel and more than 30 civilians. In the usual Nigerian pattern of mass arrests and reactive witch hunting, some journalists considered unsympathetic to the regime were also detained and newspapers even closed.
Following a Board of Inquiry, cases were referred to a Military Tribunal chaired by Major General Ike Omar Sanda Nwachukwu. The Chief Prosecutor was Brigadier General Tunde Olurin while Lt. Col. Akin Kejawa led the defence.
In July 1990, Major GG Orkar and 41 others were convicted for treason and executed by firing squad after confirmation of sentences by the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). Nine other defendants were jailed while 31 soldiers were acquitted.
Following a serious controversy inspired by allegations made by some of the convicts - as they were about to be shot - that those acquitted by the first tribunal were fellow putschists acquitted on ethnic grounds, the AFRC ordered the retrial of 31 of the surviving accused by a new tribunal headed by Major General Yohanna Yerima Kure. The Chief prosecutor this time around was Lt. Col. Kemi Peters while Lt Col JOJ Okolagwu led the defence.
In September 1990, therefore, a second batch of 27 executions was carried out.
It has been said that the core Bendel (Edo/Delta) and Rivers (Rivers/Bayelsa) plotters were not remorseful about the rebellion. Captain Empere in particular was very defiant and identified the late Isaac Adaka Boro as his mentor and hero. He and others were driven by deeply held feelings that although their exploited lands produced Nigeria's oil wealth, their people had little to show for it. It is fair to categorize the rebellion, therefore, as a "resource control uprising".
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SOME ADDITIONAL BIOSKETCHES
Major GG Orkar
Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar was Tiv from Benue State. He started his officer cadet training at the NDA in 1972 with the 12th Regular Combatant Course.
He was commissioned in December 1974 in the rank of Second Lieutenant and posted to the Nigerian Army Armoured Corps School in Ibadan. He did particularly well on the Armour Young Officers course and was later sent for some specialized courses in gunnery. Indeed he was recognized as a gunnery expert by his colleagues.
There is an unconfirmed story that as a subaltern, he was once granted six months seniority over his colleagues based on outstanding performance representing his commanding officer back in the seventies.
As a junior officer he also attended several courses in the Nigerian Army School of Infantry. He was on the first Nigerian contingent that was sent to Chad Republic and he later served in the 22 Armoured Brigade.
He passed both the junior and senior divisions of Staff College with flying colours.
His last posting was as a member of the Directing Staff of the Command and Staff College.
Major GG Orkar was said to have been recruited into the plot just a few weeks before April 22, 1990.
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Lt. Col Gabriel Anthony Nyiam
GA Nyiam attended primary school in Lagos before going to the Nigerian Military School in Zaria. He subsequently attended the Nigerian Defence Academy as part of the 9th Regular Combatant Course, beginning in January 1971.
Upon completion of his program at NDA he was inducted into the Corp of Engineers. He attended Earthwork University in Edinburgh and undertook a second degree at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. During this period he was seconded to the British Army, where he says he imbibed the culture that "soldiering is an honourable profession in the defence of the weak".
When he returned to Nigeria he joined General Babangida's staff at the AHQ. He was a staff officer at the AHQ until just before the putsch when he was posted to the Commmand and Staff College at Jaji as a Directing Staff.
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Lt. Col UK Bello
Lt Col Usman K Bello was an indigene of Niger State. Gwari by tribe, he started his Officer Cadet training with the 9th Regular Combatant Course in January 1971 at the Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna. He was commissioned in the rank of Second Lieutenant in June 1973 and posted to the Recce Regiment.
He attended several courses in the Nigerian Army School of Infantry and some Armour officers' courses in Britain and the United States.
He was ADC to Brigadier SM Yar Adua when the latter was Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters. He was also the Brigade Major 24 Armoured Brigade before he proceeded to the Command and Staff College (CSC) for his Senior Division Course. At CSC he did very well and came first in order of merit.
Bello was not a university graduate but he put all his energy into making a career of the army. His last posting before being deployed to Dodan Barracks was as the CO of the Recce Battalion in Kaduna. As a Lt Col, he replaced Major MS Dasuki as ADC to President Babangida. Even as ADC he sought permission to undergo airborne training in the Nigerian Army School of Infantry. This was not a normal practice for one at his age and rank
Bello commanded tremendous amount of respect from all ranks. The President had a lot of confidence in him.
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REFLECTIONS ON THE UPRISING BY LT. COL. GA NYIAM
(For full details, see Guardian and Vanguard newspapers dated April 15 & 16, 2000)
What was the objective of the April 1990 rebellion?
According to Lt. Col. G Anthony Nyiam, who was the most senior officer involved in the uprising (but not the leader), the aim was "to have a caretaker government with a view to do two things at that time. One was to do a proper national census and a proper election and also set up a framework for a national conference."
In an interview with the Sunday Vanguard Newspaper published on April 16, 2000, Nyiam also said "With that in mind, we never had any idea that we were going to govern anybody. It was just to restore power to the people. That is to restore democracy. Our aim was that there was going to be a caretaker committee which was going to be headed by a former minister under President Shagari."
How did Nyiam get involved?
Nyiam volunteered information that he was recruited into the conspiracy in February 1990 "when some junior officers approached me to express their discontentment with the system...Because, I did not completely trust them, I did not give any word whether I would support the plan or not. Instead, I started to watch them. I watched them for about one month to see if they were serious or the intention was to set me up. These were young officers who really meant business because they were full of zeal. Because of their enthusiasm and anger, they were anxious that the coup be carried out almost with dispatch. But, I continually urged restraint as what they wanted would not have given room for much planning. Eventually, we came in to try to reorganize and look at things, how we could do it better. But, along the line, the action leaked. We had envisaged the possibility of a leakage and had, as a result of that, put in place contingency plan so that we would not be arrested like General Mamman Vatsa and co."
How did the plot leak?
"The details of the contingency plan was that we would move if the coup plot leaked. And true to what we thought, several days before action was to be carried out, our intelligence reports indicated that the plan had leaked. This obviously forced us to immediately take up arms." He went on: "In fact, another senior officer, a mate of mine who was the link between the young officers and myself, eventually sold out, that is, he was the source of the leakage. When we realised that our plans had leaked, that led to the pre-emptive action we took. I remember we took our action without any arm, it was in that night that our resources were got by first of all taking over Apapa."
Why was the so called "Far" North excised from Nigeria?
On the question about the excision of some far northern states, Nyiam said: "If you read our speech (on the coup), you will find out that our position was based on the presumption that the then Sultan was imposed on the people of Sokoto and that the act was the beginning of the destruction of the traditional institution. The act ostensibly destroyed the Sokoto caliphate by causing division between the two houses. It was on the basis of this that we said that state would not be re-absorbed (if we had succeeded in taking over government) into the country until that traditional stool had been restored to the proper person. If you read the conditionalities, you are likely to discover that what we were saying was that sultanate would not have fitted into the new order that we envisaged. We did not see the action as a coup but as an uprising, to correct some anomalies."
But in a separate interview with the Sunday Guardian newspaper, Nyiam was also reported as having 'defended the coup broadcast in which some states in the far North were exercised from the country, saying he is more convinced now that the action was proper. He said: "We saw it coming [excision]. After the Mamman Vatsa's coup attempt, I travelled with Abacha within the country to meet traditional rulers and Army Commanders to speak to soldiers. Anytime we went to the Hausa areas in the North, we were given Hausa and Islamic regalia and if you didn't wear it, they would not be happy with you. It got to a stage that if you were in the Army, you have to speak Hausa. What I am saying in effect was that, there was a gradual acculturation of other people who have superior culture." '
What was Nyiam's relationship with General Babangida?
Nyiam was reported (by the Sunday Guardian) to have admitted being an "IBB boy". The newspaper said: 'The former military president, he added, commissioned him to work on a diarchy based on Egypt's Abdel Nasser model where the military, produced the president while the civilians produced the prime minister. Explaining that it was part of the self-succession agenda of Babangida and the late Abacha, he said that being so close to Babangida, he had access to privileged information which showed that the former military president was not at all in a hurry to quit the political stage except by an uprising.'
Further, Nyiam, explaining his initial attraction to the former President, also stated that: "In a nutshell, we all came in to help Babangida whom we thought was a man who meant well. If one goes back to his earlier contribution, he was doing very well and we all gave him our support. But then, when we saw the things that were coming up; things like the way people from the South were being maginalised, in NNPC; how Ebitu Ukiwe was thrown out of power to make room for Abacha, and a host of other things that happened. It was also at this period that the OIC thing started. All these put together made one reason that one cannot just be an officer in name and watch his people being marginalised or being made victims or killed. At the time also, Dele Giwa was murdered."
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE APRIL REVOLT
Like all failed coups before it, the April 1990 coup led to certain reactive (i.e. witch hunting) measures by the military against the services, units or corps that were thought to have been deeply involved in it. Military Police Battalions were downsized. A similar phenomenon occurred after the Vatsa conspiracy. However, this angle is outside the scope of this article.
In his seminal work "The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army", Major General Mohammed Alli, former Chief of Army Staff, who as a Colonel in Kano had dissociated himself and his Brigade from the coup, described the Mukoro/Orkar et al coup as one "imbued with undue radicalism."
He opined that in execution, the revolt "suffered communication disconnection" (whatever that means) but that it had nevertheless "shaken the nation and the northern hegemony to their very foundation and fabric." Alli says that the 1990 coup, "like its predecessor in 1966" opened "a more precarious and frightening chapter, pointing to and crying for fundamental changes in the nation's political structure and the basis of existence and control of the Armed Forces." However, "as soon as it was subdued and suppressed, the nation went back to business as usual."
One obvious consequence to civilians was the acceleration of the movement of the federal capital from Lagos to Abuja in 1990 by the Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida. It was also reported by some pundits that he was rattled by the experience and lost a considerable amount of self-confidence for quite some time. This temporary newfound humility extended to some of his apologists but it was also mixed with passive-aggressive behaviors driven by fear and insecurity.
The failure of the coup, however, marked the beginning of the rise of Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha who was now increasingly being referred to in the Press as the Khalifa (successor). Whatever anyone said of him, few could doubt his ferocity and deliberate calm under conditions of extreme danger that befell him on April 22. He had proved his mettle. As former Panamanian dictator General Noriega once said: "The ultimate sign of virility is the ability to hold on to power."
It was widely acknowledged that Abacha could quite easily have taken power for himself if he wanted - although he was not highly thought of by so called 'IBB boys'. Clearly, Babangida owed him plenty and became increasingly beholden to his attitudes - particularly since there was some discussion of the merits and demerits of Babangida's abandonment of Dodan Barracks - albeit involuntarily.
Another officer who benefited from the failure of the April rebellion was Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi of the 9th Brigade. He was rewarded with the Command of the Brigade of Guards and it marked the beginning of his eventual ascendancy into the rarified atmosphere of service chiefs. It is also possible that Major General Chris Alli's eventual emergence as the first Chief of Army Staff under General Abacha may have been influenced by the standing he gained with the "caucus" during this coup attempt.
According to Kunle Amuwo, who carried out a research project on General Babangida's "personal rulership" project, the 1990 rebellion, coming as it did in the setting of Babangida's "permanent transition" undermined his credibility and may have been a factor in the way the public reacted to the deaths of over 150 middle grade officers in a subsequent C-130 plane crash in 1992. Amuwo holds the opinion that 'Even though Babangida lamented that "a whole generation of young officers (mainly Majors) has been wiped out" by the air crash, the public thought his government may have had a hand in it.
During their trials, Major Gideon Orkar and his men reportedly told the military tribunal that their coup was in three layers; that unless all young officers were killed, there was no hiding place for the regime. Over 160 officers perished in the crash. That the public tended to give credence to this story is, itself, a measure of lack of trust in the General as his "tenure" dragged to an end.' The public's reaction to the gutting by a suspicious fire of the Ministry of Defence building in 1993 followed similar lines.
But there were other consequences. Although most people dismissed the so called conditional expulsion of the "far" north as a silly gamble, according to Professor Julius Ihonvbere, the coup forced certain "deep-rooted" conflicts and "critical issues" to the front page of the national discourse. Never too distant from national institutional memory anyway, right from the days of the 1957 Willink Commission report, the Ifeajuna/Nzeogwu insurrection of January 15, 1966, the Isaac Boro "Niger-Delta" rebellion, the Petroleum and Land Use Acts, these were to play out in later years as the Ogoni crisis, small concessions by Babangida on the 'onshore-offshore' issue, creation of OMPADEC, June 12 imbroglio, and more recent undercurrents of the "Sovereign National Conference", "Power Shift", "Resource Control", "Federalism", and "Sharia" polemics.
There are observers who say that these fault lines in Nigerian politics portend an inevitable earthquake. I prefer the nuanced Chinese interpretation (as was once observed by the late President Kennedy) - that every crisis presents both danger and opportunity.
CASUALTIES OF THE REBELLION
A full accounting of the dead and injured from the April 1990 rebellion is not yet possible, in part because of the secretive nature of events surrounding the incident. However, it is widely assumed to be the bloodiest attempt to seize power in the history of Nigeria.
EXECUTED (incomplete list)
Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar
Captain N Harley Empere
Captain Perebo A Dakolo
Capt AA Nonju
Lt. AE Akogun
Lt. CN Odey
Lt. Cyril O Ozualor
Lt. NEO Deji
2/Lt AB Umukoro
2/Lt EJ Ejesuku
SSgt Julius Itua
Sgt Martins Ademokhai
Sgt. Pius Ilegar
WO2 Monday Bayefa
L/Cpl Francis Ogo
L/Cpl Jepta Inesei
Cpl. Sunday Effiong
L/Cpl Sam Mbakwe
L/Cpl Albert Ojerangbe
L/Cpl Godfrey Deesiiyira
L/Cpl Emma Oyemolan
Sgt. Stephen Iyeke
Cpl. Joseph Efe
WO Afolabi Moses
L/Cpl Idowu Azeez
WO Jonathan Ekini
S/Sgt Solomon Okungbowa
Private Richard Iseghoei
Private Egwolo Makpamekun
L/Cpl Edogamen Friday
S/Sgt Jolly Agbodowi
Sgt. Etim Umoh
L/Cpl Sam Obasuyi
Ex. Serviceman LC Otajareiri
Ex. Pvt Osazuwa Osifo
Ex. Pvt CP Wasiu Lawal
Ex. Pvt Peter Unuyoma
Ex. Pvt Synalman Goodluck Emefe
Ex. S/Sgt Samson Idegere
Pvt. Emmanuel Onoje
Trooper Roland Odogu
Corporal Lateef Awolola
Pvt. Dickson Omenka
Corp Ehietan Pius
Private Iroabuchi Anyalewechi
Private Henry Eguaoyi
L/Cpl Martins Odey
L/Cpl Sunday Asuquo
Trooper Celestine Ofuoku
Pvt. Anthony Korie
Pvt Thomas Angor
Pvt Edem Basi
Pvt Joseph Odey
Trooper Obioma Esiworo
L/C Magnus Ekechi
WO2 Godwin Donkon
Sgt. Ojo Adegboyega
Pvt Peter Abua
Pvt. Phillip Akamkpo
Sgt. Shehu Onleje
Corp Olanrewaju Ogunshola
L/Cpl Luka Yang
Trooper Malkily Ayogu
L/Cpl Andrew Onah
Michael Ebeku
OTHERS (At least 69 were officially executed, so this
list is incomplete)
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KILLED DURING FIGHTING
Lt. Col. UK Bello (General Babangida's ADC)
Lt. killed during altercation at Ikeja cantonment gate
3 - 5 soldiers at Ikeja
Captain Charles Idele (Idele was one of the coup leaders. He was Military Assistant to the Commandant, School of Infantry, Jaji. He left Jaji and came to Lagos to partake in the coup. His corpse was reportedly found wearing the uniform of a Major on the grounds outside Ikeja cantonment gate where he was shot by loyal troops. )
OTHERS (numbers unknown, from fighting at Dodan Barracks, Obalende and the Radio Station)
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JAILED
L/Cpl Ezekiel Akudu
Pvt Ibrahim Egwa
Sgt. John Alilu
Sgt. Andarich Eladon
L/Cpl David Amo Amo
L/Cpl Vitalis Udzea
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DISMISSED
L/Cpl Celestine Nebo
L/Cpl Wapami Adigio
L/Cpl Mike Odeniyi
L/Cpl Kingsley Aromeh
Sgt. Lawrence Ademola
Signal Man Fatai Daranijo
Pvt. Godwin Airomokha
Sgt. John Benson
L/Cpl Vincent Ozigbo
L/Cpl David Oke
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RETIRED OR DISCHARGED FROM THE MILITARY
An unknown number of soldiers and officers were discharged or retired from the military in a subsequent purge. The highest ranking of these was a Brigadier (from Bendel) who held the office of Director of Army Staff Duties and Plans. His career ended by virtue of the fact that Major Saliba Mukoro (widely presumed to be the leader of the rebellion) was his Military Assistant. The Brigadier was never charged, never found guilty of involvement, and was even reportedly involved in putting down the revolt. But in the Byzantine world of dog eat dog military politics; the so-called "caucus" organized his departure from the Army.
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Nigeria: The Palace Coup of November 17, 1993
By Nowa Omoigui
November 17th has had its fair share of palace coups in history. It was the day in 1954
that General Gamal Abdel Nasser assumed full powers as Egyptian head of state
following the overthrow of President Mohamed Naguib in a Palace coup. On the same
day, four years later in 1958, General El-Ferik Ibrahim Abboud, then Sudanese Army
Commander-in-Chief, staged the first coup in the history of Sudan when he deposed the
civilian government of Abd Allah Khalil. On the same day, in 1971, Prime Minister
Thanom engineered a coup against his own government in Thailand. He suspended the
1968 constitution, dissolved parliament, and created a new Troika composed of himself,
the deputy prime minister, Field Marshal Praphat Charusathian; and Colonel Narong
Kittikachorn. Narong was Thanom's son and Praphat's son-in- law.
On November 17, 1993, as judges from 11 nations were being sworn in at the inaugural
session of the United Nations Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal and Zaire was celebrating
its Armed Forces Day, Nigeria was once again the throes of a political succession crisis.
General Sani Abacha, Secretary for Defence and Vice Chairman, ousted Chief Ernest
Shonekan, then Chairman of the 82-day-old Interim National Government (ING), in
order "to save Nigeria from imminent disintegration.”
It happened quickly and in broad daylight. All relevant military units and conspirators
in Lagos, Abuja and Kaduna were quietly placed on alert. Under protective cover
provided by a detachment of the National Guard led by Colonel Lawan Gwadabe, three
very senior officers, motivated by different instincts and with no consensus on what
would happen thereafter, flew to Abuja from Lagos. They calmly walked into
Shonekan’s office at the Presidential Villa and asked that he resign. These officers were
General Sani Abacha (Defence Secretary), Lt. General Oladipo Diya (Chief of Defence
Staff), and Lt. Gen. Aliyu Mohammed Gusau (Chief of Army Staff). Shonekan, the
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former United African Company (UAC) Executive, never had operational control of the
Armed Forces during his controversial tenure. He wisely chose not to resist.
Interestingly, the Army Chief, Aliyu Mohammed Gusau, was said to be a personal friend
of Shonekan and reportedly played games with him from time to time. With British
backing, he is even alleged to have nominated Shonekan for the position back on August
25 when outgoing General Babangida decided to make Shonekan the Chairman of the
ING as an exit strategy, rather than General Obasanjo (rtd) or one or two other
contenders. In the macabre environment of schemes and counter-schemes preceding the
November coup, Gusau was not originally supposed to accompany the group to confront
Shonekan. As a bonafide coup merchant himself, some say he had his own plans for
power, but that unknown to him the “Lagos Group” that backed Abacha’s take-over had
identified him for retirement. He allegedly heard of the original plan to confront
Shonekan – without him – and reportedly confronted Abacha about it. Abacha and Diya
then invited him along for the show, some say, by some sort of subterfuge. I have not
been able to confirm the authenticity of the rumor that he was falsely promised that he
would become the Head of State after Shonekan if he cooperated in the scheme.
With Shonekan’s “resignation letter” in hand, General Abacha invoked a version of the
legally moribund Decree No. 61 of 1993 as the basis for his assumption of power as the
“most senior” Minister. [Less than 24 hours later he would abrogate this same decree
No. 61 that he claimed brought him into office]. Generals Abacha and Diya called a
meeting of the Interim National Government to apprise them of developments and
promise that he would work with them to find a solution to Nigeria’s problems. They
also met with the National Assembly and pledged collaboration. Once this was done they
returned to Lagos to meet with the “Lagos group” of military officers for the usual postcoup
horse trading in order to distribute appointments and chart the way forward.
Within twenty-four hours after Shonekan’s removal, Lt. Gen. Gusau was baited into open
disagreement with his colleagues over the issue of a Sovereign National Conference. He
found himself in an untenable position and submitted his letter of retirement - as Abacha
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wanted him to do. Major General Mohammed Chris Alli took his place as Army Chief,
as had been intended all along by the so-called Lagos group of military conspirators. Lt.
Gen. Oladipo Diya became Chief of General Staff; Maj. Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar,
Chief of Defence Staff; Rear Admiral Allison Madueke, Chief of Naval Staff; Air Vice
Marshall Femi John Femi remained Chief of Air Staff; and Alhaji Ibrahim Coomasie
became Inspector General of Police. The relationship between Aliyu Gusau and Sani
Abacha was not a good one until Abacha died in June 1998. At various times Gusau was
under security watch, had his passport impounded and was prevented from traveling.
Once Gusau was on his way out, Abacha moved forward with his broadcast to the Nation
on November 18, 1993, in which he went for the jugular:
“Fellow Nigerians,
Sequel to the resignation of the former Head of the Interim National
Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief
Ernest Shonekan and my subsequent appointment as Head of State
and Commander-in-Chief, I have had extensive consultations within
the armed forces hierarchy and other well meaning Nigerians in a bid
to find solutions to the various political, economic and social problems
which have engulfed our beloved country, and which have made life
most difficult to the ordinary citizen of this nation.
Chief Ernest Shonekan took over as Head of State and Commanderin-
Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces at a most trying time in the
history of the country. Politically, economically, and socially, there
were lots of uncertainties. Things appeared bleak and the atmosphere
was heavy with uncertainties. However, driven by a belief in himself,
his countrymen, and love for his country, he accepted to face the
challenges of our time. I will, therefore, like to take this opportunity
to pay tribute to him for his selfless service to the nation. He showed
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great courage at taking on the daunting task of heading the Interim
National Government and even greater courage to know when to
leave.
Many have expressed fears about the apparent return of the military.
Many have talked about the concern of the international community.
However, under the present circumstances the survival of our beloved
country is far above any other consideration. Nigeria is the only
country we have. We must, therefore, solve our problems ourselves.
We must lay a very solid foundation for the growth of democracy. We
should avoid any ad hoc or temporary solutions. The problems must
be addressed firmly, objectively, decisively and with all sincerity of
purpose.
Consequently, the following decisions come into immediate effect:
(a) The Interim National Government is hereby dissolved.
(b) The National and State Assemblies are also dissolved.
(c) The State Executive Councils are dissolved. The Brigade
Commanders are to take over from the Governors in their States until
Administrators are appointed. Where there are no Brigade
Commanders, the Commissioners of Police in the State are to take
over.
(d) All Local Governments stand dissolved. The Directors of
Personnel are to take over the administration of the Local
Governments until Administrators are appointed.
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(e) All former Secretaries to Federal Ministries are to hand over
to their Directors-General until Ministers are appointed.
(f) The two political parties are hereby dissolved.
(g) All processions, political meetings and associations of any type
in any part of the country are hereby banned.
(h) Any consultative committee by whatever name called is hereby
proscribed.
(i) Decree 61 of 1993 is hereby abrogated.
A Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), is hereby established. It will
comprise:
(a) The Head of State, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the federal Republic of Nigeria as Chairman.
(b) The Chief of General Staff as Vice-Chairman
(c) The Honourable Minister of Defence
(d) The Chief of Defence Staff
(e) The Service Chiefs
(f) The Inspector General of Police
(g) The Attorney General and Minister of Justice
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(h) The Internal Affairs Minister
(i) The Foreign Affairs Minister
Also, a Federal Executive Council will be put in place.
Our security system will be enhanced to ensure that lives of citizens,
property of individuals are protected and preserved. Drug trafficking
and other economic crimes such as 419 must be tackled and
eliminated.
On the current strike throughout the nation following the increase in
the price of fuel, I appeal to all the trade unions to return to work
immediately. We cannot afford further dislocation and destruction
of our economy.
On the closed media houses, government is hereby lifting the order of
proscription with immediate effect. We, however, appeal to the media
houses that in this spirit of national reconciliation, we should show
more restraint and build a united and peaceful Nigeria.
Fellow Nigerians, the events of the past months, starting from the
annulment of the June 12 presidential election, culminating in the
appointment of the former Head of State, Chief Ernest Shonekan,
who unfortunately resigned yesterday, are well known to you. The
economic downturn has undoubtedly been aggravated by the ongoing
political crisis.
We require well thought-out and permanent solutions to these
problems if we are to emerge stronger for them. Consequently, a
constitutional conference with full constituent powers will be
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established soon to determine the future constitutional structure of
Nigeria. The constitutional conference will also recommend the
method of forming parties, which will lead to the ultimate recognition
of political parties formed by the people. While the conference is on,
the reorganisation and reform of the following major institutions will
be carried out:
(a) The Military
(b) The Police
(c) The Customs
(d) The Judiciary
(e) NITEL
(f) NNPC
(g) NEPA
(h) The Banking Industry
(i) Higher Educational Institutions
This regime will be firm, humane, and decisive. We will not condone
nor tolerate any act of indiscipline. Any attempt to test our will be
decisively dealt with. For the International Community, we ask that
you suspend judgement while we grapple with the onerous task of
nation building, reconciliation and repairs.
This government is a child of necessity with a strong determination to
restore peace and stability to our country and on these foundations,
enthrone a lasting and true democracy. Give us the chance to solve
our problems in our own ways.
Long Live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.”
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Background and Count-down to the November 17 Coup
The complex military intrigues associated with the Sani Abacha led Palace coup of
November 17, 1993 and its aftermath reminds me of three lines in Chapter IV of "The
Art of War" by the Chinese Military Philosopher Sun Tzu, under 'TACTICAL
DISPOSITIONS':
“1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the
possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the
enemy.
2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the
opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the
victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and
afterwards looks for victory.”
FROM 1985 - 1990
When Major General Ibrahim Babangida came to power after the Palace Coup of August
1985, he rewarded then Major General Sani Abacha, GOC of the Army’s 2nd Division
with the position of Chief of Army Staff - the position from which Babangida had
launched himself into power. Abacha reportedly negotiated for this position as a
condition for supporting the coup.
However, Abacha was not well regarded professionally. He was thought of as a very dull
officer, who was prone to late coming, disliked staff meetings, kept odd hours, enjoyed
exclusive private parties and loved entertaining himself with curious personal interests.
There were rumors that he had not made it out of the Staff College at Jaji with honor, that
some of his old confidential reports were much below par and that he had been saved on
several occasions from retirement during his military career. One such occasion was a
controversial bloody clash with the Police when he was the Brigade Commander in Port
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Harcourt in the late seventies. Nevertheless, he was a key coup conspirator in December
1983 and August 1985 - which is what counted in the Nigerian Army of that era.
According to sources, soon after he became Army Chief in 1985 one of the first things he
did was intimidate many local and foreign Army contractors into arrangements from
which he would benefit personally. Some of those who met him then say he seemed to
be driven by a fanatical desire to compete financially with his rival and protégé, General
Babangida, who had been the immediate past holder of that office. A source told me that
Abacha - without providing any evidence - had a mental fixation that Babangida was very
wealthy and that he (Abacha) could also be wealthy if contractors “do for me as you did
for him”. The dysfunctional manifestations of this rivalry dogged Abacha throughout his
career as a Service Chief and later Head of State. Allegedly he always felt that he needed
to stash away huge sums of money as a way to guarantee his personal security. It
remains unclear to this day why he felt that way.
He was also very state-security conscious and regularly took a hard line against soldiers
suspected of disloyalty. He was party to the decision to execute General Vatsa and others
in March 1986 - in spite of numerous domestic and foreign pleas - and was not happy
when the charge against Major Akinyemi was changed from ‘Treason’ to ‘treasonable
felony’. His displeasure was that the lesser charge guaranteed that even if guilty he
would not be executed. (Never a man to forget old grudges, he stubbornly refused to
release the Major from Prison ten years later, even after he completed his sentence!)
In time, Abacha’s poor management skills and lack of professional respect undermined
him with the caucus of junior and middle ranking officers that brought Babangida to
power. As the Chief of Army Staff, he was even allegedly personally insulted by then
Major Sambo Dasuki, a one-time ADC to the President - an incident that eventually led
to the Major’s first “protective exile” to the United States on course. Clamour began
that Abacha be removed as Army Chief to make way for a more professionally sound
officer. I vividly recall an officer (now late) tell me back then that “Abacha is spoiling
the Army.” Naturally, once his blood was sensed in the water, other ambitious senior
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Army Officers began eyeing his job, notably Brigadier (later Major General) Joshua
Dogonyaro who had also been a key insider in the coup that propelled Babangida to
power. Not far behind were other Officers of the Regular One- (1) course at the Nigerian
Defence Academy who felt that their time had come to take over the leadership of the
Army from foreign-trained Officers. Such Regular One Officers included Saliu Ibrahim,
Aliyu Gusau, Oladipo Diya, etc.
Abacha’s reaction to all this was to accuse Babangida of deliberately underfunding the
Army so as to make him (Abacha) unpopular with the troops. Things were bad enough at
one stage that a secret meeting of insiders outside the context of the Armed Forces Ruling
Council had to be held at Ikeja Cantonment to smooth things over. Sources claim special
financial arrangements were made to placate Abacha and allay his suspicions, while
alternative mechanisms - like adhoc Task Forces - were later created to ensure that funds
actually reached operational units, bypassing the Ministry of Defence.
Nevertheless, clamour continued for Abacha’s removal. Eventually, General Babangida
concocted a dicey two step scheme to do so. The scheme involved the initial removal of
Lt. General Domkat Bali as concurrent Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Minister of
Defence. In this scenario, Babangida became the Defence Minister while Abacha was to
simultaneously hold the positions of Chief of Army Staff and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Step Two (2) would involve Babangida giving up the Defence Minister position,
and then later enticing Abacha to take the Defence Minister position in combination with
the position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In exchange, Abacha would vacate the
position of Chief of Army Staff.
This delicate two step process, initiated on December 29, 1989, was complicated by
negative reactions to the step one removal of Lt. General Domkat Bali and the perception
that the changes affected the religious balance of power in the military. Bali himself
refused to accept his demeaning redeployment as Minister of Internal Affairs, where he
would take over from Brigadier John Shagaya, a junior officer from the same Langtang
area of Plateau State. Instead he chose to retire ten days later.
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In April 1990, citing a laundry list of complaints, junior officers led by Lt. Col. G Nyiam,
Major Saliba Mukoro and Major Gideon Orkar staged an attempted coup, which
eventually failed [http://www.gamji.com/nowa14.htm]. One of their complaints was
“The shabby and dishonourable treatment meted on the longest serving Nigerian General
in the person of General Domkat Bali, who in actual fact had given credibility to the
Babangida administration.“
By all accounts, most of the credit for rallying the resistance and crushing this coup
attempt goes to Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha, who was at that time the Chief of Army Staff and
concurrent Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the rebellion was crushed, Abacha
went on radio to reassure the country. Among other things, he said:
"I, Lieutenant-General Sani Abacha, Chief of Army Staff, Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, have found it necessary to address you once again in the
course of our nation's history. In view of the unfortunate, development
early this morning, I'm in touch with the CGS, Service Chiefs, GOCs,
FOCs, AOCs, of the armed forces and they have all pledged their
unflinching support and loyalty to the federal military government of
General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida who is perfectly safe and with
whom I am in contact…………..
……….No amount of threat or blackmail will detract the federal military
government's attention in this regard. We are set to hand over power to a
democratically elected government in 1992. I wish to assure all lawabiding
citizens that the situation is now under control and people should
go about pursuing their lawful interest.
Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Thank you."
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General Abacha’s role in saving the Babangida regime in 1990 bought him huge stock,
not only with Babangida himself but also with a significant number of other “IBB Boys”.
It marked the beginning of the rise of Sani Abacha and the beginnings of his own
independent client network, separate from the umbilical cord that tied him into the
maternal Babangida bandwagon. His own independent network would later become
known as “Abacha Boys”, based mainly, but not exclusively, around officers from the
Kano area.
After a lull during which Babangida was very nervous and lacked confidence, he later
resumed the old plan to replace Abacha as Chief of Army Staff. In September 1990, after
two batches of executions of “Orkar coup convicts” had been carried out, Babangida
ceded his position as Minister of Defence to General Abacha who was to combine it with
his position as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some observers feel that an unwritten
part of this new arrangement was that Abacha would be left alone to do as he pleased
with defence funds while Babangida ran the rest of the government. To crystallize the
new “space” created for General Abacha as the “Defence Czar”, he stayed behind in
Lagos when Babangida moved to the new capital of Abuja in 1991. It was as if the
country had two governments.
However, rather than make fellow coup merchant then Maj. Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro the
Chief of Army Staff, Babangida prudently chose Major General (later Lt. Gen.) Salihu
Ibrahim, then the GOC, 82 Division. Ibrahim was a respected apolitical Armoured Corps
officer with no history of involvement in coups - except as a victim in August 1985 when
he was arrested in Jos during Babangida’s take over. Dogonyaro was placated with
command of ECOMOG in Liberia after the fiasco during which President Samuel Doe
was abducted right under the nose of Ghanaian General Arnold Quianoo.
Abacha retained the combined positions of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defence
Minister until August 26, 1993. After the events of April 1990, Babangida was often
quoted as referring to him as “Khalifa”, meaning “successor”. Meanwhile, it should be
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noted that although Vice-Admiral Aikhomu was transitioned from the office of Chief of
General Staff and made the Vice-President in 1990 to President Babangida, that slot was
actually initially proposed to Chief Ernest Shonekan, a civilian United African Company
(UAC) Executive.
THE POLITICAL COUNT DOWN
Others have written extensively about the political countdown and endless transition of
the Babangida regime. As is well known, the date of the final handing over of power was
shifted from 1990 to 1992 and then 1993. I shall present a brief overview and highlight
those aspects that show the hand of General Abacha as a behind the scenes manipulator.
Based in part on the report of the Political Bureau, which was originally set up in 1986, a
two-party system (one "a little to the right" and the other "a little to the left.”) was created
in October 1989. They were the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social
Democratic Party (SDP). Both parties were run and financed by the Government, which
also arrogated to itself the right to write their party constitutions. The constitutional
context was the 1989 Constitution (Decree #12 of 1989), based on work done by a
Constitution Review Committee, ratified by the Constituent Assembly and amended by
the Armed Forces Ruling Council. Among the eleven amendments imposed by the
AFRC, three were defence and security related. One removed the National Assembly’s
control over national security because, (according to the AFRC), it "exposes the chief
executives and the nation to clear impotence in the face of threats to security". The
second deleted certain provisions establishing an Armed Forces Service Commission to
supervise implementation of the federal-character principle. The third amendment
removed Section 1 (4) of the draft constitution, which had outlawed coups and
classified them as criminal.
Initially, based on Decree #25 of 1987 amended by Decree # 9 of 1989, there was a ban
on all former politicians and top officeholders since 1960, particularly those previously
found guilty of abuse of office. However, both decrees were repealed in December
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1991, initially under pressure from ‘northern elders’ but ultimately to ‘create a level
playing field for all ethnic groups’. Similarly, based on Decree #19 of 1987 and amended
by Decree #26 of 1989, the plan was for presidential elections in November 1992.
However, as a result of alleged malpractices during party primaries in Sept 1992,
primaries were canceled altogether in October 1992, major contenders frozen out, and the
timetable shifted to 1993. Local, State and National committees of both parties were
dissolved and replaced by caretaker committees. The Babangida government later
announced that they would be audited.
The driving principle behind all of this was Babangida’s fear of powerful, financially
independent politicians and his secret desire to plant handpicked, “controllable”
newbreed politicians in state government houses and legislative positions all over the
country as a civilian base for a diarchy which he would head at the center. Those who
lost out in the cancellation of the 1992 Presidential primaries and were banned included
late Major General Yar’Adua (rtd) who won the SDP nomination hands down, and Chief
Olu Falae; Alhaji Adamu Ciroma and Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi were about to go in for a
run-off for the NRC nomination. They too were banned.
A few weeks later, on November 17, 1992, General Babangida dissolved the AFRC and,
after a pregnant pause, created the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) on
January 2, 1993. A civilian Transitional Council was also set up to replace the Council of
Ministers and win back waning public confidence in the “transition program” following
the failed Presidential Primaries. Its Chairman was Chief Ernest Shonekan, also known
as “Head of Government”. Empowered by Decree #54 of 1992 (Constitution
(Suspension and Modification) [Amendment], the Transitional Council shared joint
responsibility with the National Defence and Security Council to ensure a smooth and
successful handover to civilians. It was after all of this that Alhaji Bashir Othman Tofa
and Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola later emerged as the Presidential
contenders from the NRC and SDP respectively. Strangely, though, neither man
internalized the bitter experience of men before them like Shehu Yar’Adua, Olu Falae,
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Umaru Shinkafi, Adamu Ciroma and Bamanga Tukur, all of whom had been led on by
Babangida but ultimately betrayed at the end.
All of this was being monitored by the security services - as well as General Sani
Abacha, who later told confidants that Babangida had been toying with the idea of ruling
Nigeria for 30 years. When Chief Abiola first showed interest in running for the
Presidency, certain “IBB Boys” (including Abacha) expressed concern and approached
Babangida to find some way to ban Abiola from taking part. However, based on a
security report which falsely projected Alhaji Babagana Kingibe as the likely winner of
the SDP Presidential primary convention in Jos, Babangida assured his concerned
“military boys” that Abiola would not prevail and thus there was no need for fear. On the
other hand he simultaneously assured Abiola that he could run for office if he so wished
and would have no problems if he won fair and square. He did not, as far as is publicly
known, tell Abiola at that early stage that there were restive northern officers opposed to
his political ambitions, nor did he tell his “caucus” officers that he had given his word to
Abiola that he could run for office. Interestingly, Abiola himself was independently
familiar with most members of the Babangida military caucus, either as business
associates or as a financial sponsor of previous coups (in 1983 and 1985) in which they
had played key roles.
As things turned out, to the consternation of military officers - like Abacha - who were
opposed to Chief Abiola, Abiola narrowly won the SDP nomination at the Jos
convention, overcoming determined opposition from a motley group of SDP Governors
and disgruntled former aspirants. However, security sources reported allegations of
massive vote buying. Concerned officers approached Babangida to use the report as an
excuse to ban Abiola and stop the process at that stage before it evolved to formal
national elections. Meanwhile, as the June elections came nearer, against a backdrop of
anti-military agitation by students and workers groups, General Olusegun Obasanjo and
Chief Anthony Enahoro publicly expressed doubts over the sincerity of military’s
intention to leave power. Caught between an undercurrent of public suspicions that he
had a “hidden agenda” and behind the scene pressure from some powerful elements of his
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military caucus to scuttle the transition again, Babangida initially resisted the military
pressure. Alhaji Baba Gana Kingibe emerged after difficult negotiations as Abiola’s
running mate while Dr. Sylvester Ugoh was chosen as Tofa’s Vice Presidential candidate.
It must be mentioned, however, that the voice of the military was by no means uniform.
There were officers, like Lt. Gen Salihu Ibrahim, General Ishola Williams, Brigadier MC
Alli, Colonel Abubakar Umar and a few others who genuinely wanted a disengagement
of the military from politics. Some people claim Lt. General Oladipo Diya was also not
in favor of the military perpetuating itself at this stage. Other officers preferred one
candidate versus the other, while a small clique did not want to leave power for either
candidate. This clique included Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro, Brigadier David Mark, Brigadier
Stephen Anthony Ukpo, Brigadier John Shagaya, Brigadier Halilu Akilu and a few
others, all of whom were “IBB boys”. What is really fascinating is how General Abacha
concealed his real motives and intentions from most military officers. At the few senior
officer conferences he attended, Abacha would typically remain quiet. He preferred to
express his strong views to Babangida directly and privately, while quietly mobilizing
opinion behind the scenes and maintaining discrete contact with civilian leaders of
thought who were opposed to the elections in general and to Chief Abiola specifically.
Meanwhile, to those unfamiliar with their inner tensions, he positioned himself as the
guarantor of the Babangida regime. Further on in this essay, the strategic brilliance of
Abacha’s concealment will be apparent. Major General MC Alli, for example, says that
Abacha “had the patience of a hook-line fisherman or a bush hunter, and the memory of
an elephant and a native cunning to match.”
In addition to this cacophony of discordant but troubling military voices there were
powerful civilian pressures, notably from then Sultan of Sokoto, Ibrahim Dasuki as well
as other Emirs who allegedly did not like or trust either Tofa or Abiola. In the
background, personalities who had been banned or schemed out from contesting as a
result of government fiat were also opposed to the elections. These included late Major
General Shehu Yar’Adua and Alhaji Abubakar Rimi. Funny enough Alhaji Bashir Tofa
who was a candidate, supported by some elements within the NRC, also joined the
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bandwagon to boycott and/or cancel the elections. Then there were mischievous
campaigners, like the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) which wanted the military to
hold on to power. All these internal groups and persons working hard to scuttle the
elections altogether were opposed by foreign countries like Britain and the US which
wanted the military to leave power.
Nevertheless, on June 10, 1993, ignoring ouster clauses in Decree #13 of 1993 and
Decree #19 of 1987, Justice Bassey Ikpeme of the Abuja High Court granted a motion
brought by the ABN to restrain the Electoral Commission (NEC) from conducting the
election. However, citing lack of jurisdictional authority, General Babangida initially
chose to ignore the court, which is why the NEC went ahead to conduct the election on
June 12, which was later said to be ‘free and fair’.
FROM JUNE 12 UNTIL AUGUST 26
On June 16, Professor Humphrey Nwosu announced - after results for 14 of the 30 states
were already known - that the NEC would suspend announcing election results. The
results increasingly pointed toward an apparent win by Chief Moshood Abiola, pending
appeals to higher courts against lower court injunctions. The entire result was later
released by a pressure group called the Campaign for Democracy (CD) suggesting that
Abiola won the majority of votes in 19 states while Tofa won 11 states. However,
pressure from key Army factions continued behind the scene.
General Babangida left Abuja and retreated to Minna for urgent consultations with
elements of his original 1985 military coup ‘caucus’. The majority of these elements
(including Abacha), had become thoroughly fed up with his previous assurances that
Abiola was not going to make it past the Jos convention. They were now faced with the
reality of an impending Abiola Presidency.
Practically holding him hostage, they reportedly gave him the option to choose between
annulling the elections or leaving office voluntarily short of which, it is alleged, he and
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Abiola might be killed. While all of this was going on, strange items of correspondence
were circulating alleging that if Moshood Abiola were to be allowed to take office, he
would purge the military, move the capital back to Lagos, and take other actions deemed
threatening to vested interests. Arguments were reportedly made in certain circles that
Babangida was, by act of benign neglect, about to destroy the legacy of the Sardauna of
Sokoto and yield political and ultimately military power to an ethnic region that already
dominated the country economically. This was amplified by interesting explanations that
Abiola could not be ‘controlled’, that he was owed large sums of money by the federal
government which he would now “unethically” control, that he had many wives and
concubines etc. Thrown into the mix were arguments about the controversial Jos
convention of the PDP at which he allegedly bought votes, and the basic unfairness of
preventing those who won the party primaries in September 1992, from contesting. One
school of thought felt that in fairness, since Abiola had gone through the electoral process
and spent large sums of money, he ought to be paid off for his expenses and then advised
as a friend to avoid politics and stick to business.
According to Professor Omo Omoruyi, (The Tale of June 12, Press Alliance Network
London 1999, page 165) General Babangida said:
“Sani (meaning General Sani Abacha) is opposed to a return to civilian
rule. Sani cannot stand the idea of Chief Abiola, a Yoruba, becoming his
Commander-in-Chief at all; Sani seems to have the ears of the Northern
Leaders that no southerner especially from the Southwest should become
the President of this country. Sani seems to rally the Northern Elders to
confront me on the matter. Where do I go from here? They do not trust
me. Without Sani, I will not be alive today; without the North, I would not
have become an officer in the Nigerian Army and now the President of
Nigeria……..”
“I don’t want to appear ungrateful to Sani; he may not be bright upstairs
but he knows how to overthrow governments and overpower coup
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plotters. He saw to my coming to office in 1985 and to my protection in
the many coups I faced in the past, especially the Orkar coup of 1990
where he saved me and my family including my infant daughter.”
“Sani, you know, risked his life to get me into office in 1983 and 1985; if
he says that he does not want Chief Abiola, I will not force Chief Abiola
on him….”
On June 21st, Justice Dahiru Saleh of the Abuja High Court voided the election even
though the appeal by the NEC was pending at the Court of Appeal. Formal
announcement to the nation of the cancellation followed on June 23rd, after a nocturnal
military meeting the day before of “IBB Boys” at the Presidential Villa. During the
meeting most military officers rejected a negotiated compromise to resolve the impasse,
preferring all out annulment.
Shortly thereafter, a state of Military Alert was announced, and the Chief Army Staff, Lt.
General Salihu Ibrahim went around military formations in the country to explain the
annulment. According to Major General MC Alli (rtd), who was at that time Director of
Military Intelligence (DMI), most soldiers were unhappy about the annulment for three
reasons. Firstly, they were fed up with the domination of a small clique of officers who
had been in power since 1983. Secondly, “in spite of General Babangida’s ‘settlement’ or
material bribes, soldiers wanted to return to their professional roles”. Thirdly, many were
upset about their deployment to Liberia to be killed like animals without national
consensus or proper logistic support. But they had little choice, as a result of command
influence, but to go along with it, at least on the surface. Meanwhile, according to the
former DMI, security operatives were “busy constructing overt and covert threats to the
life of Chief MKO Abiola”.
Protests and riots erupted, especially in Lagos and other parts of Chief Abiola’s home
region of the country. In response, General Sani Abacha gave marching orders to the
Governor of Lagos State, Sir Michael Otedola, to restore order or risk exposing his
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citizens to the fury of the Nigerian Army. Less than twenty-four hours later troops
poured into the streets of Lagos and shot hundreds of unarmed demonstrators
indiscriminately - on Abacha’s orders. Meanwhile the military became very unpopular
and officers even feared wearing their uniforms publicly.
Following the annulment, General Obasanjo (rtd) suggested that Babangida set up an
interim Presidential Council comprising former Heads of State (excluding Babangida) to
negotiate the transition to a future permanent form of government. This plan would
retain democratic structures at State and local levels, as well as the National Assembly at
national level, but the National Executive would be an interim government responsible to
the Presidential Council. Babangida did not like the idea of a Presidential Council
without him but liked the notion of an Interim National Government as an exit strategy.
A committee under Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro, meanwhile, urged new elections under new
rules as Babangida had indicated in a speech to the nation on June 26. This proposed
new Presidential election was allegedly to be conducted before August 27, 1993, even
though the government statement dissolved the NEC which would have been charged to
conduct such an election. Babangida viewed this as a trap aimed at him and quietly
maneuvered to slip out of it.
Initially, the SDP predictably rejected any plans for a new election and Abiola meanwhile
refused to give up his “mandate”. However, after the usual Nigerian cajoling and
bribing, political leaders of the SDP independently distanced themselves from Moshood
Abiola as well as Governors and Legislators originally elected on SDP ticket. The SDP,
under Chief Tony Anenih and Alhaji Sule Lamido, then agreed on July 7, 1993 to an
unelected interim National Government in which they would collaborate with the NRC
under Hammed Kusamotu and Tom Ikimi as well as President Babangida, to the
exclusion of Abiola, the apparent winner of the June 12 elections. Anenih’s actions
caused a rift in the SDP that was later said to be resolved on October 11, well into the life
of the ING.
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This development, which was the result of Babangida’s personal initiative, left
Babangida with the challenge of determining how he would tiptoe around his military
sharks to guarantee his personal safety and exit from power as well provide military
backing to the legitimacy of the ING. The only way he could have done this successfully
was to assume full operational and policy control of the reigns of the defence and security
establishments which meant he had to find a way to continue as Commander-in-Chief
and Minister of Defence after August 27, 1993. Unfortunately, he had dribbled his own
military backers once too many and was unable to get support for such a “Pinochet type”
arrangement from them. He did not trust them; they did not trust him; and neither did
they trust themselves. It increasingly became clear that Babangida’s personal political
agenda and that of the Nigerian military officers who brought him to power in 1985 were
divergent.
To freeze Abiola out, the government released spates of decrees. These included, but
were not limited to Decree #39 of 1993, also known as Presidential Elections repeal
Decree; Decree #40, also known as Transition to Civil Rule (Amendment); Decree #41,
also known as Presidential Election (Invalidation of Court Order) Decree. Media
organizations like The Punch, Concord Press, Sketch, Abuja Newsday, Ogun State
Broadcasting Corporation and The Observer were proscribed.
Then a Tripartite Committee comprising Military, Government, and political Party
representatives was set up on July 31, 1993, to decide how to manage what was left of the
transition. The military was represented by Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro and Lt. Gen. Aliyu
Gusau Mohammed, along with Brigadiers Mark, Shagaya and Ukpo. This configuration
pointedly excluded most members of Abacha’s “Lagos group” and provides some insight
into Babangida’s thinking and Abacha’s cunning. Dogonyaro and David Mark groups
were neck deep in ING organizational intrigues, which Babangida half-heartedly hoped
to manipulate in order to guarantee a military role for himself after August 27.
Meanwhile Abacha was quietly consolidating and networking within the military,
probing for weaknesses and lining up his ducks in a row. But Abacha was crafty enough
to allow some overlap. Brigadier David Mark, for example, was initially simultaneously
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in Abacha’s “Lagos Group” as well as being in the “IBB Group.” In this manner a
casual observer would superficially view the network of groups as one continuum of
“IBB-Abacha Boys” while Abacha quietly worked underground to crystallize his own
clique. Abacha firmly believed in the concept of keeping one’s enemies even closer to
one than one’s friends, until he was ready to strike.
The government was represented by Admiral Aikhomu (Vice President), Chief Ernest
Shonekan of the TC (as “Head of Government”), Mr. Akpamgbo of the Justice Ministry
and Alhaji Abdulraman Okene of the Ministry of Internal affairs, among others. The
NRC was represented by Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, Mr. John Nwodo,
Chief Tom Ikimi, and Mr. Eyo Eyo Ita. The SDP was represented by Mr. Patrick Dele
Cole, Chief Jim Nwobodo, Alhaji Olusola Saraki, Chief Dapo Sorumi, Mr. Joseph Toba,
Alhaji Abubakar Rimi, and Major General Shehu Yar ‘Adua among others.
In this confused situation, General MC Alli, then DMI says he raised the possibility of
overthrowing General Babangida with Army Chief Lt. Gen Salihu Ibrahim, who was
reluctant to support such a move for a variety of professional, political and practical
reasons, including his deep distrust of General Abacha. Next, Brigadier MC Alli
approached the Defence Minister General Sani Abacha with the same idea. Abacha’s
main concern was whether the Army Chief, Salihu Ibrahim, would back such a move.
Alli lied to Abacha by saying he had not yet approached Salihu Ibrahim. Caught
between two key officers who did not trust one another, Alli initially backed off. But as
the situation further deteriorated and Army prestige was at an all time low, Alli again
approached Abacha, this time at home, in the presence of Lt. Gen. JT Useni. Again
Abacha chose to be obdurate, taciturn and reflective. But Alli saw through him and
concluded - rightly - that Abacha had some kind of personal design that he was not yet
ready to spring, preferring for General Babangida to leave the scene first, peacefully. In
my view Abacha was probably gauging MC Alli’s intentions and deciding whether or not
to trust him because - as we shall see later - he had already secretly tapped some officers
to begin the delicate process of recruiting allies for his final drive to power.
Simultaneously other dynamics may have been at play between Generals Babangida and
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Abacha. One unconfirmed account says that although they had a “pact”, their wives did
not get along, and that Mrs, Babangida did not relish the thought of him handing over to
General Abacha. Meanwhile other pro-IBB and anti-IBB military interest groups were
scheming, including some core “IBB Boys” who basically wanted to implement a self
succession plan, after which professional officers in the military would be purged through
a process of being set up and eliminated. There was also a last ditch effort to get the
National Assembly to “draft” Babangida in some sort of role to plug the apparent vacuum
following annulment but this effort failed after, it is rumored, money had already changed
hands.
On August 2, 1993, the Army Chief, Lt. Gen. Salihu Ibrahim told senior officers of the
Army in Lagos that difficulties in arranging a new Presidential election before August 27,
1993 had persuaded the government, with the backing of the two parties and foreign
countries, to form an Interim National Government (ING). The ING would organize
elections and carry out government responsibilities. Officers discussed options for full
civilian government composed of the two parties, a mixed civilian-military interim
regime or a full temporary military regime. Those present recommended that Babangida
stay no longer than August 27, 1993, and that officers from all three services should work
out the details for transition. Such officers should not have held political positions in the
government. They also recommended that the National Assembly be on recess while the
ING was active and that the two political parties be self financing. The interesting thing
about this process of military consultation on the Transitional Program was that it was
parallel to the Tripartite Committee mentioned earlier.
On August 3, faced with real and imagined threats to his life and with no hope of getting
Babangida to rescind his decision on the June 12 matter, Chief Moshood Abiola left
Nigeria for Europe.
On August 17, General Babangida informed the National Assembly that he was stepping
aside. His Service Chiefs did not accompany him to the National Assembly, which was a
breach of protocol and an indicator that he was fast losing control of the military. On
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that same day, which happened to be his birthday, senior officers from all three services
met in Lagos and reaffirmed that Babangida could not continue in office. They did not,
however, appoint a successor to replace him, nor did they make room for him to play the
role of a Commander-in-Chief during an interim government. This “oversight”, which
Babangida was not pleased about, was very convenient for Abacha’s game plan. On the
strength of recommendations of the Tripartite Committee, the government then
established the Nwabueze Panel. It was tasked to draft a constitution for the proposed
ING. The panel included Professor Ben Nwabueze, Mr. C. Akpamgbo (Attorney
General), Justice P. Nwokedi, Professor Uvieghara, and Dr. Azinge. In those dangerous
days, officers who used to be freely admitted into Babangida’s courtyard with their
security details were now required to be disarmed and to leave their details as far away as
possible. There was at least one such incident involving General Abacha himself.
On August 25th, with options for a safe exit closing fast, General Babangida settled on
Chief Ernest Shonekan as his candidate for the Chairmanship of the proposed ING.
Shonekan, incidentally, was not only Yoruba like Abiola but also from Abeokuta in Ogun
State, like Abiola. Lt. General Aliyu Gusau Mohammed, then the National Security
Adviser, reportedly influenced his appointment and the British government supported it.
The Nigerian military as an institution had nothing to do with his appointment.
Professor Omoruyi opines that Shonekan agreed, as a condition of his appointment, not to
reopen the June 12 matter. He also allegedly made a commitment to assist in preventing
Yorubas from forming a united front on the issue. Another curious ‘agreement’ was that
Shonekan would not move into the official Presidential Villa in Abuja but would instead
stay at the Presidential Guest House. The main Villa was to be left vacant.
Another interesting decision General Babangida made in his confused state of mind was
to leave General Abacha behind as the Secretary of Defence and Vice Chairman of the
ING, reportedly as “an insurance against coups” and to ensure unity of the military in
backing the ING. In other words, genuinely concerned about the safety of the Hen
House, Babangida asked the Fox to guard it. To counter-balance Abacha, however,
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Babangida planned to appoint Lt. Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro as the Chief of Defence Staff.
Abacha would guide “policy” while Dogonyaro would take charge of “operations”. This
curious arrangement was actually a default for which Babangida had no serious options,
except perhaps Brigadier David Mark. Once he lost the backing of the Armed Forces to
continue in either a military or political role after August 27, he had to rely on an unstable
alliance of those he had relied on all along to keep power.
On August 26th, 1993, a retirement parade was held at the Eagle Square in Abuja for
General Babangida. Following the parade, Babangida - miffed at their lack of backing
for his continuation in office as the C-in-C - announced the retirements, along with his,
with effect from August 27, of all his Service Chiefs and announced the appointment of
Lt. Gen. Dogonyaro as Chief of Defence Staff. The service chiefs retired were Lt. Gen.
Salihu Ibrahim (COAS), Air Vice Marshall Dada (CAS), Vice Admiral Preston Omatsola
(CNS), Vice Admiral Murtala Nyako (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff) and Alhaji Aliyu
Attah (IGP). Following this announcement by Babangida, the DMI (Brig. MC Alli) met
with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defence Minister, General Abacha in his
bedroom and advised that the retirements made by Babangida be rescinded to help
stabilize the tense situation between the Armed Forces and Babangida on one hand and
the Nigerian public on the other. Abacha listened patiently, counseled patience, and
advised that “there was need to consolidate military authority before further action.”
What Abacha did next was a classic move. He met with the “retired Service Chiefs”,
empathized with the way they were treated and offered to extend the effective dates of
their retirements until September 17th. Then, the next day, with their support, he
backdated the date of Babangida’s retirement from the Army to August 26th, a step which
rendered Babangida’s pronouncements from the 27th invalid. Then he later rescinded
Dogonyaro’s appointment as Chief of Defence Staff, arguing that three northerners,
(Abacha as Defence Secretary, Dogonyaro as CDS and Aliyu Mohammed Gusau as
COAS) should not ‘unfairly’ monopolize top jobs in Defence. He offered Lt General
Oladipo Diya, Commandant of the National War College and a Yoruba from Abiola’s
home Ogun State, the position of Chief of Defence Staff. This was a cynical move by
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Abacha, who, as one of his former close confidants told me, had little regard for Diya
personally, and most Yoruba officers in general. But Abacha needed to isolate
Dogonyaro, and had larger designs on the political class, particularly Yoruba leaders of
thought who he was going to use Diya to pacify. Therefore, the “Yoruba” strategy was
useful - for now.
THE INTERIM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
The transition from Babangida to Shonekan was codified by a number of decrees. Decree
No. 59 of 1993 ended the Babangida administration whilst Decree No. 61 created the
ING.
Thus, at about 3.30p.m, on August 26, 1993, Ernest Shonekan was sworn in as the new
“Head of State and President of the ING” by the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice
Mohammed Bello, at the Presidential Villa, Abuja. He was not, however, sworn in as the
“Commander-in-Chief” of the Armed Forces! This “oversight” was also deliberate.
Another interesting detail was that Decree #61 of 1993 that established the ING identified
General Abacha by name as the Vice-President, Defence Secretary and “Senior
Minister.” The “Senior Minister” was empowered to succeed the President of the ING in
the event of resignation or other untoward event. Thus Abacha was Shonekan’s
designated successor and Shonekan had no operational control of the Armed Forces.
Other members of the ING were:
Agriculture and Natural Resources: Professor Jerry Gana
Commerce and Tourism: Chief Mrs.Bola Kuforiji-Olubi
Communications: Chief Dapo Sarumi
Education and Youth Development: Professor Abraham Imogie
Finance: Alhaji Aminu Saleh
FCT Administrator: Maj.Gen.Gado Nasko
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Foreign Affairs: Chief Matthew Mbu
Secretary of State (Foreign): Alhaji Saidu Isa
Health and Human Services: Prince Julius Adelusi-Adeluyi
Internal Affairs: Chief Ezekiel Yesufu
Industries: Chief Ignatius Kogbara
Information and Culture: Mr.Uche Chukwumerije
Justice: Mr. Clement Akpamgbo SAN
Petroleum and Mineral Resources: Chief Don Etiebet
Secretary of State (Petroleum): Alhaji Ibrahim Ali
Labour and Productivity: Prince Bola Afonja
Power and Steel: Alhaji Hassan Adamu
Secretary of State (Power and Steel): Alhaji Oladunni Ayandipo
Police Affairs: Alhaji Abdullahi Mahmud Koki
Science and Technology: Professor Bartholomew Nnaji
Transport and Aviation: Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu
Water and Rural Development: Alhaji Isa Mohammed
Works and Housing: Mr.Barnabas Gemade
Chairman, National Planning Commission: Mr.Isaac Aluko-Olokun (in
lieu of Professor Sam Aluko)
Establishment and Management Services: Mr. Innocent Nwoga
States and Local Government Affairs: Alhaji Sule Unguwar Alkali
Secretary to ING: Alhaji Mustapha Umara
National Assembly Liaison Officer: Alhaji Abba Dabo (House of
Representatives)
National Assembly Liaison Officer: Dr. Samuel Ogboghodo (House of
Representatives)
National Assembly Liaison Officer: Senator George Hoomkwap
(Senate).
A number of military era decrees were then abrogated. However, two days later the
National Labour Congress (NLC) began a nationwide strike to protest fuel scarcity.
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Shonekan addressed Nigerians on August 31st. He had begun the process of releasing
most of those detained for their involvement in pro-June 12 riots like Chief Gani
Fawehinmi, Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti and Mr. Femi Falana. He re-opened some
Universities that had been shut down and lobbied the National Union of Petroleum and
Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the NLC to suspend industrial actions. To the
military, Shonekan promised to start phased withdrawals from Liberia.
Even as Shonekan was making these lofty pronouncements, Abacha was well on his way.
It was on September 3rd that he publicly announced what had already transpired behind
the scenes. Lt-General Oladipo Diya was his replacement for Lt. Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro
as CDS, Air Commodore John Femi was to replace Air Commodore Nsikak Eduak as
Chief of Air Staff while retaining Lt-General Aliyu Mohammed as Chief of Army Staff,
and Rear Admiral Suleiman Seidu, as Chief of Naval Staff. Simultaneously he ordered
the Military Task Force on Petroleum to restore normal supply of fuel to marketers within
24 hours. Two days later, the killing of seven Nigerian soldiers serving the UN Peacekeeping
Force in Mogadishu, Somalia, was announced. It resulted in a fact-finding tour
led by Brigadier-General Cyril Iweze. On September 13th, Defence Headquarters issued a
curious clarification over the recent Army postings, saying it had no political undertone.
Spokesman Colonel Fred Chijuka said a similar exercise was underway in the Navy and
the Air Force. A week later, Chijuka was again making another statement, this time to
announce the appointment of new Divisional Commanders and the retirement of Lt-Gen.
Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro. With his position made untenable by Abacha, Dogonyaro
“voluntarily” retired from the Army, alerting the country in the process that Abacha was
in the opening phase of an all out assault on democracy. As a coup merchant himself he
should not have had any difficulty reading the signs.
On the political front, meanwhile, the calculation that Shonekan's appointment as Head of
the ING would split the Yoruba people and make it easier to consign the June 12 election
to the rubbish heap of history failed. Political threats against Shonekan began as soon as
he took office and his house even had to be protected from arsonists. The Governors of
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Oyo, Ogun, Osun and Ondo States, for example, refused, at least in public, to recognise
Shonekan as the Head of State. They and other Yoruba opinion leaders also requested
Yoruba speaking elements in the ING to resign their appointments. The legality of the
ING was also challenged in court. Pro-democracy rallies resumed. To douse this flame,
Shonekan, who had earlier agreed as a condition of his appointment not to raise the June
12 issue, and even stated on September 28th that the ING will not do so, was advised by
some to establish the Mamman Nasir panel to investigate June 12. He announced this on
October 1st, even as security men were arresting waves of pro-democracy supporters.
Two days later, in a storm of controversy in the Press, members of the SDP in the ING
threatened to pull out, claiming that they had only accepted to serve initially because they
thought they were supporting a Palace coup to oust the former President Ibrahim
Babangida. Meanwhile the National Assembly was locked into an internal battle over
efforts to repeal the decree that annulled the June 12 election in the first place. Both
Shonekan and Abiola were touring the country to raise support for their respective
agendas. Abiola filed a court motion to declare the ING illegal.
Shonekan was also later accused (without evidence) of trying to bribe opposing members
of the National Assembly in an attempt to gain legitimacy and expand his national
support base.
As far as the Army was concerned, Shonekan relied on his personal friendship with Lt.
Gen Aliyu Gusau, former National Security Adviser and new Chief of Army Staff. One
unconfirmed account suggests that both Gusau and Rear Admiral Suleiman Seidu of the
Navy may have discussed the possibility of retiring Abacha with Shonekan. If true, it
would have been interesting indeed to see how this would have transpired in practice. All
the Service Chiefs had clearly treated Shonekan with disdain. For example, during the
Passing out Parade at the Nigerian Defence Academy that year, Shonekan was not
accompanied by any of the Service Chiefs. Such an alleged but presumably
unsuccessful effort on the part of Gusau and Seidu against Abacha, therefore, if true,
would have had the effect of marking both men for subsequent retirement when Abacha
started his final push into Aso Rock.
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Long before this time military officers had begun settling down into various groups and
cliques for and against Babangida, for and against Abiola, and for and against
themselves. What later became known as the Sani Abacha Lagos group or caucus,
comprised various combinations among officers like Brigadier Ahmed Aboki Abdullahi,
Brigadier Bashir Magashi, Brigadier M Chris Alli, Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi, Brigadier
Patrick Aziza, Brigadier Tajudeen Olarenwaju, Brigadier Ibrahim Gumel, Brigadier
David Mark, Air Commodore MA Johnson, Rear Admiral FBI Porbeni, Colonel Lawan
Gwadabe and Lt. Col. Sambo Dasuki, among others. This group often met in the guest
house of Brigadier Bashir Magashi at Ikoyi. It is pertinent to mention that Brigadier MC
Alli - the former DMI who later became GOC, 1st Division and then COAS - was
“invited” into the group by Brigadier Ahmed Aboki Abdullahi, not by General Abacha.
Nevertheless it seems apparent that Abacha must have engineered it, appreciative of
Brigadier MC Alli’s confidential visits to his office and home all along.
Between August 27th and September 17th Abacha made more critical decisions as the
effective political and operational Chief of all the Armed Services. He publicly
announced new Army postings in Lagos without recourse to Shonekan who was
ensconced at Abuja. Obviously the lame duck Service Chiefs who owed him the decency
of being properly retired with adequate three-week notice and traditional pull out
ceremonies did not question his moves. By September 20th, therefore, when the new
“Service Chiefs” finally took office, new officers adjudged loyal to General Abacha,
were occupying all the strategically sensitive commands in the Army. Dangerous ‘IBB
Boys’ were defanged, first by being posted out to politically safe locations and then
subsequently kicked out of the Army entirely - in stages. Indeed nearly all the officers
(and prominent northern Traditional rulers) who helped Abacha to power eventually felt
his jackboots.
Regarding the September postings, at the Lagos Garrison Command, for example,
Brigadier Ishaya Rizi Bamaiyi took command. At the Brigade of Guards, Brig Gen.
Bashir S Magashi replaced Colonel JY Madaki, who was then posted to the Depot in
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Zaria. At the 1st Infantry Division, Brig. Gen. MC Alli, erstwhile DMI, replaced Brig.
Gen. John N Shagaya, as GOC. Shagaya was then posted to ECOMOG in Liberia as
acting Major General. At the 2nd Division HQ in Ibadan, Brig-Gen. Godwin Osagie
Abbe replaced Brig-Gen. John Inienger as the GOC. At the 3rd Armoured Division, Brig
Gen. Tajudeen A Olanrewaju replaced Brig Gen. Ahmed M Daku. At the 82 Division,
Brig (later Maj Gen.) Timothy M Shelpidi replaced Brigadier (later Maj Gen.) Chris
Abutu Garuba. Brig Gen. Ahmed Aboki Abdullahi replaced Brig-Gen M Chris Alli as
DMI. Colonel Lawan Gwadabe had taken over from Col. Abdulmumuni Aminu as
Commander, National Guard - a controversial para-military outfit viewed as a duplication
of the regular military. Lt. Col. Sambo Dasuki was in the Military Secretary’s office.
Most amusingly, Brigadier Halilu Akilu, erstwhile powerful Director-General of the
National Intelligence Agency, was posted to the Oshodi Resettlement Scheme to
rehabilitate disabled and retiring soldiers.
The Lagos group had began preparing actively for the overthrow of the Shonekan
government right from the moment he was sworn in. Nominations were accepted and
votes counted at meetings of the entire caucus or an inner caucus within the outer caucus.
In this manner, General Sani Abacha was “elected” by this self appointed military
Electoral College to take over as Head of State, C-in-C and Minister for Defence. Lt.
Gen. Diya was ‘voted’ to be his Chief of General Staff, beating Lt. General Aliyu Gusau.
Major General Abdulsalami Abubakar beat Major Generals Edward Unimna and Cyril
Iweze for the position of Chief of Defence Staff. Then Brigadier (later Major General
MC Alli) was told that “the scenario had been set” for the position of COAS to fall on
him. This implied that Lt. Gen Aliyu Gusau Mohammed who had been appointed to that
position by out going President Babangida, was to be prospectively frozen out of any top
military position in the planned Abacha dispensation. Similarly, Rear Admiral Suleiman
Seidu was later edged out as Chief of Naval Staff in favor of Rear Admiral Allison
Madueke in a high stakes game of ethnic balancing championed by Brigadiers MC Alli
and Aboki Abdullahi.
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In his book “The Federal Republic of Nigerian Army”, Major General MC Alli (rtd)
explains how he dealt with his personal doubts about Abacha’s quality as the designated
incoming Head of State. When he raised the issue with General Diya, Diya assured him
that Abacha would “change his habits.” Diya also reportedly said that Abacha “would
not succumb to his intense acquisitive instinct that utterly was no respecter of systems
and order.” Alli also says that then Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier Aboki
Abdullahi, on the other hand, “explained that “the ‘North knows’ Sani Abacha, more so,
he was the ‘most senior northern officer.’ In fact, he emphasized that Northern Emirs
approved of his ascendancy to power.”
Lt. Gen. Diya later summoned the Abacha Military Caucus to his office in Lagos. It was
tasked to produce a very detailed Top Secret report regarding the state of the Nation,
issues of National Security, the state of the military and the political stalemate occasioned
by the annulment of the June 12 elections. The Chairman was Brig-Gen MC Alli and the
Secretary, Colonel Lawan Gwadabe. Other members were Brigadiers Aboki A
Abdullahi, Ishaya Bamaiyi, Bashir Magashi, and Patrick Aziza, Commodore F. Porbeni
and Air Commodore MA Johnson. They subsequently met in the office of Lagos
Garrison Commander, Brigadier Ishaya Bamaiyi, broke up into subcommittees and came
out with what was titled “The Report: The Way Forward”. Major Gen. MC Alli (rtd)
reveals that he sampled the opinion of officers like Lt. Gen. Aliyu Gusau, then COAS,
and Major General Abdulsalami Abubakar, then Commandant of the War College.
General Gusau expressed the opinion that a full military regime at that stage would be
unwise and might destroy the military. General Abubakar questioned the rush into
removing Chief Shonekan who had only just been installed. It is not, however, clear what
either officer did with the information Brigadier Alli shared with them.
Meanwhile on September 13, Chief Gani Fawehinmi told The African Guardian:
“Whether Shonekan likes it or not, God has ordained his regime as the
shortest in history of Nigeria. And it will be suddenly terminated by God,
because June 12 has a connotation and denotation which Nigerians
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have not understood. Until they know the extent of June 12, they will be
beating about the bush...”
On September 24th, a few days after Abacha had fully consolidated military control,
Chief Moshood Abiola returned to Nigeria from Britain. A large crowd of supporters
received him at the presidential wing.
From the airport, his first stop, even before he went home, was Defence House in Lagos
where he met secretly with General Abacha behind closed doors. Knowledgeable
insiders say that both Abacha and Diya encouraged Abiola to return home - against
Shonekan’s wishes. Since both Abacha and Abiola are dead it is hard to confirm the
report that Abiola and Abacha agreed to a military take over of the government as an
interim measure before final hand-over to him down the road. But several witnesses
confirm that Abiola actively suggested names to General Abacha for inclusion in his first
cabinet. It seems clear, however, that Abacha was taking the Abiola along for a ride and
that Abiola fell for it. Maj. Gen. MC Alli testifies that when he later asked General
Abacha whether he had a pact with Abiola regarding the June 12 election, Abacha’s
reaction was: “MC, you should know better.”
THE COLONEL ABUBAKAR UMAR PLOT AND THE NIGERIA
AIRWAYS HIJACK
In early October 1993, the Army became engaged in internal security duties in the
dispute between Ogoni and Andoni in Rivers State. Such operations later became highly
controversial and eventually led to the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and others by
General Abacha. However, during the last week of September and first week of October,
Colonel Abubakar Dangiwa Umar, Commander of the Armoured Corps Center and
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School, began making contacts regarding a military coup which he said was aimed at
removing Chief Shonekan from power and installing Chief Abiola. He made an attempt
to recruit the new GOC of the 1st Division in Kaduna, Brigadier MC Alli, into his group
by claiming that his plan had the support of the Army hierarchy, including General
Abacha himself. Alli apparently contacted his crony Brigadier Aboki Abdullahi who had
taken his place as Director of Military Intelligence in Lagos. Umar was subsequently
arrested on suspicion of treasonable felony or about October 7th 1993. Because of his
very close personal relationship with former President Babangida, there was an unstated
suspicion that he may have been involved in some kind of pro-Babangida conspiracy.
Luckily for him he was not charged. Following appeals on his behalf by Brig MC Alli to
Generals Aliyu Gusau and Sani Abacha, he was released, after which he resigned his
commission.
It is important to note that in deciding to release Colonel Umar without charge, Abacha
was being savvy. He did not need the diversion at that point from his main focus; did not
need to upset General Babangida unnecessarily at that stage by pushing for one of his
closest “boys” to face possible execution or prolonged imprisonment; and did not want to
deal with the practical implications of granting the Shonekan regime unnecessary
legitimacy by trying an officer for conspiracy against what he himself considered an
illegal government which would soon be removed anyway. So he chose to deal with the
matter administratively within the military, rather than legally. Colonel Umar Dangiwa
was quietly replaced as the Commander of the Armoured Corps by Colonel M. A. Garba
who acted in that capacity until January 1994 when Colonel Peter Sha took over as the
substantive Director.
Shonekan meanwhile, on the advice of a local kitchen cabinet of close associates, was
beginning to behave like a head of state and attend foreign meetings. For example, he
addressed the UN General Assembly on October 7th, even as he was being sued at home
for releasing moneys to the NEC for the purpose of conducting fresh elections and for
setting up a panel of inquiry into the annulment of the elections. Even the late musician,
Fela Anikulapo Kuti publicly described the Shonekan government as “neocolonialist”
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and as a “western stooge”. During this period Shonekan asked security agencies to
investigate corruption in Nigerian parastatals like the NNPC, NEPA, Nigeria Airways,
Central Bank, Customs etc. Abiola was in the meantime asking Nigerians to fast and
seek God’s intervention in the affairs of Nigeria.
Shonekan attended the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) from
October 21 - 25, 1993 at Limassol, southwest of Nicosia, on the south coast of Cyprus.
At the CHOGM, Shonekan was embarrassed by an appeal from Sir Douglas Richard
Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, to "reach an accommodation with Moshood Abiola,
the unofficial winner of the poll."
From Limassol he was reported to be making calls incessantly to Abacha in Nigeria
regarding the security situation. The former UAC Chief Executive may have been
unnerved by back-channel reports of Colonel Umar’s arrest and perhaps even alleged
whispers from Lt. Gen Gusau about other conspiracies lurking in the shadows. However,
Abacha - in a move reminiscent of how he treated General Buhari in 1985 - apparently
refused to take most of the calls, citing Shonekan’s lack of authority over him as the
Defence Secretary. Interestingly, the ING announced on October 21, that it planned to
scrap the National Guard, a decision that was popular with the mainstream military and
was already recommended by the secret Brigadier MC Alli Military Caucus report. Then
on the last day of the conference, four members of the Movement for the Advancement of
Democracy (MAD) led by Jerry Yusuff hijacked a Nigerian Airways Airbus A310 (5N
AUH) with 137 passengers and 11 crew bound from Lagos to Abuja. The plane ended up
in Niger republic where it was later stormed by Nigerien paramilitary commandos. It
was Nigeria’s second aircraft hijacking incident, the first having taken place back in April
1967 during tensions leading to the Nigerian civil war. At that time a Nigeria Airways
Fokker Friendship F-27 bound for Lagos was hijacked from Benin to Enugu by Sam
Inyang and Onuorah Nwaya of the "Special Task Force", the militant wing of what later
became the Biafran Directorate of Military Intelligence.
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The manner in which the Shonekan régime handled the hijack matter raises serious
questions in my mind about the civil-military-external affairs relationship at that time.
For one the government sent a delegation led by the Transport and Aviation Secretary,
Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu, to Niamey to negotiate for the release of the hostages. Secondly,
the ING allowed Niger republic to carry out a military operation to rescue Nigerian
hostages in a Nigerian plane that was hijacked from Nigeria. The almighty Nigerian
military was not in the loop either for lack of Special Forces expertise, lack of command
consensus, or lack of trust. This writer viewed the development with consternation back
then and interpreted it as a sign that certain elements within the military were unwilling
or unable to undertake a potentially messy international rescue operation which might
undermine its credibility on the eve of a coup at home. Fortunately for most of the
hostages, the rescue operation was carried out professionally by the Nigeriens and went
well. Ordinarily, no serious country would have allowed another nation unilaterally take
such momentous responsibility for its own citizens.
On October 31st word leaked in the Nigerian Press about efforts by some influential
Nigerians to get the ING to dissolve both political parties and all existing political
structures. Coincidentally, such a recommendation was indeed part of the MC Alli secret
report. This was followed soon after by dramatic events at the National Assembly
following which the Senate President was impeached. Pro and anti-ING factions in the
legislature, guided by a strategic desire to support or oppose Presidential hopeful Major
General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (rtd), sparred on the floor of the Chambers. This dispute
eventually led to the impeachment of Senate President Dr. Iyorchia Ayu on November 2,
by pro-ING Senators led by Chuba Okadigbo. Senator Ameh Ebute replaced Ayu. All of
this came against background plans by the new NEC led by Professor Okon Uya to
organize party primaries from January 7 - 9, 1994 followed by Presidential elections on
February 19, 1994.
On November 3rd, social critic Gani Fawehinmi was quoted during a Book launching
ceremony as saying: “The military must intervene to stop this war of Shonekan’s
government against the people”. On the contrary, three days later on November 6th,
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Northern Elders led by former President Shehu Shagari met to find ways to ensure that
Nigeria remained united. They expressed support for the ING as the midwife for a stable
transition.
Under these circumstances, Chief Shonekan, taunted by some for “lack of power”,
symbolically moved into Presidential Villa from the Presidential guest house in early
November - against his original understanding with former President Babangida - and to
the consternation of Abacha. General Abacha was increasingly worried about Shonekan’s
growing confidence and irritated by security reports to Shonekan that he was planning
“something”.
Under pressure from declining international oil prices, Shonekan’s government chose at
that inauspicious time to withdraw the petroleum subsidy on November 8th, and raise the
price of petrol from 70 Kobo to 3.50 Naira, a massive increase with predictably dramatic
effects on inflation. Not surprisingly, it led to street protests and plans for a full-scale
resumption of industrial action by pressure groups.
THE FINAL DASH
Two days later, on November 10, 1993, the Shonekan-led ING was declared illegal in a
ruling at the Lagos High Court presided over by Justice Dolapo Akinsanya. Back in
October, as previously noted, a case had been brought by Moshood Abiola and Baba
Gana Kingibe to declare the ING illegal, null and void. The lead Attorney for the
Federal Ministry of Justice, Mr. Dele Jegede, advised the court that Decree # 61, which
was supposedly the legal basis of the ING, did not exist. Decree #56 had previously
fixed August 27, 1993 as the date of commencement of the 1989 constitution. Justice
Akinsanya reasoned that since Babangida had divested himself of power by signing
Decree # 59 of August 26th, he had no power to sign Decree # 61. All of this dovetailed
nicely into General Abacha’s original skillful backdating of the effective date of
Babangida’s retirement to August 26th.
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The day after the Court Judgement, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi publicly pleaded with
General Sani Abacha to rescue Nigeria from a " terrible political and legal quagmire".
But Abacha, ever so patient and disciplined regarding the timing of coups resisted being
rushed before crossing his “Ts” and dotting his “Is”. After all the ING was contesting the
Akinsanya judgement in a higher court and Abacha still had to watch his flanks within
the military carefully. There was still the matter of how to handle the Chief of Army
Staff, Lt. Gen. Aliyu Gusau Mohammed, who was not a man to be underrated.
On November 15, 1993, however, the Nigerian Labor Congress called a General Strike.
On November 16, 1993, the Senate began open hearings on the fuel price increase by the
Shonekan Administration while the House of Representatives asked the ING to rescind
the price increase.
The next day, on November 17th at about 10 am, Generals Sani Abacha, Oladipo Diya
and Aliyu Gusau arrived at the Presidential Villa in Abuja accompanied by truckloads of
fearsome looking soldiers. These troops were under the command of two “Lagos Group”
conspirators, namely Colonel Lawan Gwadabe of the National Guard and Brigadier
Bashir Magashe of the Brigade of Guards. Magashe was almost certainly there to make
sure Gwadabe followed the Abacha script and no other. Following a ‘private meeting’
with Chief Ernest Shonekan, Shonekan was graciously allowed to deliver a farewell
speech to the ING after 82 days of controversy, following which he was flown to Lagos.
After waiting patiently for so many years, Abacha, “the successor”, had finally struck.
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