Read Part 4 HERE Major Chukwuma 'Kaduna' Nzeogwu POST-SCRIPT The officers (and civilians) who planned and carried out the ...
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| Major Chukwuma 'Kaduna' Nzeogwu |
The officers (and civilians) who planned and carried out the January 15 and July 29 1966 military rebellions have never been tried or convicted before any military court-martial although there was an agreement at Aburi that this should occur.This, as we know, was overtaken by events leading up to and including the Nigerian Civil War.
The only exception made among the January 15 group was for those surviving officers who not only took part in the January 1966 coup but also participated in the Biafran invasion of the Midwestern region in August/September 1967.Most officers in this overlapping group were brought before a Military Board of Inquiry, jailed until October 1974, and all – exceptLts. J.C. Ojukwu and Ijeweze (?Igweze) who were retired - eventually dismissed. They include Major A. Ademoyega, Captain Ben Gbulie, Capt. E. M. Udeaja, Lt. F.M. Okocha, Lt. B.A.O. Oyewole, Lt. N.S. Nwokocha, Lt. G.B. Ikejiofor, Lt. G. G. Onyefuru, Lt. A.R.O. Egbikor, Lt. A. N. Azubuogu, and 2/Lt. C.G. Ngwuluka.Interestingly, prominent surviving January 15 mutineers like Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi (rtd), who did not take part in the Midwest invasion, but played other roles in the civil war (as a Colonel in the Biafran Army, Field Commander and later Chief of Staff in General Ojukwu’s HQ)were spared in a general amnesty covering both the January and July 1966 rebellions.
What used to be known as Race Course in Lagos was renamed Tafawa Balewa Square after the late PM.A prominent street in Jos is also named after him.The street in Victoria Island, Lagos, straddling the Bar Beach, is named after the late Sir Ahmadu Bello.A prominent street in Kaduna is also named after him.Streets in Lagos (Ikeja) and Abuja are named after Samuel Ladoke Akintola, late Premier of the West.
When he came to power in 1975, late General Murtala Muhammed- coup leader of the July 1966 uprising - went to great lengths to look after the family of the late Major General Aguiyi Ironsi. In 1993, General Ibrahim Babangida - a participant in the July 1966 revolt - named an Army Barrack after the late General and post-humously awarded him the Great Commander of the Federal Republic (GCFR).A street in Abuja was also named after him.A Barrack in Abuja is also named after Ironsi’s successor, General Yakubu Gowon (rtd).The International Airport in Lagos is named after General Muhammed while the one in Abuja is named after former President Nnamdi Azikiwe, and the one in Kano after late Malam Aminu Kano.
Some streets in Lagos (Ikeja) and Ibadan are named after the late Lt. Col. F. Fajuyi.The Barracks where the Headquarters of the Nigerian Army Armored Corps and School is based in Bauchi is named after Major John Obienu.NAF Majors Nzegwu and Obi have names of streets within certain AirForce Bases named after them. In 2001, President Obasanjo, on the other hand, named certain streets and monuments in Abuja, Nigeria’s new capital, after the military officers who were assassinated during mutiny-coup ofJanuary 15, 1966 – a long overdue gesture.In a separate essay,I shall preview the outcome of the lives of some of the key players in the January and July 1966 rebellions.
References
BOOKS, PERIODICALS, NEWSPAPERS AND WEBPAGES
Luttwak, Edward.Coup d’Etat – A Practical Handbook.Alfred Knopf, 1968.
Dudley, Billy J.Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria.Ibadan University Press,1973.
Norman J Miners.The Nigerian Army 1956-1966.Methuen, 1971
Daily Times of Nigeria, Lagos, 1966.First 100 Days.
Onipede. O.Nigeria Crisis. Africa Quarterly Vol. 9, No. 3, p 233-263, New Delhi, 1969.
Luckham Robin.The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt: 1960-67. Cambridge University Press, 1971.
A. H. M. Kirk-Greene.Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary SourceBook.(Volume I; Oxford University Press, 1971)
A. H. M. Kirk-Greene.Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary SourceBook.(Volume II; Oxford University Press, 1971)
Tamuno, T. & Ukpabi, S., Eds.Nigeria Since Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years: Vol.VI: The Civil War Years Heinemann Educ. Books (Nig.) Ltd. 1989
Omoigui, N. History of Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria (Part 3) : Count-Down to the January 1966 Coup.http://www.gamji.com/nowa11.htm
Major P.C.K. Nzeogwu: Declaration of Martial Law over Northern Nigeria, January 15, 1966. http://www.dawodu.com/nzeogwu2.htm
Ademoyega, Adewale.Why We Struck: The Story Of The First Nigerian Coup.Evans Brothers, 1981
Obasanjo, Olusegun.Nzeogwu. Spectrum Books Ltd, Ibadan, 1978.
Nigeria Police Special Branch, 1966:Military rebellion of 15th January 1966.(Investigative Report)[http://www.gamji.com/NEWS1103.htm]Also see Kirk-Greene and Cervenka.
Akinjide, Richard. The Amalgamation of Nigeria was a Fraud. Vanguard Newspapers. July 9, 2000. http://www.deltastate.com/articles/akinjide.asp
Nwafor Orizu: Liberty Or Chains — Africa Must Be (Autobiography). Excerpted in Vanguard Newspaper – “Reminiscences; Nigeria’s First Military Coup and Why we Handed Over.” Sat, 24 Apr 1999. (www.afbis.com/vanguard).
Dent, Martin.The Military and Politics: A Study of the relation between the army and the political process in Nigeria.pp 113-139.In:Kirkwood Kenneth (ed):African Affairs, St. Antony Papers, No. 21. Oxford University Press, 1969
MCK Ajuluchukwu: How Nigeria lost the dream
http/www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles/2001/September/29092001/id429901.htm
Chief Anthony Enahoro: NIGERIA AT 41* The Journey So Far
http/www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles/2001/September/29092001/id129901.htm
Madiebo, Alexander A.The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War. Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980.
Major General JN Garba.Revolution in Nigeria.Another View. Africa Books Ltd.1982.
Enloe CH.Ethnic Soldiers.State Security in a Divided Society.Penguin, 1980.
Bernard Odogwu:No Place to Hide.Crises and Conflicts inside Biafra.Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985.
Shehu Shagari:Beckoned to Serve. Heinemann (Nigeria), 2001
Ogbemudia SO.Years of Challenge.Heinemann, 1991.
Ogbonna Oleka, Ndubuisi Ofondu.Power with Civility. A Biography of Rear Admiral Godwin Ndubuisi Kanu. Nekson Publishers, 1998
DJM Muffet.Let Truth be Told.The coups d’etat of nineteen sixty-six.HudaHuda Publishing Company, 1982
Olusegun Obasanjo.My Command.An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-70.Heinemann, 1980.
De St. Jorre, John.The Nigerian Civil War.Hodder and Stoughton, 1972
Cervenka Zdenek.The Nigerian War 1967-1970.Bernard & Fraefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1971
Nigerian International Bibliographical Centre.Who is Who in Nigeria.1999.
Tunji Otegbeye.The Turbulent Decade.VisionLink Nigeria Ltd.1999.
Azikiwe, Nnamdi:Military Revolution in Nigeria. London:C. Hurst, 1970.
Dr. Zik’s letter Reveals – Ojukwu planned coup in 1964.In:New Nigerian, Kaduna, 1968. (June 1st) page 12.
J. Isawa Elaigwu.Gowon.West Books Publisher Limited, 1985.
Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka:Biafra, Selected Speeches with Journal of Events.Perennial Library, 1969.
Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka: Biafra. Random Thoughts. Harper and Row, 1969.
Oluleye, JJ.Military Leadership in Nigeria, 1966-1979. University Press Ltd. 1985
Osaghae, Eghosa E.Crippled Giant : Nigeria Since Independence. Indiana University Press, 1999
Saliu Ibrahim: Nigeria’s participation in United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) 1960-64. pp 71-89.In: MA Vodt, AE Ekoko (eds).Nigeria in International Peace-Keeping 1960-1992, Malthouse Press Ltd, 1993.
Major General DA Ejoor (rtd).Reminiscences. Malhouse Press Ltd, 1989.
Barrett, Lindsay.Danjuma:The Making of a General.Fourth Dimension, 1979.
Njoku, HM.A Tragedy without Heroes:The Story of the Nigerian Civil War.Fourth Dimension, 1987.
Jemibewon, David.A Combatant in Government.Heinemann, 1978.
Ministry of Home Affairs and Information, Western Nigeria, 1967:Fajuyi the Great; a soldier of peace.
Allison Ayida:The Nigerian Revolution, 1966-1976. Ibadan University Press, 1973
Forsythe, Frederick.The Biafra Story.Penguin, 1969.
Akpan, NU.The Struggle for Secession in Nigeria 1966-70. Frank Cass, 1971.
Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos 1967.Federal Republic of Nigeria, Meeting of Military Leaders, held at Peduase Lodge, Aburi, Ghana, 4 and 5 January 1967.
Aburi Meeting of Nigerian Military Leaders, 4th and 5th January 1967 (recorded by the Ghana Government and released by command of Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Givernor of Eastern Nigeria).Enugu:Phonodisc, 1967.(24 sides, 12 discs)
Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos 1967.Nigeria 1966.
Eastern Nigeria Regional Publication, Enugu 1967.January 15:Before and After; No. WT/1003/3674/40,000, 1967
Dennis Ejindu.Interview with Major P. C. K. Nzeogwu. In: Africa and the World, London 1967, Vol. 3, No. 5, p 15.
Nwankwo, Ifejika.Biafra - The making of a Nation. Hurst, 1969.
Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Federal Government Honours 1966 Coup Victims. http://allafrica.com/stories/200107230701.html
Chuks Iloegbunam.Ironside: The Biography Of General Aguiyi-Ironsi, Nigeria’s First Military Head Of State.Press Alliance Network Limited, London, 1999
Sanmi Ajiki. ‘Fajuyi: The martyred soldier’.Referenced inChuks Ugwoke:Aguiyi-Ironsi/Fajuyi: Old memories linger 35 years after.Vanguard, August 4, 2001.See http://nigeriamasterweb.com/nmwpg1Ironsifajuyi.html
Uwechue Raph.Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War. OITH International Publishers, 1969.
Dan Agbese.Fellow Nigerians.Turning Points in the Political History of Nigeria.Umbrella Books, Ibadan, 2000.
Panter-Brick SK.From Military Coup to Civil War. pp 14-57.In:Panter-Brick (ed), Nigerian Politics and Military Rule, Prelude to the Civil War. Athlone Press, University of London, 1970.
Haywood, A. and Clarke, F.A.S. The history of the Royal West African Frontier Force. Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1964.
Ogham-Emeka, Chijioke.Aguiyi Ironsi's Legacy.http://nigeriamasterweb.com/nmwpg1Ironsilegacy.html
Obi Nwakanma.Abati's Revisionisms and Distortions of Nigeria's history.http://www.usafricaonline.com/obinwaka.igbohater.abati.html
Chuks Iloegbunam:Reuben Abati And Other Anti-Igbo Bigots In Nigeriahttp://www.usafricaonline.com/chuksilo.igbohater.abati.html
Chuks Iloegbunam: The Vial of January 15.
http://www.dawodu.com/chuks.htm
INTERVIEWS
Interview: Major General EO Abisoye (rtd). Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Colonel DS Abubakar (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Brigadier Benjamin Adekunle (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000. See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: General IB Babangida (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000. See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: General Domkat Bali (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000. See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Lt. Gen. TY Danjuma (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000. See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Lt. Gen. Garba Duba (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000. See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Major General David Ejoor (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000. See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: General Yakubu Gowon (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Major General IBM Haruna (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Lt. Gen. GS Jalo (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Major General Sunday Ifere (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Major General YY Kure (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Colonel Yohana Madaki (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Major General AB Mamman (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Captain Emmanuel Nwobosi (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Brigadier General M. Remawa (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Major General Abdullai Shelleng (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Major General M. Shuwa (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Brigadier Baba Usman (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Major General Martin Adamu (rtd). Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Lt. Col. Hilary Njoku (rtd).Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview:Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu.Archives of the Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.See text in - Major General HB Momoh (ed):The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.History and Reminiscences.Sam Bookman Publishers. Nigerian Army Education Corps and School, 2000.
Interview: Brigadier MJ Vatsa (Interview on Radio Kaduna, as reported by J. Isawa Elaigwu.Gowon.West Books Publisher Limited, 1985)
Interview: Colonel Garba Duba (Interview on Radio Kaduna, as reported by J. Isawa Elaigwu.Gowon.West Books Publisher Limited, 1985)
Interview: Lt. Col. W. Walbe (rtd). (Interview with Professor Elaigwu, as reported by J. Isawa Elaigwu.Gowon.West Books Publisher Limited, 1985)
Interview: General Yakubu Gowon (rtd). (Interview with Professor Elaigwu, as reported by J. Isawa Elaigwu.Gowon.West Books Publisher Limited, 1985)
Interview: Major General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua (rtd). (FRCN interview with Major-General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, 26 October 1979)
PERSONAL COMMUNICATION
Personal Communication:Dr. Humphrey Idemudia Idehen (former personal Physician to the President of Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe).
Personal Communication:Antony Goldman (former Financial Times of London Correspondent) and biographer for Major General Shehu Yar’Adua (rtd).
Personal Communication: Brigadier S.O. Ogbemudia (rtd), former Brigade Major, 1st Brigade, Kaduna.
Personal Communication: Lt. Col. M.O. Nzefili (rtd), former Commander, 4th battalion, Ibadan.
Personal Communication: Lt. Col. A. Keshi (rtd), former Brigade Major, 1st Brigade, Kaduna
Personal Communication:Serving and retired military officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (Unnamed by request)
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APPENDIX I
BROADCAST BY LT. COL. YAKUBU GOWON, AUGUST 1, 1966
‘No Trust or Confidence in a Unitary System of Government’: Lt.-Col. Gowon’s Broadcast on the Assumption of Office, 1 August 1966
This is Lt-Col. Y. Gowon, Army Chief of Staff, speaking to you.
My fellow countrymen, the year 1966 has certainly been a fateful year for our beloved country, Nigeria. I have been brought to the position today of having to shoulder the great responsibilities of this country and the armed forces with the consent of the majority of the members of the Supreme Military Council as a result of the unfortunate incident that occurred on the early morning of 29th July 1966.
However, before I dwell on the sad issue of 29th July 1966, I would like to recall to you the sad and unfortunate incidents of 15th January 1966 which bear relevance. According to certain well-known facts, which have so far not been disclosed to the nation and the world, the country was plunged into a national disaster by the grave and unfortunate action taken by a section of the Army against the public. By this I mean that a group of officers, in conjunction with certain civilians, decided to overthrow the legal government of the day; but their efforts were thwarted by the inscrutable discipline and loyalty of the great majority of the Army and the other members of the armed forces and the police. The Army was called upon to take up the reins of government until such time that law and order had been restored. The attempt to overthrow the government of the day was done by eliminating political leaders and high-ranking Army officers, a majority of whom came from a particular section of the country. The Prime Minister lost his life during this uprising. But for the outstanding discipline and loyalty of the members of the Army who were most affected, and the other members of the armed forces and the police, the situation probably could have degenerated into a civil war.
There followed a period of determined effort of reconstruction ably shouldered by Maj-Gen. J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi but, unfortunately, certain parties caused suspicion and grave doubts of the Government’s sincerity in several quarters. Thus, coupled with the already unpleasant experience of the 15th January still fresh in the minds of the majority of the people, certain parts of the country decided to agitate against the military regime which had hitherto enjoyed country-wide support. It was, unfortunately, followed by serious rioting and bloodshed in many cities and towns in the north.
There followed a period of uneasy calm until the early hours of 29th July 1966, when the country was once again plunged into another very serious and grave situation, the second in seven months. The position on the early morning of 29th July was a report from Abeokuta garrison, that there was a mutiny and that two senior and one junior officers from a particular section of the country were killed. This soon spread to Ibadan and Ikeja. More casualties were reported in these places. The Supreme Commander was by this time at Ibadan attending the natural rulers’ conference and was due to return on the afternoon of 29th July. The Government Lodge was reported attacked and the last report was that he and the West Military Governor were both kidnapped by some soldiers. Up till now, there is no confirmation of their whereabouts. The situation was soon brought under control in these places. Very shortly afterward, at about the same time, there was a report that therewere similar disturbances among the troops in the North, and that a section of the troops had taken control of all military stations in the North as well. The units of Enugu and the garrison at Benin were not involved. All is now quiet and I can assure the public that I shall do all in my power to stop any further bloodshed and to restore law, order and confidence in all parts of the country with your co-operation and goodwill.
I have now come to the most difficult part, or the most important part, of this statement. I am doing it, conscious of the great disappointment and heartbreak it will cause all true and sincere lovers of Nigeria and of Nigerian unity both at home and abroad, especially our brothers in the Commonwealth.
As a result of the recent events and the other previous similar ones, I have come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this wise, as the basis of trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of time. I have already remarked on the issues in question. Suffice to say that, putting all considerations to test-political, economic, as well as social-the base for unity is not there or is so badly rocked, not only once but several times. I therefore feel that we should review the issue of our national standing and see if we can help stop the country form drifting away into utter destruction. With the general consensus of opinion of all the Military Governors and other members of the Supreme and Executive Council, a decree will soon be issued to lay a firm foundation of this objective. Fellow countrymen, I sincerely hope we shall be able to resolve most of the problems that have disunited us in the past and really come to respect and trust one another in accordance with an all-round code of good conduct and etiquette.
All foreigners are assured of their personal safety and should have no fear of being molested.
I intend to continue the policy laid down in the statement by the Supreme Commander on 16th January 1966 published on 26th January 1966.
We shall also honour all international treaty obligations and commitments and all financial agreements and obligations entered into by the previous government. We are desirous of maintaining good diplomatic relationships with all countries. We therefore consider any foreign interference in any form will be regarded as an act of aggression.
All members of the armed forces are requested to keep within their barracks except on essential duties and when ordered from SHQ. Troops must not terrorise the public, as such action will discredit the new National Military Government. Any act of looting or sabotage will be dealt with severely. You are to remember that your task is to help restore law and order and confidence in the public in time of crisis.
I am convinced that with your co-operation and understanding, we shall be able to pull the country out of its present predicament. I promise you that I shall do all I can to return to civil rule as soon as it can be arranged. I also intend to pursue most vigorously the question of the release of political prisoners. Fellow countrymen, give me your support and I shall endeavour to live up to expectations. Thank you.
Source:A. H. M. Kirk-Greene.Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary SourceBook.(Volume I; Oxford University Press, 1971)
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APPENDIX II
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Explanation of Ranks
Ranks of officers changed over time.The format used was the Nigerian rank an officer or non-commissioned officer was wearing at the time a given event occurred.For example, Hassan Katsina and M.O. Nzefili were Majors in January 1966, and Lt. Cols. by July 1966.Hassan Katsina retired as a Major General in 1975.Yakubu Gowon was a Lt. Col in January and July 1966, a Major General by July 1967 and a General in 1975.Garba Duba was a Lt. in July 1966, a Colonel in 1979, and is now a retired Lt. Gen.Yohana Madaki was an NCO in 1966 but is now a retired Colonel.Lt. W. Walbe was a Lt. in July 1966 but retired as a Lt. Col. in 1975.Murtala Muhammed was a T/Major in January 1966, a T/Lt. Col by July 1966 and a General in 1976.Martin Adamu was a Captain in July 1966 but retired in 1977 as a Major General.Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma was a T/Major in July 1966 but retired as a Lt. Gen in 1979.There are many other examples.
I did not use Biafran ranks.Note, however, that Lt. Col. H. Njoku (rtd) was a Brigadier and first Commander of the Biafran Army.An unconfirmed account says he was on the verge of being promoted to the rank of Brigadier in the Nigerian Army by General Ironsi when the July coup took place.Lt. Col. C. O. Ojukwu was a General in that army.However, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu was dismissed from the Nigerian Army in June 1967, which is why he is addressed as “Chief” Odumegwu Ojukwu in the Nigerian Army Archives.Captain E.N. Nwobosi (rtd) was a Colonel in the Biafran Army.
ABBREVIATIONS
"Aure" - A Hausa word for "marriage"
AG- Action Group, led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo
ASP- Assistant Superintendent of Police
Bn – Battalion. Two or more companies. Cavalry and
aviation refer to this as a "squadron".
Bde: Brigade. Two or more battalions. Usually commanded by a Brigadier or Senior Colonel.
Corps: Two or more divisions. Usually commanded by a Lt. Gen. (Note the use of the word "Corps" here is different from the ordinary usage in the Nigerian Army - which uses it to refer to professional groupings of specialized teeth, support and service arms e.g. Infantry, Artillery, Ordnance, Engineers, Signals, Medical, Finance, Supply and Transport etc...)
BYM - Borno Youth Movement
Div: Division. Two or more brigades. A division has between 12,500 and 25,000 troops. Usually commanded by a Maj. Gen.
DSP – Deputy Superintendent of Police
GOC – General Officer Commanding
IG – Inspector General
NCNC – National Council of Nigerian Citizens, led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe
NDC - Niger Delta Congress, led by Chief Dappa Diriye
NEPU – Northern Elements Progressive Union, led by Alhaji Aminu Kano
NNA – Nigerian National Alliance, including the NPC, NNDC, NDC and their surrogates
NNDP - Nigerian National Democratic Party, led by late Chief Akintola, a split off from the AG
NPC – Northern Peoples Congress, led by Sir Ahmadu Bello
PM – Prime Minister
UPGA – United Progressive Grand Alliance (an alliance of the AG, NCNC, UMBC, NEPU and BYM)
(rtd) – retired
UMBC – United Middle Belt Congress, led by Joseph Tarka
NAF – Nigerian Air Force
NN – Nigerian Navy
NA – Nigerian Army
QNR – Queens Nigeria Regiment
DAQMG - Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General
BM – Brigade Major
ADC – Aide-de-Camp
C-in-C – Commander-in-Chief
Officers Mess - A rest and recreation center for the exclusive use of
officers
NMTC – Nigerian Military Training College (the precursor to NDA)
Mutiny - Insurrection against constituted authority, particularly military or naval authority; concerted revolt against the rules of discipline or the lawful commands of a superior officer; hence, generally, forcible resistance to rightful authority; insubordination. [Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913)]
Coup - a sudden and decisive change of government illegally or by force [synonym: coup d'Etat, putsch, takeover] (http://www.dict.org) ALSO, a sudden, decisive exercise of power whereby the existing government is subverted without the consent of the people; an unexpected measure of state, more or less violent; a stroke of policy. [Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913)]
2ic – Second in Command
HQ – Headquarters
SHQ – Supreme Headquarters
AHQ – Army Headquarters
SMC – Supreme Military Council
COS – Chief of Staff
Chief of Staff (COS) - the senior officer of a service of the armed forces. In Nigeria of 1966 it meant the officer responsible for coordinating staff matters on behalf of the Supreme Commander for a given service like the Army. The title does not have the same degree of power and latitude as a Chief of Army Staff (COAS), which is why it was derisively regarded as the Supreme Commander’s ‘Chief Clerk’.
ONUC – United Nations Operation in the Congo
MTO – Motor Transport Officer
Acting Rank. Assumes the salary and benefits appropriate to the acting rank, but appropriate authorities may order the holder to revert to previous rank held. For example, Brigadier Ironsi was an acting Major General as Commander of ONUC from January to June 1964
Local Rank. Temporary unpaid rank, usually made for a specific operation in a specific area.
Substantive Rank.(S) Fully remunerated confirmed permanent rank. e.g.S/Major – Substantive Major
Temporary Rank. (T.) Rank granted for a short period, usually for a specific task or mission or to allow a junior officer assume higher command responsibilities.e.g. T/Major – Temporary Major.When Murtala Muhammed was promoted to T/Lt. Col. and Inspector of Signals in May 1966 he was actually an S/Captain.
CO:Commanding officer
Other ranks – Ranks other than Officer ranks. It includes NCOs , Lance Corporals and Privates.
NCO – Non-commissioned officer is a slang term for a Sergeant. However, it also refers to all ‘other ranks’ above Lance Corporal and below Lieutenant. It may also mean a subordinate officer not appointed by a commission from the chief executive
or supreme authority of the State; but by the Secretary of War or by the commanding officer of the regiment. [Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913)]
RSM – Regimental Sergeant Major (the most senior NCO in a battalion or regiment)
Subaltern - A commissioned military officer below the rank of Captain [Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913)]
Company Grade Officer – A commissioned military officer holding the ranks of 2/ Lieutenant, Lieutenant, or Captain. (Note that in 1966, because of officer manpower imbalance at lower levels, Lieutenants, who ordinarily command platoons,used to command companies in some battalions)
Field-Grade Officer - An officer holding the rank of Major or Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel
General Officer – An officer holding the ranks of Brigadier (one star), Major General (two stars), Lieutenant General (three stars), General (four stars) or Field Marshal (five stars).
Int – Intelligence
GSO – General Staff Officer
Recce – Reconnaissance
Arty – Artillery
Squadron – can be either:
1: A cavalry (armored) unit consisting of two or more troops and headquarters and supporting arms
2: An air force unit larger than a flight and smaller than a group
3: A naval unit that is detached from the fleet for a particular task
Troop – means a group of soldiers, but is more often used to refer to a cavalry (armored) unit corresponding to an infantry company. It can consist of 3-4 armored vehicles.
Company – means a small infantry military unit; usually two or three
Platoons, probably 100 men or less, commanded by a Major or senior Captain. Artillery refers to this as a "battery", while cavalry and aviation units call it a "troop".
Platoon - a military unit that is a subdivision of a company;
usually has a headquarters and two or more squads (sections); usually commanded by a lieutenant. Typically 24-36 men.
PT - Physical Training.
Recoilless rifle – A recoilless weapon is designed to minimize recoil. The M40A1 106mm Recoilless Rifle Rocket Launcher was developed during the Korean War
and used by U.S. Marines in Vietnam. US refusal in early 1967 to supply ammunition for the 106mm recoilless rifles they had earlier sold Nigeria badly affected US-Nigerian relations when the civil war broke out.
“Glover’s Hausas” – A nickname for the constabulary force formed in 1863 to police the colony, protect British traders, and handle some raids into the hinterland. This nickname originated from the fact that Lt. Glover of the Royal Navy whose exploration ship got wrecked near Jebba on the River Niger picked up a band of run away Hausa slaves and employed them as a security force as he made his way back to the coast over Yoruba land.This unit was the ancestor of what later became the 4th Battalion of the Nigerian Army at Letmauk Barracks, Ibadan during the first republic.
____________________
RANKS IN THE NIGERIAN ARMY (adapted from British Army)
Officers.
• Field Marshal (No Nigerian has ever attained this rank)
• General
• Lieutenant General
• Major General
• Brigadier
• Colonel
• Lieutenant Colonel
• Major
• Captain
• Lieutenant
• Second Lieutenant.
Other Ranks
• Warrant Officer Class 1 (senior NCO)
• Warrant Officer Class 2 (senior NCO)
• Staff Sergeant (NCO)
• Sergeant (NCO)
• Corporal (junior NCO)
• Lance Corporal
• Private
Miscellaneous Ranks
The following ranks or appointments have been used on and off in the Nigerian Army:
1. Brigadier General, is the US equivalent of a Brigadier
2. Gunner, means a Private in the Artillery
3. Bombardier, means a Corporal in the Artillery
4. Lance Bombardier, means a Lance Corporal in the Artillery
5.Sergeant Major, can be a Warrant Officer Class 1 or Class 2
"If you want to prevent a coup, remove the cause."
The Murtala Muhammed Coup of 1975
(Part 1)
By Nowa Omoigui, MD, MPH, FACC
Murtala Muhammed (see footnote about variations in his name) was born in Kano on November 8, 1938 and attended Barewa College Zaria. In 1959, his coursemate cohort entered the Army. Initially educated at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK, as a regular combatant, he underwent subsequent courses in the teeth arm specialty of Signals. He was commissioned 2nd lieutenant in 1961, rising to the rank of Lieutenant 7 months later.
In early 1962, he served a tour of duty in the Congo as part of the UN peacekeeping force before returning to Nigeria to serve as ADC to Dr. Majekodunmi who acted as Administrator of the Western region after the declaration of a State of Emergency. Twenty eight months after commission he made the rank of Captain at which time he was given command of a signals unit at the Brigade HQ in Kaduna. By late 1964 he had been promoted temporary Major (T/Major).
He subsequently moved to Apapa in Lagos about the time his Uncle (Alhaji Inua Wada) became Defence Minister in 1965, following Ribadu's death, and was in Lagos when the first coup took place in January 1966.Indeed, without his knowledge, many soldiers from the signals unit at Apapa were used by Major Ifeajuna for Lagos operations during the first coup, a fact that proved to be a source of immense embarrassment to Muhammed.
Although still technically a substantive Captain (but T/Major), he was elevated to the rank of temporary Lt.Colonel in April 1966 by then C-in-C, Major General Aguiyi Ironsi who also made him Inspector of Signals, Nigerian Army. After the military coup d'etat of January 15, 1966, Major Murtala Muhammed played a crucial role in mobilizing opinion among northern soldiers and officers in Lagos for the second military coup.However, the coup he (along with TY Danjuma, Martin Adamu and others) planned and had postponed no less than three times, was overtaken by events on July 29, 1966, as a result of an unplanned sequence of events at Abeokuta in which Lt. Colonel Gabriel Okonweze, Major John Obienu and others were impulsively shot to death in the officer's mess by northern NCOs.
Once it became obvious to northern soldiers in Lagos that killings had started in Abeokuta, Murtala Mohammed, Martin Adamu and others got themselves organized and launched operations in Lagos to "adjust" to the situation. Meanwhile, wearing a borrowed uniform, Major TY Danjuma, who was accompanying General Ironsi on a nationwide tour, cordoned Government House Ibadan with troops from the 4th battalion and arrested the General, along with Colonel Fajuyi. Shortly thereafter, certain junior officers and NCOs pushed Danjuma aside, took control of the situation and abducted both men. They were later shot. (Other accounts of the events indicate that Danjuma actually ordered the killing of Ironsi and Fajuyi).
It was subsequently alleged that Muhammed used his key position as Inspector of Signals to communicate messages to northern conspirators in other parts of the country urging action. It was also alleged that he was the leader of the initially separatist faction among northern troops in Lagos and at one point commandeered a passenger jet to transport northerners out of Lagos back to the North in an apparent move to secede. This murky charge has never been satisfactorily explained and it is hard to get consistent accounts about it.
As things settled down after the initial orgy of killings in Abeokuta, Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna, the tentative Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (who was then Chief of Staff, Army, professionally senior to Muhammed) emerged as the choice of the northern rank and file, barely edging out the charismatic Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed from the position of C-in-C. The bad feelings generated by this power rivalry was to dog their relationship from then on. (Recent accounts at the Oputa Panel allege that Gowon was a participant in that coup.)
With Lt. Col. Hassan Katsina as the Military Governor of the North, Mohammed lay low in the background in Lagos as Lt. Col. Gowon traded banter with Lt. Col. Ojukwu and negotiated the tortuous path through various 1966 constitutional conferences and the 1967 Aburi meetings. This resulted in part because Gowon was uncomfortable with Mohammed and kept him "out of the loop". However, in the period leading up to the outbreak of hostilities with Biafra, Murtala Mohammed did not hide his feelings that peace talks or not, war was coming and that preparations be made for this inevitability.
It is alleged that some of the earliest preparations by northern civilians to import weapons privately were made at his urging. As fate would have it, Mohammed did not have long to wait. On May 30, 1967, Lt. Col. Ojukwu proclaimed the Republic of Biafra. Almost immediately, steps were taken to bring the situation under control. A total naval blockade of the bights of Benin and Biafra (later renamed 'Bonny') was ordered. The 'police action' land phase of what is now referred to as the Nigerian Civil War subsequently began on July 6, 1967.A few weeks later, faced with north-south and south-north axes of federal advance, Ojukwu took a gamble.
On Wednesday, August 9, 1967, about 3000 Biafran soldiers and militiamen, under the command of Lt. Col. ["Brigadier"] Victor Banjo, crossed the Niger Bridge at Onitsha into Asaba. The seizure of the Midwest was essentially accomplished within 12 hours. It became obvious that Ibadan and Lagos were next. Desperate for a bail out, Gowon turned to the 28 year old Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed. Aided in part by temporary hesitation on the part of the Biafran commander, Muhammed, with Patton-like boldness, hit the ground running, commandeering officers, men, supplies, mammy wagons, and weapons meant for other divisions which had been waiting for clearance at the Ports.
He practically created a new Army Division from scratch by building around a skeletal crew of units withdrawn from other fronts and local units in Lagos and Ibadan.Supported by Lt. Cols Akinrinade, Aisida and Ally as his Brigade Commanders, Muhammed launched a lightening counter-offensive, eventually checking the Biafran units at Ore as two brigades entered the Midwest from Okenne and marched southwards furiously in a flanking move toward Benin City.
The ancient city fell back to federal control at 6 p.m. on Sept 20, 1967. With supporting operations in the Delta by units of Lt. Col Adekunle's third division, much of the Midwest, except Agbor and Asaba, were cleared simultaneously.
On arrival in Benin, one of several sensational allegations made against Murtala Mohammed during his lifetime came to life. Rumors said he had organized the looting of the Central Bank in Benin. Other reports said the Treasury and Central Bank were looted of approximately $5.6 million by retreating Biafran troops under the supervision of an Igbo civil servant, on Ojukwu's orders. The money was allegedly used to support the war effort - at least until the Federal Central Bank in Lagos changed currency much later on during the course of the war. The mystery of the Benin Central bank looting was finally settled by the book by Emmanuel Okocha titled "Blood on the Niger" in which he actually named those involved.
On September 21, 1967, Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed made the following radio broadcast:
"My dear brothers and sisters of the Mid-Western State of Nigeria: On behalf of Major-General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, I, Lt.-Col. M. R. Mohammed, do hereby officially confirm the complete liberation of the Mid-Western State of Nigeria except Agbor and Asaba from rebel soldiers. The inhuman atrocities suffered by all true Mid-Westerners through the so-called Biafran soldiers, though short-lived, have shocked all Nigerians wherever they may be''.
''The molestation of innocent civilians and the looting of their property and the indiscriminate killing of men, women and children recently undertaken by the rebel troops has ended. All Mid-Westerners in the areas where the rebel troops have been crushed are free to move about as they please. No innocent citizen living in any of the mentioned areas will ever be molested again''.
''The federal troops have been warmly received by the Mid-Westerners everywhere they have gone. We appreciate the friendship of the people and I sincerely hope that this friendship will continue forever. I would like to assure the people that my soldiers will do everything in their power to maintain this friendship. With regard to Emeka Ojukwu and his rebel soldiers, I., Lt.-Col. M.R. Mohammed, do hereby assure the people of Nigeria and the people of the Mid-West in particular, that by the grace of God, we will, in a very short time, crush the rebels in the Central-Eastern State''.
''To this end, I would like to advise all innocent citizens of the Central-Eastern State to keep out of the way of the federal troops.The march to Enugu continues, and anybody that stands in the way of the federal troops will be regarded and treated as a rebel. I have already dispatched my forces to deal with the rebels around Agbor and Asaba.I would like to appeal to all my brothers and sisters in the Mid-Western State of Nigeria to assist the federal troops in locating, and in the eventual destruction of the rebels that may be hiding around the Mid-West. It is necessary to advise the people in Benin City to remain indoors from nine o'clock tonight until six o'clock tomorrow morning as mopping-up operations will continue''.
''The Administration has suffered quite a lot due to the mischief brought about by the rebel troops. On behalf of the head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, I appoint Lt.-Col. Samuel Ogbemudia as the temporary administrator of the Mid-Western State of Nigeria. All officers and men of the Nigerian Army based in the Mid-Western State of Nigeria should report for duty immediately at the Military headquarters in Benin City. Brothers and sisters of the Mid-Western State of Nigeria: May God bless you all and good luck."
Unfortunately, discipline broke down locally and reprisal killings against Igbos in Benin, deemed to have betrayed the region took place on a large scale, often coordinated with soldiers under Mohammed's command. Similar killings occurred in other Midwestern towns. To be fair to Mohammed, one can report at least one case in which he personally intervened to prevent such killings. An uncle of mine, for example, accused of protecting Igbos from execution, was himself saved from summary execution at Ugonoba by the quick intervention of Colonel Murtala Mohammed himself. But the worst was yet to come.
Upon arrival of the main spearhead of the Second division at Asaba, hundreds of able-bodied males were allegedly lined up and summarily executed, Nazi style, for "collaborating with the enemy". At least one authority opines that the delay occasioned by this exercise may have resulted in a missed opportunity by Muhammed to take Onitsha from the disorganized and retreating Biafran forces without a fight. This terrible incident was, however, never officially investigated by a Board of Inquiry nor did it lead to a court-martial, although General Gowon has since apologized for it many years after the war.
Against instructions from Supreme Headquarters, and faced with disobedience from two of his brigade commanders (Lt. Cols. Aisida and Akinrinade), followed by a near fist-fight with a fellow divisional commander (Col. Shuwa), Murtala Mohammed then tried repeatedly to conduct an assault river crossing by taking Onitsha frontally from Asaba. He lost thousands of men and millions of dollars of supplies in three carelessly planned attempts. At least one of these attempts was made on the advice of marabouts.
Eventually, he acceded to military orders to swing northwards, make an unopposed crossing at Idah, and eventually take Onitsha via a north-south coastal advance, with Col. Shuwa's 1st division protecting his eastern flank. Even then, he suffered one more humiliating loss at Abagana on March 31st 1968, when Biafran troops ambushed a logistics column seeking to link up with Major Yar'Adua's unit at Onitsha.
Gowon replaced the emotionally exhausted Mohammed as the GOC of the badly mauled second division in mid 1968 with Colonel Ibrahim Haruna. Haruna was himself later replaced on May 12, 1969 by Col. Gibson Jallo when all divisional commanders were recalled.
It is alleged that after the Abagana debacle, Mohammed simply went to Kano and then left the country on vacation to London without bothering to inform Supreme HQ. He was, however, promoted to Colonel in 1968 and reappointed to the Inspectorate of Signals.
But tensions with Gowon and Army HQ continued. At one point he accused the Ministry of Defence and its contractors of inflating the cost of weapons and ammunition, daring them to give him money to go abroad to purchase ammunition himself. As the story goes, he contacted his Uncle, Inua Wada, former civilian Minister of Defence who arranged for him to get weapons and ammunition abroad at cheaper rates, embarrassing the Army HQ in the process.
Close to the end of the war, Mohammed made another interesting move. In late 1969, he approached then Colonel Obasanjo, commander of the third division and appealed to him to slow down the rate of advance of his division, fearing that a quick victory over Ojukwu would make Gowon unapproachable by fellow officers as a victorious War Commander. What Mohammed had in mind was that senior officers should force then Major General Gowon to "share power" as a condition of cooperating with him to end the war! Obasanjo refused and pushed ahead furiously with the 3rd division's advance which eventually cut Biafra into two parts and ended the war in January 1970.
"If you want to prevent a coup, remove the cause.''
The Murtala Muhammed Coup Of 1975
Part 2
By Nowa Omoigui, MD, MPH, FACC
In 1971, Mohammed was nevertheless promoted to the rank of Brigadier. After further Army coursework abroad, he returned again as Inspector of Signals. By 1974, then General Gowon felt he either had to coopt or purge him, eventually choosing the former line of action.
On August 7, therefore, Brigadier Murtala Mohammed became the Federal Commissioner for Communications - while retaining his role as Inspector of Signals in the Army. Tensions were already building in the Army - accelerated in part by Gowon's decision, announced on October 1, 1974, to renege on his promise to hand over to civilians in 1976. But the main grouse was that officers who "fought the war" felt excluded from patronage. Several solidarity meetings of senior Army Officers were held. It is alleged that at one such meeting Brigadier Mohammed advised General Gowon: "If you want to prevent a coup, remove the cause".
In late 1974/early 1975, the cabal of civil war frontline officers who felt they had been long excluded from the corridors of power and patronage, began actively plotting to remove General Gowon from power.
These officers, including Colonels Ibrahim Taiwo, Abdulahi Mohammed and Anthony Ochefu, Lt. Cols. Shehu Yar'Adua, Ibrahim Babangida and Alfred Aduloju among others, co-opted Colonel Joseph Nanven Garba, then Federal Guards Commander.
Then they approached Brigadier Murtala Mohammed for blessing. He reportedly told them that he would not actively join them but would do everything to 'save their necks' if they failed. They timed their coup to coincide with the absence of General Gowon at an OAU meeting in Kampala, Uganda on July 29, 1975. Mohammed took the precaution of arranging an official trip to London to avoid being asked to accompany Gowon to Kampala.
Once Colonel Garba went on air in Lagos, a plane left London for Nigeria and was allowed to land in Kano even though all airports were theoretically closed at the time. That plane had an important passenger - Brigadier Murtala Ramat Muhammed. After a serious misunderstanding with the coupists, in which they almost decided to drop him as their choice to lead the country, Brigadier Murtala Muhammed finally agreed to accept the position of Head of State on their condition - that he would share power in a trioka with Brigadiers Obasanjo (who was senior to him) and Danjuma (who was junior to him). Muhammed had initially wanted absolute executive power.
On July 30, 1975 he delivered the following address:
"Fellow Nigerians'
Events of the past few years have indicated that despite our great human and material resources, the Government has not been able to fulfill the legitimate expectations of our people. Nigeria has been left to drift. This situation, if not arrested, would inevitably have resulted in chaos and even bloodshed.In the endeavour to build a strong, united and virile nation, Nigerians have shed much blood. The thought of further bloodshed, for whatever reasons must, I am sure, be revolting to our people. The Armed Forces, having examined the situation, came to the conclusion that certain changes were inevitable.
After the civil war, the affairs of state, hitherto a collective responsibility, became characterized by lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline and even neglect. Indeed, the public at large became disillusioned and disappointed by these developments.This trend was clearly incompatible with the philosophy and image of a corrective regime. Unknown to the general public, the feeling of disillusionment was also evident among members of the armed forces whose administration was neglected but who, out of sheer loyalty to the Nation, and in the hope that there would be a change, continued to suffer in silence.
Things got to a stage where the head of administration became virtually inaccessible even to official advisers; and when advice was tendered, it was often ignored.
Responsible opinion, including advice by eminent Nigerians, traditional rulers, intellectuals, et cetera, was similarly discarded. The leadership, either by design or default, had become too insensitive to the true feelings and yearnings of the people. The nation was thus plunged inexorably into chaos.
It was obvious that matters could not, and should not, be allowed in this manner, and in order to give the nation a new lease of life, and sense of direction, the following decisions were taken:
1. The removal of General Yakubu Gowon as Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
2. The retirement of General Yakubu Gowon from the Armed Forces in his present rank of General with full benefits, in recognition of his past services to the nation.
3. General Gowon will be free to return to the country as soon as conditions permit; he wil be free to pursue any legitimate undertakings of his choice in any part of the country. His personal safety and freedom and those of his family will be guaranteed.
4. The following members of the Armed Forces are retired with immediate effect:
Vice Admiral JEA Wey - Chief of Staff, Supreme HQ, Major-General Hassan Katsina - Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme HQ, Major-General David Ejoor - Chief of Staff (Army), Rear Admiral Nelson Soroh - Chief of Naval Staff, Brigadier EE Ikwue - Chief of Air Staff, and all other officers of the rank of major general (or equivalent) and above.
Alhaji Kam Salem - Inspector General of Police, Chief TA Fagbola - Deputy Inspector General of Police
5. Also with immediate effect, all the present Military Governors, and the Administrator of East Central State, have been relieved of their appointments and retired.
6. As you are already aware, new appointments have been made as follows:
Brigadier TY Danjuma - Chief of Army Staff, Colonel John Yisa Doko - Chief of Air Staff, Commodore Michael Adelanwa - Chief of Naval Staff, Mr. MD Yusuf - Inspector General of Police
New Military Governors have also been appointed for the States as follows:
1. Lt. Col. Muhammed Buhari, North East 2. Colonel George Innih, Midwest 3. Lt. Col. Sani Bello, Kano 4. Captain Adekunle Lawal (Navy), Lagos 5. Lt. Col. Paul Omu, South East 6. Colonel Ibrahim Taiwo, Kwara 7. Captain Akin Aduwo, (Navy), West 8. Col. Anthony Ochefu, East Central 9. Lt. Col. Usman Jibrin, North central 10. Col. Abdullahi Mohammed, Benue-Plateau 11.Lt. Col. Umaru Mohammed, North West 12. Lt. Col. Zamani Lekwot, Rivers The Structure of Government has been reorganized.There will now be three organs of government at the federal level namely,
(i) The Supreme Military Council
(ii) The National Council of States
(iii) The Federal Executive Council
There will of course continue to be Executive Councils at the State level. The reconstituted Supreme Military Council will comprise the following:
The Head of State and C-in-C of the Armed Forces
Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo - Chief of Staff, SHQ
Brigadier TY Danjuma - Chief of Army Staff Commodore
Michael Adelanwa - Chief of Naval Staff
Col. John Yisa Doko - Chief of Air Staff
Mr. MD Yusuf - IG of Police GOCs -
1st Division, Brigadier Julius Akinrinade
2nd Division, Brigadier Martin Adamu
3rd Division, Brigadier Emmanuel Abisoye L.G.O., Brigadier John Obada
Colonel Joseph Garba
Lt. Col Shehu YarAdua
Brigadier James Oluleye
Brigadier Iliya Bisalla
Colonel Ibrahim Babangida
Lt. Col Muktar Muhammed
Colonel Dan Suleiman
Captain Olufemi Olumide (NN)
Captain H Husaini Abdullahi (NN)
Mr. Adamu Suleman, Commissioner of Police
Lt. Col. Alfred Aduloju
Lt. Commander Godwin Kanu (NN)
All the civil commissioners in the Federal Executive Council are relieved of their appointments with immediate effect. The composition of the new Executive Council will be announced shortly.
Political Programme
We will review the political programme and make an announcement in due course. In the meantime, a panel will be set up to advise on the question of new states. A panel will also be set up to advise on the question of the federal capital.
With due regard to the 1973 population census, it is now clear that whatever results are announced will not command general acceptance throughout the country. It has, therefore, been decided to cancel the 1973 population census. Accordingly, for planning purposes, the 1963 census figures shall continue to be used.
A panel will be set up to advise on the future of the Interim Common Services Agency (ICSA) and the Eastern States Interim Assets and Liability Agency (ESIALA).
The Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture is postponed in view of the obvious difficulties in providing all the necessary facilities. Consultations will be held with other participating countries with a view to fixing a new date.
Finally, we reaffirm this country's friendship with all countries. Foreign nationals living in Nigeria will be protected. Foreign investments will also be protected. The government will honour all obligations entered into by the previous Governments of the Federation. We will also give continued support to the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations Organization, and the Commonwealth.
Fellow Countrymen, the task ahead of us calls for sacrifice and self discipline at all levels of our society. This government will not tolerate indiscipline. The Government will not condone abuse of office.
I appeal to you all to cooperate with the Government in our endeavour to give this nation a new lease of life. This change of Government has been accomplished without shedding any blood; and we intend to keep it so.
Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria."
With dizzying speed, a series of initiatives were announced, including a mass purge of the civil service and parastatals, often without regard for due process.Probes of former officials were similarly flawed - although popular at the time. Witchhunting was the rule rather the exception. But not all that was done was inherently reckless or impulsive.
Muhammed launched an assertive foreign policy, recognizing the MPLA government in Angola, for example. However, it is unfortunate that the war in Angola continues to this day.
Although unpopular within the military, a gradual program for inevitable Army demobilization was announced.
A 50-man Constitution Drafting Committee was appointed - although some to this day would have preferred that it was elected or that its recommendations should have been approved by plebiscite.
Panels were set up to advise on assets investigation of some former public officers, abandoned properties in the three Eastern States, the location of the Federal Capital and creation of more states.
The administration announced a "low profile" policy for public officers and Muhammed chose to stay at his home in Ikoyi rather than move into the more fortified Dodan Barracks residence. He occasionally startled observers by showing up at the Polo ground (for example) without protection! In the weeks leading to his assassination he was warned to be more cautious but brushed aside all admonitions.
In January 1976, Murtala Muhammed was promoted to the rank of full General (four stars). TY Danjuma and O Obasanjo were also promoted to the rank of Lt. Generals - in a move that proved to be controversial within the uppermost echelons of the military.
As Chief of Army Staff, for example, Danjuma (who was originally a Short Service Officer trained at Mons OCS Aldershot) became senior to his own Defence Minister, Major General Iliya Bissalla (a Sandhurst trained Regular Officer) who was originally senior to him, had commanded him during the civil war, and was still in active service. On February 3, 1976, following recommendations of the Aguda panel, General Murtala Muhammed announced that the Federal Capital would be moved "to a federal territory of about 8,000 square kilometres in the central part of the country." No plebiscite has ever been organized to approve this momentous decision.
Subsequently, seven (7) new states were created and a political transition program announced which was scheduled to end with hand-over to civilians on October 1, 1979.
Unfortunately, he did not to live to see the outcome of his efforts. General Murtala Muhammed was assassinated in the early morning hours of February 13, 1976.
The coup attempt eventually failed, crushed by forces rallied by Lt. General TY Danjuma, Chief of Army Staff. Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo became the Head of State. Lt. Col. Shehu Yar'Adua, one of the original leaders of the July 1975 coup, was promoted in an ethno-religious balancing move to the rank of Brigadier and appointed Chief of Staff SHQ.
The Defence Minister, Major General Bissalla was arrested and shot for his alleged role in the plot, along with Lt. Col. Dimka and many others, some controversial to this day. Efforts to extradite Muhammed's old rival, General Yakubu Gowon, from the UK to stand trial for allegedly being involved in the plot failed. He was subsequently dismissed in absentia from the Army, but later pardoned by President Shehu Shagari after the military left office.
General Murtala Ramat Muhammed's colorful life thus came to a tragic end at the tender age of 38 years.Many monuments in the country are dedicated to his memory, including the International Airport in Lagos and a park in Benin City. Note (1): In his early years General Murtala Muhammed was known as Murtala Rufai Mohammed. He changed this to Murtala Ramat Muhammed when he came to office as Head of State.
To be continued in Part 6
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